Single Question. Whether Christ Merited in the First Instant of his Conception

Bonaventure, 3 Sent. d.18 q. 1, a.1
Scotus, 3 Sent. d.18 q.1
Thomas, ST IIIa q.9 a.4
Richard of St. Victor, 3 Sent. d.8 q.2
Durandus, 3 Sent. d.18 q.2

1. About the eighteenth distinction the question asked is whether Christ could have merited and, if so, whether he did so in the first instant of his conception.

2. That he could not have merited is proved thus: he was not able to sin, therefore not to merit either. The antecedent is plain because his will was perfectly united to the ultimate end by act of enjoyment. The proof of the consequence is that, if Christ could have merited, then the blessed could merit now. For an act is meritorious to the extent that a right act is freely elicited, although a non-right act could be elicited.

3. Again, a meritorious act is either the same as a beatific act of enjoyment or it is not. If it is the same then it is not meritorious, otherwise it would be meritorious now and in the blessed likewise. If it is not the same then, since a meritorious act has God for object, and just as a beatific act of enjoyment is adequate to the whole of the will, the result would be that the same power about the same object will have an adequate act and an additional act.

4. Again, that he did not merit in the instant of conception in particular is argued thus: a meritorious act is contingent and free; but in the first instant of conception the act would be necessary, because while a thing is coming to be it is necessarily coming to be, but it could not have had choice before then, as is plain.

5. Again, two changes where the term of one presupposes the term of the other cannot be simultaneous; but creation of the will and the acting or motion of the will are of this sort. For a meritorious act, which is the term of an acting or motion of the will, necessarily presupposes the being of the will, which is the term of the creation of the will;     therefore etc     .

6. On the contrary: that Christ could have merited is plain, because he was truly a wayfarer as we are;     therefore etc     .

7. That he merited in the first instant is plain, because sufficient for being able to merit are a free power, grace, a presented object, and the power being able to perform an act about that object through the mediation of grace. But all these were in Christ in the first instant of his conception. The first three of these are plain from what has been said. The fourth is proved from Augustine On the Trinity 6: if fire were eternal its splendor would be co-eternal, and yet the splendor is an effect of fire; therefore an effect can be coeternal with its cause.

To the Question

8. I reply that it is difficult to see that Christ merited, for since he was truly a blessed, then, if he could have merited, any of the blessed by parity of reasoning can merit, and so, since to merit there always corresponds a reward, the blessed would never have their ultimate reward.

9. The first thing then to see is what merit is; the second how Christ could have merited; the third how he could have done so in the first instant of conception.

10. About the first I say that merit is some act virtuous and praiseworthy in view of some further end, which corresponds to the act as a reward according to the acceptation of the rewarder. By the first part of this description all vicious and indifferent acts are excluded from the idea of merit. By the second part all acts that are beatific acts and contain beatific acts are excluded; for a beatific act, since it is the ultimate to be expected in the genus of acts, does not have the idea of merit since it cannot be ordered to another further act. Similarly acts that follow a beatific act cannot be ordered to another further act by which they obtain the ultimate. By the third part all acts are excluded from the idea of merit that are elicited by someone, or are in someone, who does not have charity from the ordination of God, so that charity alone is the reason for acceptation to the eternal reward.

11. About the second [n.9] it is said that Christ only merited according to his sensitive part because he could only suffer as to this part. But this is not sufficient, especially since he could also suffer as to his intellective part as concerns its lower part, as has been shown. For grief over sins cannot be in the sensitive part and he grieved over our sins, according to Ambrose, as was said there.

12. I say about this point, then, that Christ merited as to all the acts of his sense part as these were commanded by his will; for all such acts were right by will, since commanded by right will, and he could truly suffer and be wayfarer as to the sense part.

13. Again I say that he also merited as to all the acts of the intellective part as to its lower part, because he could suffer and so be a wayfarer also as to this part - and I say this as to the acts that regard what is for the end. For the acts of the intellective part that regard the ultimate end simply are acts of the higher part. For the higher and lower parts are not diverse powers but the same power is called the higher part as it regards the ultimate end simply, but it is called the lower part as it regards things that are for the end in respect of the ultimate itself, that is, that are according to eternal rules.

14. But against this seems to be that a power which is simply in its term cannot merit, since merit is ordered to the reward that responds to it as its term; but the inferior part in Christ was simply in the term, for it was joined to the higher part, which was simply blessed.     Therefore etc     .

15. I reply that Christ’s lower part being in the term simply can be understood in two ways, namely either as to the affection for justice and to impeccability, and in this way the statement is true; or as to the affection for advantage and impassibility, and in this way it is not true, as is plain in d.15;     therefore etc     . But this suffices for being able to merit;     therefore etc     .

