Single Question. Whether Christ was a Man during the Triduum

Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d.22 q.1
Scotus, 3 Sent. d.22 q.1
Thomas, ST IIIa q.50 a.4
Richard of St. Victor, 3 Sent. d.22 q.1
Durandus, 3 Sent. d.22 q.1

1. About the twenty second distinction the question asked is whether Christ was a man during the Triduum.

2. That he was: Christ is a man; Christ was Christ during the Triduum; therefore Christ was a man during the Triduum. The major is plain, because the species is predicated of the individual. The minor is also plain, because the same thing is predicated of itself.

3. Again, Christ had his whole humanity during the Triduum;     therefore he was a man. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is proved in two ways: first because the Word had the soul united to Him; but the soul is the form, and the form states the whole whatness according to the Philosopher and the Commentator (Metaphysics 7); therefore etc     .

4. Second [n.3], because he had the soul and the body; the whole humanity is nothing but the soul and body really, and death is only their separation, according to Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 5, and Damascene 3.26.

5. Again a supposit subsisting in some nature can be denominated by that nature; but during the Triduum the Word subsisted in the nature it had assumed, and he was not called soul-ed, or a body, or bodily;     therefore it remains that he could be called a ‘human-ed’ man.

6. On the contrary: a dead man is not a man; but Christ during the Triduum was a dead man; therefore etc     .

To the Question

The Question Treated Theologically

7. I reply that this question must first be treated theologically, because theologians do not care about the concepts of the words but about the power of the reality. Secondly it must be treated logically [n.33ff.].

8. In the first way of treating it, the theological way, Hugh [of Saint Victor] says about the sacraments (in the first book and in the second part) that Christ was a man during the Triduum, because for this purpose it suffices that the whole humanity, which is the soul and body, be united to the supposit but not that soul and body be united with each other but only that they be in the supposit.

9. The Master of the Sentences agrees with this conclusion. Others agree in the conclusion but give a different proof of it. For they say that Christ was a man during the Triduum to the extent that he had the whole humanity simply united to him. Now they prove it as follows: the form states the whole quiddity of a thing, but Christ had the whole form of man, namely the soul, united to him in the Triduum. The major is proved in many ways, and first as follows: matter is that according to which a thing can be and not be (Metaphysics 7); but the quiddity cannot be and not be. Also, in the same place of the Metaphysics, matter does not belong to the idea of the quiddity but only the form does;     therefore etc     .

10. Again, whatever exists can be the principle for knowing a thing (Metaphysics 7); but matter is in itself unknown (Physics 1); therefore it is not part of the quiddity.

11. Again, in things separate from matter the quiddity and what has the quiddity are the same (Metaphysics 7.4), but in things that have matter they differ; therefore, from the fact that matter is the cause of the difference between the quiddity and what has the quiddity, it follows that matter is outside the idea of quiddity.

12. Again in Metaphysics 7.2 the Philosopher says that the matter is posterior to the quiddity; so it is outside the idea of the quiddity. Then, or further, they say that, insofar as the form states the whole quiddity, if the soul in the resurrection were united with a different body it would still be the same man numerically because it would be the same whole humanity numerically.

13. Against the first conclusion [n.8] is Augustine City of God 13, ‘The soul is not the whole man but the better part of man; and the body is not the whole man but the inferior part of man’. But that has the name of man which is both conjoined together. But this authority of Augustine is against the major of the above argument, which says that the soul is the whole man.

14. Again in the [Athanasian] Creed: ‘just as rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ’; but there is no Christ if the humanity is not united with the divinity; therefore neither is there a man if the soul is not united to flesh.

15. Again, Damascene 3.3 says that all men are composed of soul and body.

16 Further, contrary to the major of Damascene’s reason [n.15], against the heretics who say that Christ had a supremely excellent body, and that as such he passed through the body of the Blessed Virgin, in that he was a man univocally with us; but the argument would be of no validity, as is plain, if the body did not belong to the idea of man.

