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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17. > book 3. distinctions 1 - 17 > second part. on the fact of the incarnation > single question. whether the formal reason of being the term for the union of the human nature with the word is the word’s relative property > i. to the question > a. what the property is that constitutes a person > 2. rejection of the aforesaid reasons and responses > b. about the conclusion in itself
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Second Part. On the Fact of the Incarnation
Single Question. Whether the Formal Reason of Being the Term for the Union of the Human Nature with the Word is the Word’s Relative Property
I. To the Question
A. What the Property is that Constitutes a Person
2. Rejection of the Aforesaid Reasons and Responses
b. About the Conclusion in Itself

b. About the Conclusion in Itself

207. As to the other point, namely about the conclusion [n.177], the authorities of the saints seem to speak in favor of relations as doing the constituting rather than absolute properties.

108. I also adduce one reason for this, that if the first person is an absolute (let him be a), and if the second is an absolute (let him be b), then in the first moment of origin a is not the Father or a ‘this’ having a real relation, because he does not have a Son; in the second instant of nature he generates, and then there is a Son and a real relation in a; therefore the first person would acquire by the act of generation something formally existing in himself, just as does the second person - which seems unacceptable, because, just as whatever the Son has he has through generation, according to Hilary [cf. Ord. 1 d.28 n.13], so the Father has nothing by generation but has everything from himself without any beget-ability.

209. However this argument could be stated and solved by distinction of priority and posteriority of origin, so that in the first instant of origin a is posted as being the Father and in the second b is posited as being the Son, and yet a would be Father and b would be Son in nature simultaneously. And this distinction of priority and posteriority was touched on in 1 d 20 n.34.

210. Let the other reasons be examined into, those that prove this inference, ‘three persons are one God, of which persons one is from one by generation and one is from two by inspiriting; therefore the first things constituting and distinguishing these persons are relations’; if the conclusion be asserted it is something that is to be believed; for nothing that is not expressly an article of faith is to be held as simply to be believed unless it follows from something that is simply to be believed [cf. Ord. 4 d.11, Lectura 1 d.2 n.164]. Many of the reasons adduced [e.g. supra nn.165-176] to prove this inference are soluble, and many have already been solved [e.g. supra nn.178-206, Ord. 1 d.26 nn.73-94].