2. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. As to this first article [nn.10-11] I concede that neither in their genera commonly assigned (as justice, fortitude, and temperance) nor in the more general ones that I assigned earlier [d.34 n.33], which is virtue as disposing affection to oneself and to another, are the moral virtues necessarily connected.

33. The evidence for this is as follows: Virtue is some perfection of man, and not total perfection because then one moral virtue would suffice. But when there are several partial perfections of something, that thing can be perfect simply according to one perfection and imperfect simply according to another - as is clear in man, whose property it is to have many organic perfections. Man can have one perfection at its highest, having nothing of another (as that he is supremely disposed to sight or touch but has nothing of hearing). One can therefore have perfection at its highest with respect to the matter of temperance, while having nothing of the perfection that would be required with respect to the matter of another perfection; and consequently one can be simply temperate, even as to any act of temperance, but not simply be moral without all the virtues (just as one is not simply a sensing thing without all the senses). Yet one is not less perfectly temperate, although one is less morally perfect (just as one is not less perfectly sighted nor less perfectly a hearer, although one is less perfectly sentient).