Question Three. Whether One Person can Assume Several Natures

123. Whether one person can assume several natures.

124. That he cannot:

Because then he would be either one man or several men. But not one, because there would not be one nature; nor several, because there are not several supposits. - The first consequence is proved by the fact that the three persons are one God. The second by the fact that a knower of several sciences is one knower, because of unity of supposit.

125. Further, nature gets unity and numerability from the supposit, because a nature in abstraction from individuals is not enumerated; therefore if there is one supposit, there is one nature.

126. On the contrary:

Another nature could have been assumed if the one assumed was not assumed;     therefore this other nature can be assumed now. The proof of the consequence is that the potency of the other nature is not reduced to act because the one assumed was assumed; nor does the relation on the part of the Word have this assumed nature as adequate to it in idea of terminated dependent thing on terminating independent thing, because as a universal rule, although one caused thing cannot depend totally on several total causes, yet one cause can well terminate totally the dependence of many caused things; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

127. I reply that, since another nature could have a dependence of this idea just as does the assumed nature, and can even have it at the same time - for there is no repugnance either on the part of the natures (for the dependence of one nature is not repugnant to the dependence of another nature) or on the part of the Word (because only relations of reason are hereby posited in him, or no relations of reason, but only the fact that he terminates several real relations at himself - and this is not impossible, just as the whole Trinity terminates all the relations of creatures [2 d.1 nn.44, 48]) - therefore there is no reason for the impossibility or incompossibility of the assumption of another nature, even when the assumed nature remains united.

II. To the Principal Arguments

128. To the first argument [n.124] the response is made [Richard of Middleton] that he would be neither one man nor several.

But on the contrary: ‘one’ and ‘many’ are opposites that divide being immediately; therefore one or other opposite is also immediately true of ‘this being which is man’, so that if it is a man it must be one man or several, otherwise it would not be a man. The like is proved by the terms ‘one’ and ‘not-one’, which are contradictories about any subject, and something ‘not-one’ in being is necessarily ‘many’.

129. Another response is made [Thomas Aquinas]ST IIIa q.3 a.7 ad.2, “A name imposed because of some form is never stated by us in the plural unless there is a plurality of supposits; for a man who is wearing two garments is not said to be two wearers but one wearer with two garments, and a man who has two qualities is said to be in the singular a man qualified by two qualities... And therefore if a divine person assumed two human natures he would, because of unity of supposit, be called one man having two human natures.” ⁸ that he would be ‘one man’ because of unity of supposit, just as ‘one knower’ is, though he knows many sciences.

But against this is that then a concrete thing of this sort should be multiplied because of the multiplication of supposits, and so the several divine persons would be several Gods.

130. Therefore I speak in a third way, as was done in 1 d.12 n.46, that Father and Son are ‘one inspiriter’ and yet not ‘one inspiriting’ but ‘two inspiriting’.Scotus’ point would therefore seem to be that if one divine person assumed two human natures he would be one person being two men, or one person doing two ‘man-izings’. At any rate in the cited n.46 he says, “Everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive. When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate where its dependence is terminated, - but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said ‘two inspiriters’, at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are ‘two inspiriting’, both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them.” ⁹

131. On the contrary: to be a man is to be a person; therefore to be several men is to be several persons. The proof of the consequence is that, as singular entails singular, so plural entails plural [1 d.12 n.43].

See the response [1 d.12 n.47].“n.47. Hence, as to this consequence ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’, - I deny it. And when you prove it ‘because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural’ [n.43], I say that it is not necessary - if on some antecedent some consequent follows - that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting supposits are distinguished, and on ‘inspiriting supposit’ there follows ‘inspiriter’, but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing ‘inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, - therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters’ there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent.” ¹⁰

132. To the other argument [n.125] I say that, just as singularity precedes the idea of supposit, so a plurality of natures can stand in the same supposit.

Henry of Ghent responds differently, and responds well.Summa a.29 q.7, “Although a simple form, as it is a certain essence, is divisible into several supposits, yet, as it has singularity, it is altogether indivisible - just as ‘this singular man’, according to his singular form of ‘this humanity’, cannot be at all divided.” a.25 q.3 arg.4, “A designated supposit, as it is a designated supposit..., is in no way multipliable - just as if Socrates were man by the very designation by which he is Socrates, then, just as what Socrates is in reality cannot be ‘several Socrateses’, so the nature by which he is a man cannot be ‘several men’.” ¹¹