I. To the Question

13. In this question three things must be looked at: first, because habits are manifested by acts, one must look at the act ‘loving God above all things’, as to whether it is a right act such that there could be a virtue for it; second, about the formal idea of the object of this act and of the habit that inclines one to first act; third, whether nature without an infused habit is capable of this act.

A. Loving God above All Things is a Right Act

14. About the first article [n.13] I say that the love God above all things is an act conform to right reason which bids what is best to be supremely loved, and so it is an act that is of itself right; indeed its rectitude is self-evident (as the rectitude of the first principle in matters of action); for something is to be supremely loved and nothing other than the supreme Good, just as nothing other than the supreme truth is to be most held true in the intellect. There is a confirmation too, that moral precepts belong to the law of nature, and consequently ‘Love the Lord your God etc.’ belongs to the law of nature, and so it is known that this act is right.

15. From this follow that there can be a virtue naturally inclining one to this act - and that a theological virtue, for it is about a theological object, namely God, immediately. Nor is this all, but it also rests immediately on the first rule of human acts, and it has to be infused by God; for this rule is of a nature to perfect the higher part of the soul, which is not perfected most perfectly save immediately by God.

16. This virtue is distinct from faith, because its act is not understanding or believing. It is also distinct from hope for its act is not to desire a good for the lover insofar as it is of advantage to the lover, but it tends to the object in itself, even if the advantage for the lover were, per impossibile, to be removed.

17. This virtue, then, which perfects the will insofar as it has the affection of justice, I call char