D. Objections against Scotus’ own Solution

46. Against the first part [nn.43-44] an objection is raised that then, on this account, there could be moral virtues in an angel [cf. n.14]. The proof is that an angel can have a right act of will about things that sensitive appetite is naturally excited to have a passion about, and so from many such right acts of will a virtue would be generated in the angel. There is a confirmation, that it is possible not only to have right choice about passions present in the sensitive part but also about passions shown by the intellect, even though they will never be and never were there present, as was touched on in the question on practical knowledge in Prol. n.288. Therefore, from such choices a virtue is generated in the will and there is no concomitant virtue in the sensitive appetite.

47. Further, if moral virtue were in the will, then it would be nobler than prudence, because the perfection of a nobler perfectible power is itself nobler [cf. Prol. n.353]. The consequent is against the Philosopher in Ethics 6.11.1143a8-9; so the antecedent is too.

48. An argument against the second part [n.45] is that if, by the sole fact that the sensitive appetite is moved by command of the will, a quality can be generated in that appetite inclining it to similar acts, and if that quality is a virtue, then by parity of reason a moral habit can be generated in the part of the body that is moved frequently by command of the will; and not only so, but also in the inanimate and irrational things that the will uses.