B. Scotus’ own Opinion
32. To the question, therefore, as to its first article [n.8] I concede that a nature naturally fit to enjoy and being assumed and not enjoying [the Word] does not involve a contradiction, and this even if it be posited that the nature can be assumed without a created habit, as the rejected opinion [n.14] posited. But if it were posited that the nature - so that it might be assumed - must necessarily have in act the habit of glory, then, because of the reason posited against the aforesaid opinion [n.15], I do not see the necessity of it.
33. As to the second article too [n.8] I concede the reason leveled against the opinion [n.25], because a created nature can depend not only with the dependence of caused on cause but with the dependence of what can have a hypostasis on the hypostasis, because a created nature does not have in itself anything whereby such dependence might be repugnant to it; and the Word can terminate this dependence, because, although there not be in it a distinct idea of hypostasis and person, yet it has in itself whatever is required for person and hypostasis in the way person terminates as perfectly as if he were not a person.