2. On Positive Acts of Love

29. If we speak about the other way of taking the precept, namely positive acts of loving an enemy [n.13]: It could be said that eliciting at some time an act of love of a neighbor is not binding on anyone, for one is not bound even to think about him - for example if one were so occupied in contemplation of God that one never thought with full deliberation about one’s neighbor. But if one should think about a neighbor, it is not necessary to elicit an act of love of him, for even without this one can perform acts properly ordered to the end and to what is necessary to attain the end. Accordingly, one is much less bound to elicit an act of love of an enemy, because one is not bound even to think of him.

30. However one can, by moderating this reply, say that if some need of one’s neighbor or an enemy is evident to anyone, for example that without our help he could not have what was necessary for attaining love of God (suppose he is an infidel and that without our teaching him he could not be converted to the truth; or suppose he is wicked and that without o correction he cannot be converted to the good - which may perhaps, however, never happen), then one is bound to want not only the final good for one’s neighbor but also the goods necessary for him to attain the final good. And one is bound to want it not only by exterior volition but also by pursuing it with effective action, if one has the power.

31. But as to riches or health, the opposite of which one can will for him, as was said before [n.17], one is not bound positively to want them for him in some particular case.

32. As for spiritual goods, one is bound to want them for him not only with interior will but also with effective exterior action, in particular in the respect that one is bound to adore and pray to God on his behalf and on behalf of the whole Church. In this prayer one is bound to want the Church to be powerful as to spiritual good for everyone, good and bad. For just as a stomach would be bad that did not want its support to be strong enough to sustain the hand, so would he not be a good a member in the Church who did not want his good acts (if he has any) to prevail for every member of the Church, insofar as God accepts them and insofar as one is able to sustain himself and others (for one is never bound to want simply that which one can will the opposite of).

33. But as to bodily life, one is perhaps bound to want it with exterior as well as interior acts - especially if one can save a life and there is no one else nearby at the time able to help. For example, if someone were about to die of famine or drown in a river and only oneself were present to relieve his hunger or snatch him from the river, one would be bound then not only to want life for him but also, in order to assure it, to labor for it with all one’s strength.

34. How to prove this, however, does not seem very clear either from Scripture or from reason. For if the person in need were in danger of death then, supposing he were good, he would [by dying] attain to perfect love of God in the fatherland, whereas if his bodily life was saved he might perhaps fall afterwards into sin and end in final evil. But it is pious to think piously about saving the life of a neighbor, because one must make the supposition that, if he is good, he could become better and his goodness will be valuable for himself and others; or if he is evil one must make the supposition that he will be corrected. For to judge piously is this, to interpret things always for the better when the opposite is not manifest.