17. Again, if the soul alone states the whole humanity, then man is totally and simply created and in no way generated, especially if only one form is posited in man.

18. Again, what has a quiddity complete in its kind does not make something per se one with anything else; for if something per se one is to come to be from two things, it is necessary that neither of the two be a chiefly per se complete being. If     therefore the form alone states the whole complete quiddity, it never makes a per se one with matter; and so either all things are immaterial and simple, or something composed of matter and form is not one being per se but one by aggregation.

19. Again, what does not include in itself any quiddity of any genus, nor is included in any such quiddity, is in a genus neither per se nor by reduction; therefore either it is God or it is nothing; therefore etc     .

20. Again, in Metaphysics 7 the Philosopher maintains that, just as from this matter and this form this individual comes to be, so from this common form in general the common quiddity results; and the reason is that from this matter and this form no per se one thing comes to be unless the former is in potency and the latter is in act; but matter is potency by reason of matter in general and form is act by reason of form in general;     therefore etc     .

21. Again natural science is about material and corruptible things and is a true science; but a true science is only about quiddities (Metaphysics 7 near the end); therefore the quiddity of a natural thing is corruptible; but everything corruptible includes matter according to your argument above [n.9]; therefore the quiddity of a natural thing includes matter.

22. I say to the question, then, that Christ was not a man during the Triduum because, as has been proved [nn.13-21], the soul alone does not state the whole humanity. Nor do soul and body principally state the whole humanity -neither when not united with each other nor even when united, because the formal idea of humanity does not consist in a relation of union, for then man would not be a being per se one but one by aggregation.

23. I say     therefore that man has a certain unity and entity other than the parts taken together, as I have proved [nn.13-22] - not indeed a partial unity and an entity that would be related to the parts by addition to them (for then there would be a regress to infinity, as is plain). But it is a unity and entity constituted by and resulting from those parts, and by this unity and entity man is formally man; but this unity and entity were truly corrupted in death; therefore etc     .

24. Next to the arguments [nn.9-12], and to the first proof for the major of the reasoning [nn.9]

25. As to this first proof, note that the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7 is speaking equivocally about three things, namely the species, the whole together, and the matter. For sometimes he takes for the form the species (which is one part of the composite), sometimes for the abstract ultimate, sometimes for the quiddity of the whole (which is the total resultant). Likewise, he takes the whole together for this existing individual in its being as existing, and sometimes for the total concrete composite taken absolutely and not concretely. Likewise, he takes the matter sometimes for matter non-contracted but absolutely taken, and sometimes for matter in its ultimate contraction, namely as it is a part of this individual sensible thing.

26. Once these facts are seen the solution is plain. For matter taken in the first way [sc. absolutely] belongs to the essence and is part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the third way [sc. as the quiddity of the whole]; and matter taken in the second way belongs to the essence and is part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the third way. And similarly matter taken in the first way is part of the idea of the whole together taken in the second way [sc. the concrete composite taken absolutely]; and matter taken in the second way [as contracted] is part of the idea of the whole together taken in the first way [sc. the existing individual in its being as existing]. But matter is never part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the first way [sc. as species].

27. Next I say further that everything that has matter taken in the first way as part of itself is able to be and not to be only in remote potency and not in proximate potency, namely potency for that by which a thing can be corrupted; however only the proximate matter will ever be corrupted. Now a thing is corruptible in proximate matter when it has as part of itself matter taken in the second way. An example: fire is always in potency to heating things, but it is only ever in proximate potency and can only ever issue in act when it has something heatable proximate to it (although the relation of proximity is not the formal idea of being heatable, it is yet an idea that is necessarily required). So matter taken in the second way is in proximate potency, that is, what it is part of is able to be and not to be; but when taken in such a way it is not part of the quiddity taken in the second way, and so the quiddity as thus taken is said to be incorruptible, for it is not in proximate potency to corruption; nor can it be corrupted unless it is in proximate potency, and then it would have as part of itself matter taken in the second way, in which way matter does not belong to the idea of the quiddity (as Aristotle there takes quiddity).

