3. Against the Conclusion of Aquinas’ Opinion

38. One can, in addition to these arguments [nn.15-37], argue against the holder of this opinion as follows: If, according to him, ‘in the state of innocence there would not be in the sensitive appetite any passion repugnant to right reason’ [Aquinas ST Ia q.95 a.2], there would be no need to posit virtue in the sensitive appetite; and yet the virtues did then exist, because man was then perfect in accord with them - from the Master in the text.

39. There is also the authority Augustine in Letter 35 or 36 [Letter 155 to Macedonius 3.12: “There will be one virtue there, and it will be both virtue and the reward of virtue. It will be prudence...and courage...and temperance...and justice”].

40. Also in his Soliloquies I. 6.13, “Perfect reason is the soul reaching its end.”

41. Again in his City of God 11.15 [14.6: “Love itself is to be loved, whereby that is loved well which should be loved, so that the virtue by which we live well may be in us”].

42. Again the Master lists the acts that can remain in the fatherland, and they are not acts of the sensitive appetite.