II. To the Principal Arguments of Both Parts

23. To the first argument [n.2] I say that a habit possesses something of perfection, and to this extent it is posited in God. But to the extent it requires imperfection (because it requires a power that is perfectible in act), it is not in God. For he is identically the same as his power, and the same as his act, since whatever is in him is of itself formally infinite.

24. To the second [n.3] I say that though inanimate things properly are not lovable out of charity (for charity is a friendship and no friendship is properly to be had with them), yet I can have for them out of charity some ‘willing’ of the sort that should be had for them out of charity. For I can out of charity want a tree to be and want a tree to serve me for such and such an act, insofar as such an act aids me to love God in himself. And in this way it can be admitted that God loves all things out of charity, not by a will of friendship but by the sort of will that should be had with respect to them.

25. The third argument [n.4] proves inequality as to the goods willed for those who are loved. For God does not will as great goods for the non-predestined as he wills for the predestined, and he does not will for those with whom he is said to be angry (at the time when he is said to be angry) as much good as he wills for those with whom he is not said to be angry. And this inequality of love, that is, the effect of love, must be admitted to hold not only as to degrees of nature but also within individuals of the same species. Nor is the reason for this the nature in this thing or that, but the divine will alone [cf. I d.41 n.53].

26. The argument to the opposite about ‘understanding’ [n.5] only proves equality of the act as it is the act of the one understanding, and not as it ranges over its objects.