C. Whether Christ was Saddened in the Higher and Lower part of the Intellect

1. Of the Objects and Ways as to which each Part is Saddened

72. As to the third principal article [n.26], namely about the sadness that concerns something not wanted by free will (and not only what arises from the flesh), one needs first to consider what Christ in his higher part was saddened by.

73. This part can be taken in two ways: in one way strictly, for the intellect and will as they regard eternal things alone, and in another way more broadly, for the intellect as it judges something according to eternal rules and for the will as it wills each thing by referring it to eternal things (Augustine speaks of this second way in On the Trinity 12 ch.2 n.2).

74. In the first way the higher part of the will cannot have a sadness that is disordered, because such a sadness would be consequent to not wanting God in himself or not wanting some perfection to be intrinsic to God. This sort of not wanting is so disordered in itself that it is perhaps the sin against the Holy Spirit, and scarcely do the damned thus sin, for though they do not want God to be just, yet it is not perhaps that they do not want this absolutely but that they do not want the effect of justice, namely the punishment that they feel; and this does not belong to the higher part taken strictly.

75. As to the higher part understood in the second way, there are three things that this part could be saddened by: namely, first, by lacking enjoyment of the eternal object; second by the sin of its own or another’s will; third by other evils disagreeable to its own supposit or to other persons dear to it. The order is plain. For just as the higher part, taken broadly, wills first its own enjoyment of God, wills second any justice that is ordered to enjoyment (and this whether in itself or in another), and wills third intermediate and lesser goods, in accord with eternal rules, for itself and others in their ordering to the greatest goods - so the same higher part has a not-wanting with respect to the opposite of these things, and is saddened by the opposites if they happen.

76. As to the first of the three [lack of enjoyment of God, n.75], the soul of Christ did not have sadness about it, because no non-enjoyment or non-perfection that was unwanted happened to him in death; for it was not fitting that he should be joined less to the end by that through which he merited to join others to the end.

77. As to the second [n.75], Christ’s soul was not saddened by his own sin because he had none; but he was saddened by others’ sin, as about the unfaithfulness of the doubting disciples and the cruelty of the persecuting Jews. Hence Ambrose, On Luke [On Faith 2 ch.7 n.54] (and it is in the text), says, “You are grieved, Lord, not over your wounds but mine,” that is, you are saddened by my sins that wound my nature, not by any of your own.

78. But there is a doubt here: since Christ merited for no one save because he paid back his passion for them by his act of will, and since he wanted his disciples’ innocence more than the innocence of the others (otherwise he would not seem to have been saddened), how is it that he did not merit that his disciples be preserved from a fall that was not wanted? There is a confirmation: he merited that they should rise from their fall, so he could have preserved them from it     etc .The editors put this doubt in brackets, noting that there is no response given to it later by Scotus. ⁹⁷

79. As to the third [n.75], one must reply diversely according to the four ways set down in the first article about the disagreeable and the sorrowful [nn.47-60].

80. For by making a beginning here from what was last there, as being more manifest [nn.60, 55-56], it is plain that Christ’s will was conjoined with his pained sense appetite, therefore      his will was of a nature to be pained along with it.

81. Next, as to what was second to last there [nn.60, 52-53], it is plain that the will as it is a nature desires the good of the whole person, just as it is an appetite of the whole person; for just as the more universal and higher cognitive power in man is the cognitive power of man qua man, so the supreme appetite in man is most of all the appetite of man, and this appetite, as it is a nature, is inclined to the natural good of man; and the destruction of nature, or the separation of the parts of the whole nature, was against this inclination. Similarly, the will as it is a nature strongly desires the good of any lower power; therefore what is disagreeable to any power is as a result disagreeable to the will as it is a nature.

82. As to the third from last there [nn.60, 58-59], one can reply in accord with Augustine On the Trinity 13.7 n.10, when he proves that no one is blessed here [in this life] because no one has what he wants in wanting nothing bad, for although perhaps he is ready to bear with equanimity the adversities that befall him, yet he is not blessed because, as far as it is in him, he does not want them.

83. And as to the two first objects, namely enjoyment and justice [n.75], no distinction should be drawn here between the higher and lower parts, for just as the lower intellect can have enjoyment and justice for its object, so the lower will, like the higher, was not saddened in some respects, for the unwanted things did not come about, and saddened in other respects, as by the sins, for they were thus unwanted too. For since Christ’s will was right, the sins of sinners neither pleased him nor were neutral to him but were presented to him as bad.

