b. As concerns Indifferent Goods

16. But as for the other goods, the indifferent ones, it seems I could hate them for my neighbor, both because I can rightly hate or not want them for myself, and because he can rightly not want them for himself. And whatever he can rightly not want for himself he can rightly not want for another, for whatever I can rightly not want for myself if I were as he is, I can rightly not want for myself.

17. The assumption just made is plain, for I can want myself not to have riches or health or things universally necessary for bodily life, and I can rightly do this in two ways: either first by despising them (for example, if I were to become a pauper voluntarily), or second by wanting God to inflict the loss of them on me because of my sins or, if I am to have them inflicted, to accept them willingly and to rejoice while they are being inflicted.

18. So likewise I can in as many ways will these things, namely voluntary poverty and thus loss of riches, for someone else. I can even want certain evils, I mean temporal evils, to be inflicted by God on someone for his emendation and correction. And if the evils have already been inflicted I can still want them for him by approving the divine judgment and being glad about them. And not only in these ways can I want for him such extrinsic disadvantages, but also, if I believe that, because of temporal advantages, he will always be adding to his sins, I can want for him the evils opposite to these advantages. And this holds in like manner of the goods of fortune and of the goods of the body.