16. I say further that every act too of the higher part in Christ could have been meritorious, and if it could have been it was; and although this be more difficult to prove because of the authority of some of the saints, yet I prove it as follows:

17. God can accept any praiseworthy act for some reward; but every act of Christ’s higher part was a praiseworthy and beatific act;     therefore etc     . The minor is plain. The proof of the major is that even if to a beatific act there cannot correspond as reward another beatific act in the same thing, or an intensification of it (for then it would not be ultimate and most perfect), yet there can correspond to it as reward some good in something else; and in this way Christ merited for us. And so, according to the major of this reasoning, one must say that even now a created beatific act of someone blessed could, without contradiction, be accepted by God for some reward in another, though in fact it is not so. For it was so in Christ up to his death and resurrection because he was not entirely outside the state of this life; indeed in some aspect of himself he was truly a wayfarer, and this by way of dispensation, so that he might merit for us.

18. About the third main point [n.9] I say that Christ could have merited in the first instant of his conception, nor do I see the opposite. The reason is that it is possible to say that, for a meritorious act, there is only required an unimpeded power of will, the habit of grace, and an object presented in idea of object; but all these were present in Christ’s soul in the first instant of his conception;     therefore etc     . The major is plain. The declaration of the minor is that Christ’s will in the first instant in the soul was perfect as to first act, and grace was most perfect, as is plain from what has been said; and in the same instant there could have been presented to him the whole of what he was due to suffer for our salvation according to the will of God the Father. For he had in his intellect in the same instant most perfect knowledge, as is plain; therefore, in the same instant he could have voluntarily accepted what was shown to him, and consequently earn merit.

19. But you will say not so, because a meritorious act is an elicited act, and choice chooses to deliberate first; deliberation requires the practical syllogism, and so as a result requires discursive reasoning and some delay.

20. I reply by saying that this is true in the case of someone who is not perfectly habituated, but it is not true in the case of someone who is perfectly habituated. Hence it is said by the Philosopher that if a lyre player, when he has to play a chord, were to deliberate first, he would have imperfect knowledge of how to play the lyre; and this is certainly sufficiently plain. Hence if someone virtuous is once exercised in virtuous acts, he would immediately accept a choosable good, without any prior deliberation, as soon as it was presented to him; and it would be similar in its own way with anyone virtuous, as is plain; but no one was ever as completely habituated, whether in virtue or in knowledge, as Christ was habituated in virtue and knowledge in the first moment;     therefore etc     .

To the Principal Arguments

21. Next to the principal arguments to the contrary:

As to the first [n.2] I concede the antecedent but deny the consequence. The proof is plain in the reply taken from what was said in the question about how Christ, although he was blessed as to his higher part, could yet have merited as to his lower part and sense part, insofar as he was able to suffer; and even according to his higher part he could have merited, as was said above. Nor does it follow from this that the blessed could merit, because they are outside the state of this life. But Christ was truly a wayfarer. Nor even is it necessary that a meritorious act be able to be elicited non-rightly; but it is sufficient that the act be right and free and possessed of charity - which is the idea of merit that is orderable to some end that would correspond to it as reward, whether in itself or in another; otherwise the blessed Virgin could not have merited, since she was confirmed [in good].

22. To the second [n.3] I say, as was said above, that there was a meritorious act in Christ, both the beatific act and other acts. And when it is said ‘if beatific then [not]meritorious’, I say that this does not follow, because now Christ and the blessed are always in the term both as to affection of justice and impeccability and as to affection of advantage and impassibility. But then [during his earthly life] Christ was in the term only as to the first affection, as was said before. And when an additional act etc. is mentioned, I say that a beatific act is adequate to the power intensively, such that the power cannot elicit a more intense and more perfect act. But it is not adequate extensively, since there can be along with it at the same time other more imperfect acts, though acts about other immediate objects; otherwise the blessed would never see things in the Word and even less in their proper genus. And when it is said that a meritorious act has God for object, I say not necessarily for immediate object but certainly for final object, as that every meritorious act is because of God as end. Hence in Christ the only meritorious act that had God for immediate object was the beatific act, but others of his meritorious acts had other things (or powers in the Word or in their proper genus) for immediate object, by referring them to God as to final end, as is plain.

23. To the objection [n.4], that he did not merit in the instant of conception, I concede the major but deny the minor. For as nothing is formally necessary save when it actually exists, so nothing is formally contingent save when it is actual. Hence I say that a cause need not precede a contingent effect in duration, but it is enough that it precede in nature. Hence even if the world were from eternity, it would yet be contingently produced, and God would from eternity have determined to produce the world in such and such a ‘now’, and he could then have determined the opposite. And when it is said that while a thing comes to be it must be coming to be, I say that this is true in the composite sense but false in the divided sense; hence the conclusion does not absolutely follow, that therefore it must come to be. So this proposition is true in the composite sense: ‘when Christ’s will is willing in the first instant it is necessarily willing’; but it does not follow, ‘therefore he necessarily wills in the first instant’ but rather he willed contingently, and he was able not to will the good things that were presented to him, though he could not will against them. because he was already confirmed in good.

24. To the final objection [n.5], I say that, as to simultaneity of nature but not as to simultaneity of duration, it is true that when the sun shines the sun illumines. Note too that it is not necessary that every meritorious act be elicited by him for whom the act is meritorious, for it is possible for one person to merit for another, as Christ merited for us. But hence it is necessary that the meritorious act be voluntarily and freely elicited by him by whom it is elicited. Hence also someone could merit by an act caused in his will by God, and he would by that act be formally willing but not causally so.