84. As to the third object, namely the passion of Christ [n.75], one must speak in different ways about the two parts [the higher and lower parts]; and one must do so according to the four ways set down in the first article about the disagreeable and saddening [nn.47-59]. One must consider if all of them can be posited to exist in each part.

85. In this regard there seems to be a double sadness: one that does not follow an actual not-wanting nor a habitual or conditioned not-wanting, but a natural one as it were, which concerns the will as it is a nature [nn.52-53]; and another which concerns the conjoining of the will to the sense appetite that is suffering [nn.55-56]. This double sadness, I say, seems to be appropriated to the two parts, such that the natural not-wanting, and so the being saddened, belongs to the will only in its higher part, while the being saddened only by a suffering along with the sense appetite belongs precisely to the will in its lower part.

86. Proof of the first point [n.85]: the higher part broadly taken (as said before according to Augustine [n.73]) has regard to that which is regarded in its order to the eternal, and this both in the reason, as that from which reason takes its principle of knowing, and in the will, as that for which as ultimate end the will wills it. But the will naturally wills nothing first and for itself save the ultimate end, and so it wills everything else not first and in order to what is first;     therefore etc     . [sc. the will as it is a nature is the will of the higher part]. The minor is plain from the rightness of natural inclination, which would not be right if it were inclined most and ultimately to a lesser and non-ultimate good. But if someone were to say that the will as it is a nature is only inclined to its own proper good first, he would be in disagreement with what has been said in this argument. But let the contrary be supposed here, from the question dealt with elsewhere [Reportatio IV A d.49 q.8-9 nn.4-5, 18].

87. Proof of the second point [n.85]: the intellect insofar as it understands something because the sense (with which it is conjoined) senses it, is the lower part alone; therefore the same holds of the appetites. The antecedent is plain because, insofar as the intellect does thus know, it knows nothing through eternal rules, for it would know in the same way if it could not judge according to those rules.

88. Against these arguments: the second argument [n.87] seems to be in conflict with the first [n.86], for the will suffers along with sense appetite as the will is a nature, because it does not do so as it is free, for the sudden suffering it has because of the natural connection of the higher appetite with the lower is not in its power; therefore the will as it is a nature does not concur precisely with the higher part and does concur, as suffering along with the sense appetite, precisely with the lower part.

89. Response: will as nature is taken in two ways.

In one way as it tends naturally to objects proper to this power as it is this power, all other things being excluded and this power being understood only as it is perfectible by certain objects and these its own objects. It is in this way that the first argument [n.86] is being understood, because the will is in that way inclined to its objects (ordered according to the natural order of the objects) insofar as the objects are in some way perfective of it.

90. Will as it is a nature is spoken of in another way when any order of it to anything consequent to the will’s nature is understood - this properly not as it is free but only as it is intellective appetite, or as it possesses the love of advantage and not of justice. And thus taken it has an order toward feeling along with the lower appetite not only in the order that the desired object has to the first object of the will as it is a will, but, setting aside this order, as the will thus feels along with the lower appetite about anything, and is as disposed toward this anything as if it could not be referred to what is eternal. But not like this is the natural inclination of the will (as the will is a power) that is precisely ordered to its own proper objects, because this inclination is not to any object at all save insofar as it is a further inclination to the eternal (just as matter is not inclined to a preceding disposition save as further inclined to perfect form).

91. Briefly, then, the will as nature in the first way is the will as only naturally inclined to its own proper objects; in the second way it is the will inclined to the objects of the other appetite with which it is conjoined by means of that inclination. In the first way it is the higher part only; in the second the lower part only. Thus in general, the will as nature can be taken as it includes both, and thus does it belong to both parts.

92. About the other two sadnesses, which follow absolute actual volition or conditional (or habitual) volition [nn.58-59], it seems that since both parts are able in both ways not to want anything that happens, both will be able to be saddened in both ways.

93. Of the four ways, then, of being saddened set down in the first article, two are common to both parts and two are proper to the two, such that both parts can be saddened by an object that is in a triple way unwanted.

2. Of the Passion as it is the Object of Sadness in the Higher Part

94. Next, by still applying to the matter at hand the object of Christ’s will that is the passion, one must look at which part could have been saddened by this object, and according to which of the three ways of being saddened possible for it.

