3. To the Arguments for Henry’s Opinion

34. Hereby is plain the answer to certain things touched on for the first opinion, that is, for the possibility of virtue’s falling away [n.16]. This is false of virtue, for virtue does not fall away, but he who has virtue can, through deficiency in another virtue, fall away as regard the matter of that other virtue. But the virtue is not for this reason imperfect, because it is not virtue’s job to direct man about everything but about its own proper objects (just as he who cannot see does not fall away more in hearing than if he could see, but rather he falls away in sensing).

35. If it be argued against this that thus a virtue is easy to lose and so is not a virtue, I deny the antecedent; on the contrary although falling away happen contrary to a virtue’s inclination, the good disposition is not corrupted save by many sins or vices, or by a few intense ones.

36. And the same point makes plain the response to what was said about delightful activity [n.18], for one does act delightfully as to the matter of the relevant virtue taken precisely [n.17]. It is pleasant, I mean, for him to abstain from the works of intemperance, but it is not pleasant for him to undergo terrible things, because he is not in an orderly state with respect to them. Therefore, in sadness he commits an act of intemperance because it is against his habit; but because it would be sadder for him to endure terrible things, he flees what is sadder and in a way chooses involuntarily the less sad so as not to fall into the more sad. I concede therefore that such a person is imperfect and acts sadly; but he is not imperfect, nor does he act sadly about the matter of his virtue [sc. of temperance], save only per accidens, because it is accompanied by another matter [sc. enduring terrible things], about which he is not virtuously disposed so as to act virtuously and delightfully with respect to it.

37. The same makes plain the answer to the point about the end of the moral virtues [n.19], because a single virtue does not lead one perfectly to the end of the virtues, just as neither does a single sensitive power lead man perfectly to the perfect act of sensing. But each virtue leads one as far as is it can, and all are required for leading one perfectly to act virtuously or delightfully. I concede therefore that one virtue does not lead one sufficiently to the end but - as far as in it lies - leads one sufficiently to the end, namely it suffices for the perfection of such virtue.

38. To the first argument that is added there from Blessed Augustine [n.16], I say that the Philosopher does not say in the Categories that a habit cannot be lost, but that it can with difficulty be lost. Although therefore a virtue could be lost and so he who has it could fall away, the virtue itself indeed does not fall away, but he who has it draws back from the peak of virtue. However it does not follow that his virtue was not virtue, even perfect virtue, according to the idea of habit, because it was not incapable of being lost but capable with difficulty of being lost. What therefore Augustine [Paulinus] says about charity needs to be understood as that someone was truly in charity who yet afterwards sinned mortally; but the charity was not the charity which truly joins to the end, that is, to blessedness.

39. To the authorities cited there:

About Gregory [n.20] one can say that he is speaking there about the virtues as they are the principle of gaining merit; and in this way it is true that one moral virtue without another is not virtue, because merit is not gained through one virtue if the others do not accompany it. For he who has moral temperance does not gain merit if humility does not accompany him, or at least if the opposite vice is present in him.

40. The same can be said to the gloss on Revelation [n.21].

41. The same again to the Commentator on Ethics 6, about virtues being sisters to each other [n.20]. I concede that although sisters mutually aid each other for common life, yet one sister is not another, nor does one sister essentially perfect another; the virtues do thus each well help each other mutually, each in saving the other. And in this can be understood the saying of some people that one of them is not complete without another, because one is not thus well preserved without another. For to a man exposed to many temptations in diverse matters, imperfection in one matter can be an occasion for acting imperfectly in another, and a perfect disposition in one matter aids toward right action in another matter; therefore the virtues help each other as sisters. But no virtue is essentially required for the perfection of another, just as one sister is born first without another, and so on, if they cannot be generated together. But two perfect acts cannot always be had together so that through them two virtues might be generated, because one perfect act of one power would impede the act of another power; they could then be generated together?