28. To the second proof [n.10] I say that just as matter is more imperfect than form in existing so is it more imperfect in causing with respect to the composite; and since it is likewise more imperfect in causing knowledge of the composite it is also said to be unknown in itself, for it is not very powerful in causing knowledge; yet matter is very well known in the composite when the composite is known; otherwise the composite would never be known but all knowledge would be of simples.

29. One can say differently that matter taken in the second way is not known with scientific knowledge, and in this way it is not part of the quiddity, and scientific knowledge is of the quiddity.

30. To the third [n.11] I say that in things separate from matter there is no difference of really divided parts but there is such a difference in material things, and therefore the component parts are not the same, namely matter and form, so that what has the quiddity is taken there for matter and the quiddity is taken for form.

31. In another way it can be said that some things have a quiddity per se and first, as man; and then the quiddity and what has the quiddity are the same, such that man and his quiddity are the same, as the Philosopher expressly maintains in Metaphysics 7, so that the two together are said to be separate from matter, that is, from contracted matter, matter said in the second way. But other things have quiddity per se but not first, as this man, and in this case they are not the same first though they are the same per se; and the Philosopher means this in the place cited, such that he takes matter for the idea of the individual.

32. To the fourth [n.12] I say that the Philosopher is speaking there of contracted matter, matter taken in the second way.

The Question Treated Logically

33. Then, treating of the question logically [n.7], I say that this proposition is truly logical, ‘Caesar is a man’, even though Caesar is not now existent. However, this proposition is not true: Christ during the Triduum was a man even logically. The first point [about Caesar] is plain, for a logician considers the concepts of the terms, and speaks only in the way that the concept of the predicate term is included in the concept of the subject, and that the ‘is’ is added as a third part and not as part of the predicate, so that the proposition does not require the actual existence of the terms.

34. The second point [n.33] is proved as follows: when some predicate is attributed to some subject then, because the subject does not state one concept but several, if they are repugnant to each other the proposition is false. An example: when no white man exists then the proposition ‘a white man is a man’ is false, because on the basis of the hypothesis [sc. the subject states more than one concept] the concepts are repugnant, as is plain. If Christ states not one concept but two, because he is one supposit subsisting in two complete natures, according to Damascene 3.3, then this proposition is false, ‘Christ during the Triduum was a man’, because the subject of it ‘Christ during the Triduum’ includes in itself a repugnance of concepts, as is plain; for then one of the natures was not complete, namely the human nature, and the fact that the concepts of the predicate are included in only one concept of the subject does not suffice if the concepts of the subject are mutually repugnant. The point is plain, otherwise this would be true: “Something greater than God exists because ‘exists’ is included in the concept of God.”

To the Arguments

35. Then to the arguments for the opposite:

To the first [2] the response is plain from what has just been said, that the subject includes a repugnance of concepts.

36. To the second [3] the answer is plain from what was said in the question [nn.23, 34], that during the Triduum the whole of the humanity was not there.

37. But to the authorities proving that it was there [nn.3-4], because death is only the separation of parts, I say that death is the separation of parts together with corruption of the whole that resulted from their union or unity.

38. As to the point from the Philosopher [n.3] it was dealt with above [nn.25-27].

39. To the third [n.5] I say that body and soul are essential parts of man, and parts do not denominate the whole when they are actually outside the whole, for then they would not be parts.     Therefore during the Triduum they did not denominate the Word, where they did not exist united because they were actually outside the whole that resulted from them, namely from humanity. So the Word could not be called body, or soul, or bodily, or animate, because such parts are not parts of a man during the Triduum; but he could be named with some other appropriate name (if no name were imposed), but not with the name of man, because humanity did not remain etc     .