[Appendix] Twentieth Distinction

Single Question. Whether it was Necessary for the Human Race to be Repaired by the Passion of Christ

Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d.20 q. 1, a.1
Scotus, 3 Sent. d.20 q.1
Thomas, ST IIIa q.46 as.2-3
Richard of St. Victor, 3 Sent. d.20 q.2
Durandus, 3 Sent. d.11 q.1
Francis of Meyronnes, 3 Sent. d.17 q.2

1. About the twentieth distinction the question asked is whether it was fitting for the human race to be redeemed by the passion of Christ.

2. That it was not: a nobler nature, namely the Angelic nature, was not redeemed nor will be redeemed; therefore neither should human nature, which is more ignoble, have been redeemed.

3. On the contrary is Anselm in Why God man?

To the Question

4. I reply that this question is a purely theological one, and Anselm seems to have written his book, Why God man, because of it.

5. First it is necessary to see that it was necessary for man to be redeemed; second that man could not be redeemed without satisfaction; third that satisfaction had to be done by God-man; fourth that it was fitting that it be done through the passion of Christ.

6. I prove the first as follows: God and nature do nothing in vain; but man is ordered to eternal beatitude; therefore if man could not attain it he would be in vain; but he could not have attained it after the fall if he had not been redeemed; therefore etc. This is in Anselm’s book Why God man 2.

7. I prove the second [n.5] as follows: someone is said to be unjust if he does not pay a man what he owes; therefore he is more unjust if he does not pay God what he owes; but no one who is unjust is admitted to eternal life; therefore etc. On this Anselm in Why God man 1. But you will say that man is not unjust because he is excused through inability. Again, because his offenses could have been forgiven through mercy without satisfaction. But Anselm meets these responses as follows:

8. To the first he says that though some inability excuses yet not an inability to which man voluntarily subjected himself; on the contrary, such inability is sin. But this is in fact the case because man received from God the power of rendering him honor, for he received original justice; but he voluntarily made himself incapable of this; therefore etc.

9. To the second [n.7] Anselm says that either God so remitted to man the debt, whereby he was obliged to render God honor, that man could in no way have this debt; and to attribute this sort of mercy to God would be ridiculous. Or God remitted it in this way, that he wanted to reward man without man’s returning his debt to God; and so he will reward man without man’s rendering God honor; therefore he will reward man for sin, which is absurd; therefore etc.

10. I prove the third [n. 5] as follows: satisfaction could not be made to the Creator unless more or as much was returned to him as was taken from him; but man by sin took away the honor due to God himself; but the honor due to God is greater than any creature; therefore it was necessary that something be returned and sacrificed to God that was greater than any creature; therefore God-man. Anselm on this in his book.

11. Next the minor [n.10] is proved thus: because man by sin took from God what God had disposed about man to do; but God had disposed about man to repair the fall of the Angels; but a creature was not able to do the repair since he could not justify; therefore etc.

12. The fourth [n.5] I prove as follows: because man sinned through the sweetness of taste; therefore he who satisfied had to satisfy through bitterness; but nothing is more bitter than death; therefore etc. Anselm in his book 2.

To the Argument

13. Next, in response to the argument to the contrary [n.2], some say that the case of Angels and men is not alike, because many of the Angels remained but none of the men did.

14. But this response is not valid, especially for those who make it, because they posit that each Angel constitutes a single species; therefore since many Angels fell, many species fell that were more noble than one more ignoble species; but men make one species; therefore etc.

15. Another response is that the case of Angels and men is not alike because man was tempted by another, while the Angel was not but sinned from pure malice.

16. But this response too does not seem to be valid, for it is likely that Satan tempted the other Angels to go along with him, and this is found in Revelation 3 when it is said that there was war in heaven between the Dragon and Michael, such that the Dragon, that is Lucifer, prevailed in tempting others and inducing them to his side; but Michael and his Angels did not thus side with the others; therefore etc.

17. I say otherwise, then, that because man was of a weaker and more imperfect nature therefore the temptation was more violent for him, and his fall was less imputed to him than the fall of the Angels was to the Angels, who were of a more perfect nature and had a clearer knowledge; and so the fall of the Angels was graver.