II. To the Principal Arguments

61. To the principal arguments:

As to all the authorities [nn.2-5] I concede what they assume, that in the sensitive appetite there is some quality that can be called a virtue; however, this quality has the idea of virtue less perfectly than the quality in the will that inclines to choice.

62. To the last argument [n.6], about the irascible and concupiscible powers, I say that these are not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the will. And when you make objection about the objects of the arduous and the delightful [n.6] - whether these are the objects or not will be dealt with in the next question [d.34 nn.38-49]; a distinction can be found of this sort on the part of the objects in relation to the will just as on the part of the sensitive appetite.

63. To the next one,This argument is not found in the Ordinatio but in the Lectura d.33 n.6 (a peculiarity found elsewhere in the Ordinatio). ⁷ when it is argued that the will is made sufficiently perfect by theological virtue, I reply that this is true in respect of the divine good but not in respect of any other good save in its order to ‘loving God’, so that no act is elicited by charity save one whose object (at which it stops) is God himself - though this is done through other intermediate objects. Now not only can I rightly will a good for myself by willing rightly that ‘I will God’, but I can also will ‘this particular good’ insofar as it has the sort of goodness agreeable to me according to its proper idea; and thus to will ‘this particular good’ belongs to the will from a different habit.

64. And if you object that ‘the habit will not be the idea of referring things to God, so it will not be a right habit, because its act seems to be an enjoying of created goods’ - I reply that an inferior habit does not of itself possess the act of a higher habit; but charity, which is a higher habit, does have this habit of ‘referring things immediately to God’. No other habit, therefore, properly possesses of itself this referring of things, but only has of itself its own proper act of loving this particular good, which particular good has to be carried beyond by charity. Nor does it follow from this that the inferior habit is bad, nor that it is a principle of loving a created good, because although it does not, by enjoying created goods, fail to refer them, yet neither does it oppose the referring, namely by repudiating it. But ‘to enjoy’ includes not only ‘not to refer’ but also what is opposed to referring, namely ‘to use contrariwise’, as was said in Ord. I d.1 nn.16. 66, 68, 180, 186 on ‘enjoying’ [cf. also II d.41 nn.10-11].

65. To the argument from the Politics [n.5] about despotic rule, a response is that the Philosopher thought the condition of corrupted human nature was also the condition of nature as first instituted.

66. However, something different was said on this in II d.29 nn.8-18 -about how the inferior appetite was then of a nature to possess delight and how it could be moved concordantly with the will, but in such a way that some virtue could have existed in both appetites. Or how this could have been so unless perhaps original justice caused in the will a more perfect dominion over the sensitive appetite and could at once use it as a slave. But even so one would not, as it seems, preserve the fact that the sensitive appetite would (however much the will dominated over it) still have delight, unless there was in the sensitive appetite some habit inclining it to such motion - in the way that if, in wanting you to choose rightly in the case of some passion, I could generate from this some moral virtue in myself.

67. By holding to this way of understanding things [n.66], one can draw a distinction between will as nature, will as free, and will as deliberative.

68. In the first way virtue is denied of the will, because in this way the will naturally tends to the end, and to every good shown to it such that the end shines out in it. On account of this natural determination a virtue is not required in the will as such.

69. Nor too is there virtue in the will as it is free, because virtue inclines by way of nature and the will, as free, is not of a nature to be moved naturally. For if it could be inclined naturally then it could, as free, be necessitated.

70. In the third way, then, namely as the will is deliberative with respect to what is for the end (and not with respect to the end), moral virtue will exist in it.

71. Add that virtue moves by way of nature, because it moves suddenly. Hence, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 3.9.1115a32-34, “if in sudden perils one is fearless, one most of all appears brave.”

72. Against this [nn.67-71]

First because the will as ‘nature’ [n.68] does not elicit any act, as was said in III d.15 nn.48-50. Therefore, it does not as nature tend to any object, whether to the end or to something else (as to an elicited act); rather it tends only by way of natural inclination, as a heavy object is said to be tending downwards even though it is stationary above.

73. Against the other two members [n.67]: the one seems to include the other, for the will is ‘free’ as it is ‘deliberative’. For it is called deliberative either insofar as it prescribes deliberation, or insofar as it chooses with preceding deliberation. Both of these belong to the will insofar as it is free, because the will freely commands choice. And therefrom it follows that to deny there is virtue in the will as the will is free, and to concede there is virtue in it as it is deliberative, is contradictory.

74. Also the proof [n.69] that virtue is not in the will as it is free because then it could be necessitated, is not conclusive, because a superior agent (in whose virtue is the action of an inferior agent) cannot be necessitated by the inferior agent; but virtue, if it is in any way an agent for an act, is an inferior agent, as was said in I d.17 nn.53, 66-67 (about habit). And it was said there too [ibid. nn.28-30] how a habit is not repugnant to free acting, and yet that a habit acts in the will with respect to the same effect by way of nature.

75. In a like manner too can one reject the argument [n.71] that there is no virtue in the will as deliberative if it is true that virtue acts suddenly, preceding deliberation (for the will as deliberative does not seem to act suddenly and to forestall deliberation).

76. But one should not rely on this, for the word ‘suddenly’ needs to be explained, since absolutely speaking no one acts virtuously save from deliberation. For just as one does not act humanly if one does not act understandingly, so (as regard what is for the end) one does not act well humanly if one does not understand what one is acting for the sake of; and this ‘understanding’ is a

‘deliberating’. So hence a virtuous man does not act suddenly and without deliberation the way nature does (Aquinas Physics II lect. 14 n.8).

77. The statement of the Philosopher then [n.71] must be understood as follows, that just as a virtuous man, when shown an object, is inclined to choose rightly from having a right habit, so also is he directed by prudence to at once giving a right command about choosing it; and he deliberates imperceptibly, as it were, because of his promptness for practical syllogizing. But someone else, who is imperfect, does practical syllogizing with difficulty and delay, because he does not have habits in practice perfectly. And if he does at last choose rightly, he is not said to act suddenly, but slowly; while someone else who is perfect is said, in respect of the former, to act suddenly, because he acts as it were in imperceptible time.