III. To the Argument on behalf of the Philosopher in the First Opinion

84. To the other argument adduced on behalf of the Philosopher from the first opinion, about heroic virtue [n.10], I say that he assigns four degrees in every goodness or virtue that belong to the same specific habit, namely: perseverance, continence, temperance, and heroic virtue. The most perfect degree then, though remaining within the same species, is heroic virtue; and it perfects, as others metaphorically say [Henry of Ghent, n.9], in an un-human way, for it is not commonly a feature of man to attain to that degree of the same species.

85. And as to what is added to the opposite about bestiality [n.10], one could say similarly that it is an excess in the same species of vice; but it can be better said that it is of another species, because about another object. But from this the proposed conclusion does not follow, because it is possible to err and act viciously about many things, but only about one thing, in its perfect conditions, is it possible to act rightly [cf. I d.48 nn.3-5, II d.40 n.8-11].

86. So although bestiality is a different habit from common human vice, because it is about another object, yet it does not follow that heroic virtue is of a different species from human virtue, for heroic virtue orders man about the same object, though more excellently; nor is it manifest that this excellence cannot be realized in another degree of the same species.