I. To the Question

13. In this question three things must be looked at: first, because habits are manifested by acts, one must look at the act ‘loving God above all things’, as to whether it is a right act such that there could be a virtue for it; second, about the formal idea of the object of this act and of the habit that inclines one to first act; third, whether nature without an infused habit is capable of this act.

A. Loving God above All Things is a Right Act

14. About the first article [n.13] I say that the love God above all things is an act conform to right reason which bids what is best to be supremely loved, and so it is an act that is of itself right; indeed its rectitude is self-evident (as the rectitude of the first principle in matters of action); for something is to be supremely loved and nothing other than the supreme Good, just as nothing other than the supreme truth is to be most held true in the intellect. There is a confirmation too, that moral precepts belong to the law of nature, and consequently ‘Love the Lord your God etc.’ belongs to the law of nature, and so it is known that this act is right.

15. From this follow that there can be a virtue naturally inclining one to this act - and that a theological virtue, for it is about a theological object, namely God, immediately. Nor is this all, but it also rests immediately on the first rule of human acts, and it has to be infused by God; for this rule is of a nature to perfect the higher part of the soul, which is not perfected most perfectly save immediately by God.

16. This virtue is distinct from faith, because its act is not understanding or believing. It is also distinct from hope for its act is not to desire a good for the lover insofar as it is of advantage to the lover, but it tends to the object in itself, even if the advantage for the lover were, per impossibile, to be removed.

17. This virtue, then, which perfects the will insofar as it has the affection of justice, I call charity.

B. On the Formal Object of this Act

1. Three Ways or Opinions, from Others

18. About the second article [n.13], it seems that one of the following ways must be held: that the formal object of this sort of habit is God in himself according to his absolute idea [n.20], or that it is God insofar as he is agreeable to the lover [n.19], or third insofar as it includes both, namely as it is a certain infinite good in itself of which the lover is a sort of participation, in the way that the finite is a certain participation in the infinite good.

19. The second way [Aquinas] would thus posit that God, although insofar he is the good of the creature, as giving the creature its being, he is to be loved with natural love, yet insofar as he gives beatific being he is to be loved with charity, and so the object of charity would be God insofar as he is the beatific object of the lover.

20. The first way [n.18] would be posited because of what has just been touched upon [n.19], for it is not enough for someone’s being supremely loved that he be alone in himself the supreme good (as the infinite Good), but there is need in addition that he be the good of this lover insofar as he is participated by the lover.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

21. Argument against the first way [n.18] is that then, if there were, per impossibile, another God, he should be loved above all things with charity -which seems unacceptable of itself. It also seems unacceptable by reason, because there cannot be two things that are lovable above all things, because each would be loved above the other, and then one and the same thing would be loved above itself.

22. Second, because if the idea of ‘the simply good’ is the idea of the good lovable above all things, then the idea of a greater good is the idea of a greater lovable - and thus everyone would be obliged to love more than himself a neighbor better than himself, which does not seem probable.

23. The second way [n.19] does not seem probable because the act of charity - if it is perfect - has regard to God under the most perfect idea of lovability; but the most perfect idea of lovability in God is not the comparison of him to any creature but is some idea of lovability in itself; for an ‘in itself’ is absolutely better than any relation to another could be.

24. Further, if the supreme good, insofar as it is beatific, is the principal object of charity, I ask what is the beatific thing: is it an aptitudinal respect whereby it is of a nature to beatify, or is it an actual respect whereby, namely, it does actually beatify?

If in the first way, and the aptitude is not the reason for terminating a perfect act perfectly save by reason of the nature that such an aptitude belongs to (just as neither is any aptitude in itself universally a perfection but does necessarily carry with it the nature that it is present in) - then to say that God is thus the beatific object of charity is to say that he is, as far as he is of such a nature, the object of charity.

The second way does not seem probable, because the relation that is in the object insofar as it actually beatifies follows the act; for there is in the object no difference between the actual and aptitudinal respect, save because the act is elicited about the object; therefore to say this would be to posit that - insofar as it terminates the act elicited by charity - it would have the formal idea of the object of the act. Likewise ‘to desire the good for this person’ belongs to the affection for advantage, and according to this affection the will is not perfected by charity.

25. Besides both actual and aptitudinal beatitude, if it states anything in God, states precisely a relation of reason, actual or aptitudinal; no respect of reason can be the formal idea terminating the act of charity.

26. And the arguments touched in 1 Prol. nn.164-166 can be adduce