D. To the Principal Arguments

41. To the first principal argument [n.2] the answer is that the body is, because of sin, mortal by demerit; and from this it follows that there was no sin in Christ from the first instant in which he assumed innocent nature; and there was in him, from the first instant of nature, no cause of death by demerit. And this in response to the quotation from Genesis, that, after Adam had eaten, the first parents had by demerit a necessity to die - also the reasoning [about Adam] does not proceed in this way, but the cause is different, as was said toward the end of the question [n.30].

42. To the second [n.3], after conceding the antecedent, I deny the consequence, and the reason is that an omnipotence for producing anything possible cannot be conferred on a creature, or on anything, unless the thing has in itself one or several forms wherein is rooted a power for making everything possible first come to be; but this sort of form cannot be one or many accidental forms, for an accident does not and cannot have in itself (while it remains an accident) a power for producing all substances, or any substance (I mean producing ‘from itself’); therefore the omnipotence would have to be in the thing by some substantial form that contains virtually, and in perfection, every form or being that is able to come to be. But such a power cannot be conferred on Christ’s soul while it remains a soul, nor on an angel; therefore neither can an act of making cool be conferred on it; and so such a form virtually containing everything is repugnant to it while its nature remains. But to be able to know everything knowable, since to know is not to produce things in being, requires only an intellective power and a habit or the accidental species of which the soul is capable; and because knowing tends to knowable things not by causing them but by knowing them only, therefore the foundation for knowing simply does not require as much perfection as the foundation of a power requires for being able to cause everything possible.

43. To the third [n.4], when it is said that Christ knew equally well how to guard and to restore, I say that he knew if (for the state in which he was) he had had pure food and an unweakened nutritive power; but both of these were lacking; so there was no conversion of food into blood and flesh as pure as before (so that he should remain always), nor was his power as intense in converting food.

43. To the fourth, when it is said that Christ’s soul was most perfect and so it took away every privation (as the form of the heavens does), I say that just as the form of the heavens is not such as to contain all forms in itself perfectly and virtually and causally, so it cannot take away all privation and potentiality in its matter for some other form (if there is matter and potency in the heavens for other forms); and so if in the heavens there is matter of the same nature as here below, there is necessarily privation of matter and potentiality in it for other forms. And therefore, if the heavens are incorruptible, one must say that either its form is simple or that, if it has matter, it is of a different nature and is in potency only to the form that the heaven has of itself.