95. And first, as to the higher part, it is plain of the will as it is a nature that it did will the good of the person of Christ and did so in its order to what is eternal; and in this way something unwanted did come about, and it was unwanted as being against the affection for advantage but not as being against the affection for justice. But something unwanted in this way, namely as against the affection for advantage, is a sufficient cause for being saddened (from the first article [n.54]); therefore the higher will as it is a nature was in this way saddened by the passion.

96. Nor is it an obstacle that the good to which Christ’s death was ordered was greater than the preservation of his life for a time; for although in this regard the good was to be more freely willed according to the affection for justice, yet not so by the will according to the affection for advantage - unless it could have been shown that the salvation of man was then a greater advantage to the person of Christ than the preservation of his life, and shown to be a greater advantage naturally, and not just from its ordering as being more useful to a good end.

97. If it then be objected that the will as it is a nature is not in that case the higher part, because it does not regard everything in its order to the eternal, nor in its order to the eternal first, for something else (namely its own being) seems naturally more advantageous to this person than any other extrinsic thing - one must deny this last point, for the eternal is not only the supreme good that is to be loved with justice, but it is also the supreme advantage of every will as it is intellective appetite (when this appetite is taken in abstraction from freedom and justice). And therefore, in each natural ordering of objects the eternal is first.

98. But, second, one must consider the higher part of the will insofar as it is free, and consider the sadness in it consequent to the actual not wanting of what was happening. It seems, on the basis of principles taken from the ultimate end, that one cannot conclude about his passion and its opposite (as they are referred to the end) that the passion was to be wanted; for as opposite things cannot be demonstrated, if one simply draws, by reference to the end, the conclusion that at that moment life was not to be wanted and death was to be wanted, then the divine will would not rightly have wanted the passion because it was against right reason; nor would Christ’s will have rightly wanted it, nor would he have obtained merit in wanting it - which results are absurd. It seems then that, just as the higher reason could not, by reference to the ultimate end, judge that death was bad at that moment but rather was definitely good (either because the willingness to die was ordered immediately to the ultimate end on account of its truth, or was so ordered mediately, namely by way of the salvation of man, for the procuring of which death was willed) - so, in the same way, the higher will as free and ordered was not able not to want death at that moment but rather to want it determinately, and so not to be saddened by it with the sadness consequent to a free absolute not-wanting.

99. On the contrary: therefore the higher part does not then have joy in Christ’s being alive, for there is no reason to conclude that his life is or should be simply wanted as referred to what is eternal, because the same reason would have concluded the same thing at the moment of the passion.

100. Reply: the conclusion of a practical demonstration concerns the act with its circumstances, and just as ‘wanting to die’ was simply good at that moment (for it was wanted by the Trinity at that moment, namely as to be undergone at that moment for confirming justice and procuring salvation), so life is good for the present moment now. But as to the point adverted to, that a demonstration always concludes the same thing [n.99], it is true that a demonstration has the same conclusion also in practical matters when it is circumstanced in the same way; but not so if one concludes ‘I have drawn the conclusion for this moment as this moment states a circumstance, therefore I have drawn it for every moment’, for the conclusion ‘composition, therefore also division’ is not the same when the ‘for this moment’ determines the inference or the thing inferred.

101. Third, one must consider the higher part as it is free and consider conditional or habitual not-wanting [nn.58-59] (and I mean by ‘habitual’ that whose act the will is inclined of itself to issue in, unless something stands in the way). On this point one must, it seems, say that the higher part did not want the passion, that is, it would not have wanted it as it would have been in itself if all the advantageous and just things that are desirable in themselves had been equally present without the passion.

102. The proof is by a twofold authority and a twofold reason:

One authority is from Augustine On the Trinity 13.7 n.10, “Although a just man is, though fortitude, ready to accept and bear with calm mind whatever adversity may happen, yet he prefers it not to happen, and if he can he does so; and he is ready for either event such that, as far as is in him, he chooses the one and avoids the other; and if he falls into what he is avoiding, he bears it willingly, because what he wanted could not be done” (understand: as far as is in him). Now it is clear that Augustine means what his words say, because through them he proves that no one, however virtuous, can be blessed here, for he can suffer adversity here and so does not have what he wants; because, as was already said, ‘he chooses, as far as he can, one of the alternatives’, namely the advantageous one.

