1. Three Ways or Opinions, from Others

18. About the second article [n.13], it seems that one of the following ways must be held: that the formal object of this sort of habit is God in himself according to his absolute idea [n.20], or that it is God insofar as he is agreeable to the lover [n.19], or third insofar as it includes both, namely as it is a certain infinite good in itself of which the lover is a sort of participation, in the way that the finite is a certain participation in the infinite good.

19. The second way [Aquinas] would thus posit that God, although insofar he is the good of the creature, as giving the creature its being, he is to be loved with natural love, yet insofar as he gives beatific being he is to be loved with charity, and so the object of charity would be God insofar as he is the beatific object of the lover.

20. The first way [n.18] would be posited because of what has just been touched upon [n.19], for it is not enough for someone’s being supremely loved that he be alone in himself the supreme good (as the infinite Good), but there is need in addition that he be the good of this lover insofar as he is participated by the lover.