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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 26 - 40.
Book 3. Distinctions 26 - 40
Twenty Sixth Distinction
Single Question. Whether Hope is a Theological Virtue distinct from Faith and Charity
I. Various Possible Solutions
C. Third Way, which is that of Henry of Ghent
2. Rejection of it

2. Rejection of it

33. Argument against this opinion.

And first against the first reasoning, which proceeds on the basis of the objects [n.28]. Since the point about ‘the difficult good’ can be understood well or badly, I ask what you mean by ‘difficult good’: whether an absent good, or not only absent but exceeding the faculty of the power for which it is said to be hard, or thirdly a valuable, that is desirable, good as it exceeds everything else that is contrary to it? If the first way then there will be no irascible power in the fatherland and consequently possession will not succeed to hope, for it would be necessary for possession to be in the same power as hope is if it is to succeed to it, and so it would have for object a difficult good that is absent, if this is how the word ‘difficult’ is to be understood - but this is false, for in the fatherland no desirable good will be absent. If in the second way then there would be no irascible power in God, for there is no object that is excessive for him; the consequent is false because if, in those who have hope, hope is a habit of the irascible part, then possession regards the same part; but it does not seem that God is to be denied possession with respect to himself. If in the third way, the object of hope is not rightly posited as ‘difficult’ in distinction from the object of charity, for charity most of all the virtues regards God under the idea of the valuable, because it regards him under the idea of the infinite good (On the Trinity 15.18).

34. Further, being valuable is understood of the object either actually or aptitudinally. If aptitudinally, because it is naturally apt to be thus valued, then this seems chiefly to belong to the object of charity, for - as was said [n.33] -charity most of all regards its object under the idea of infinite Good in itself. If actually, that is because the will does in fact thus value it, this valuing is badly assigned as the idea of the object of a power, for this actual valuing is because the will values the object in its act; so only this passive actual valuing is what is consequent in the act, but the formal idea of the object of any power necessarily naturally precedes the act of the power; but valuing cannot naturally be the idea of the object of a power or force.

35. Further, the act adequate to the irascible power is ‘to be irate’, just as the act adequate to the intellect is ‘to understand’; but being irate cannot have the difficult good for object, and cannot have it in any of the ways stated [n.33]. For according to the Philosopher in his Rhetoric 2.2.1378a31, ‘to be irate is to desire revenge or punishment’. This ‘desire’ takes for object either the punishment itself, or the one to be punished; neither is valuable; therefore the irascible power does not take the difficult good for object. - This argument disproves the second reason for the above position [n.29], for if ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power [n.29], it follows that it is not distinguished from the concupiscible power by reason of a difficult good distinct from the pleasing good.

36. Against the third reason [n.30] the argument is that although what is of a nature to impede, through a positive act, the delight of any power must be subdued by some act that makes the power to enjoy in peace, yet what is not of a nature to impede save by way of privation does not need to be subdued positively but only privatively, namely by flight; now a vicious act does not positively attack the ordered delight of the concupiscible power, for the act that quasi-impedes the ordered act of the concupiscible power does not arise at the same time; therefore there is no need to subdue it save privatively, namely by fleeing it or preventing it happening. But fleeing the dishonorable belongs to that to which desiring the honorable belongs; therefore the concupiscible power is what subdues. - Besides, the concupiscible is posited as not fighting back or fighting for, because fighting back impedes delight [n.30], and yet later in the account it is said that the concupiscible power is defended by the irascible so that it is not perturbed in its delight; these two things seem to be opposites, namely that the power that does the fighting for impedes the concupiscible power and that it does not impede it but preserves it in its delight.

37. From this fact the fourth reason is refuted, which assigns these diverse acts to the irascible force [n.31]. It could also be argued that some of these acts do not belong to the irascible, at any rate in the sense part, which has no act about the future as future.

38. What is added in the first reason [n.28] - that the concupiscible power wants some good desired by the one desiring as advantageous for him - seems improbable, because the concupiscible is not denied existence in God as neither is the most perfect delight, and yet God does not desire anything as advantageous to him, because no other things are advantageous to him.

39. To this extent therefore, the doubt can be dismissed as to whether the irascible and concupiscible exist in the will (up to distinction 34, nn.48-50); and if they should be posited in the will, they seem to be posited because of the distinction between the moral virtues that perfect the will [d.34 n.51], and not because of the distinction between the theological virtues (namely hope and charity) as this opinion supposes [supra n.27].

40. Further, just as force presupposes power so object presupposes object; therefore the act of the force presupposes the act of the power about its object along with something added [infra nn. 90-99]; but such an addition is universally more noble (the point is evident in all acts that mutually add to each other); therefore if the irascible is the force and the concupiscible the power, the act of hope would be simply more noble than the act of charity, which is false.