Thirty Fifth Distinction

Single Question. Whether Wisdom, Science, Intellect, and Counsel are Intellectual Habits

1. About the thirty fifth distinction I aska whether wisdom, science, intellect, and counsel are intellectual habits.

a.a [Interpolation] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the gifts by comparing one to another, the question asked is whether...

2. Arguments for and against - look for them [Lectura III d.35 nn.2-5]

3. The solution is plain from what was said above [d.34 n.72]: wisdom of course is an appetitive habit, namely charity, although it includes something as prior to it, namely faith, just as an act of will includes an act of intellect prior to it [d.34 n.32]. Now science and intellect are ways of speaking about perfect and imperfect habit of faith, as was said before [d.34 n.72]. Counsel, though, taken as a habit is the habit of prudence [d.34 n.70].

4. And if you object that intellect and science are not one habit, because in acquired cognition there is one habit of the principles, which is intellect, and another of the conclusions, which is science, so by similarity there is in infused knowledge one habit of knowing the articles [sc. of faith] and another habit of knowing the consequences of the articles - I reply that the consequence is not valid. For in acquired knowledge assent is made to a true proposition on account of the evidence it has from the terms. For a principle has properly one kind of evidence from its terms and the conclusion has another kind of evidence from its terms, and there is a different evidence for the two different ideas, namely mediate or immediate, caused or uncaused. And although one of the evidences is caused by the other, and so there can be different habits with respect to each of them (which habits would regard the formal idea of truth in either case respectively), yet it is not so in matters of faith. For assent is not given to something believed because of the evidence of what is believed, but because of the truthfulness of the one who reveals what is assented to [Lectura III d.23 nn.22-23]. And this veracity is the same as regard the first articles and as regard the other articles explained by them. And so there is not a different habit for one and the other, or for these and those, because there is the same object for both under the same formal idea.