103. The other authority is from the Philosopher Ethics 3.12.1117b7-11, “Death and wounds are sad for the courageous man; but he endures them because it is good or not base to do so. And the more he has the whole of virtue and the happier he is, the greater will his sadness be in death;” which is only because, as far as is in him, he wants the opposite. And Aristotle’s authority manifests what was said in the first point [n.95], that such not wanting suffices for being saddened.

104. The reason with respect to this point is that an object of patience does not seem to be choiceworthy in itself, for then patience would not in that case be required, and the blessed choose no such things.

105. If it be said in response to the authorities [nn.102-103] that they are speaking of fortitude in the moral sense, which is a disposition of the lower and not the higher part - there is no impediment here, because the higher part seems to judge nothing to be eligible according to eternal rules, as far as concerns itself, without judging the opposite to be more eligible provided justice do not forbid; otherwise why do those who are bound tightly to the ultimate end, as the blessed, choose nothing contrary to it?

3. About the Passion as it is an Object of Sadness in the Lower Part

106. Finally one must consider the lower part with respect to the object which is the Passion. That this part, as it is a nature or is conjoined to sense appetite, did suffer by being saddened is clear.

107. But there is a doubt about the lower part as it is free, whether it suffered because of an absolute free not-wanting or of a conditioned not-wanting.

As to conditioned not-wanting, one should, it seems, say something similar to was said of the higher part [n.101]; and the authorities [nn.102-103] prove it as much, or more so.

108. All that is left, then, is whether the lower reason could conclude that the Passion was absolutely not to be wanted, and thus whether the lower will could, with due order, absolutely not want it and so be saddened.

a. First Possible Solution and the Weighing of it

109. With respect to this question it seems one should say no as to the lower reason, and consequently as to the lower will too.

110. The proof is multiple:

The first is that the same power cannot have opposite acts about the same object when one of these acts is exercised to its fullest, for one opposite, when at its fullest, is not compatible with the other. But the lower and higher part are one power (according to Augustine On the Trinity 12, and it was shown in Lectura 2 d.24 nn.7-12), and the higher part at its fullest in intellect prescribes the passion to be wanted, and at its fullest in will supremely wants it;     therefore the lower part could not not-want it.

111. Again, from a principle and conclusion opposite results do not follow; the principle of lower practical reason is a conclusion of higher reason; therefore etc     . Proof of the minor: practical first principles are taken from the ultimate end; directed to that end are other ends from which are taken the principles of the lower reason, so that the goodness of these other ends comes from that end; therefore the principles taken from the other ends are proved from those taken from that end.

112. Again: in whatever way the principles of the lower reason are disposed (namely whether they are conclusions, as the preceding argument assumed [n.111], or are immediate, though posterior to the immediate first principles taken from the ultimate end; for there can, as it seems, be an order of dignity between the practical and theoretical immediate principles), this at any rate is certain, that opposites cannot both be demonstrated but one of them would be the result of sophistical argument. Therefore, if the higher reason demonstrates that ‘this thing is to be willed’, then from no principles save sophistical ones can the lower reason argue that it is to be absolutely not willed. Now we are supposing that Christ’s right reason was not in error through sophisms, and that his will was in conformity with right reason and not sophistical reason.

113. Again, the reason which judges about the acts of the political virtues is lower reason; but it judges that ‘death is to be endured willingly’ for the common good; so Christ’s lower reason could not have concluded that death was not to be willed, but rather would have concluded the opposite.

114. If it be said that right reason judges that death is to be endured but not that it is not to be willed, so that its being not to be willed, and thus its being sad, is a conclusion drawn from something else (and even Aristotle seems to agree with this in the citation above [n.103] about the brave man, and Augustine too [n.102] and his reason, that an act of the virtue of patience is willingly chosen but the object the act concerns is not) — on the contrary: the conclusion that death is now to be endured is drawn by reason, and either the will does not will what is concluded now and then it is not right, or it does will and then it seems not absolutely not to will death; for an absolute and efficacious volition of a does not stand along with an absolute and efficacious not wanting of that without which a cannot be, for then it would flee and not flee the same thing at the same time. For an absolute and efficacious not-wanting is the cause of fleeing from what is not wanted, just as an absolute and efficacious wanting is the cause of pursuing what is wanted.

115. Again, there are authorities that seem to be for the principal conclusion [n.109]:

Augustine On Psalms ps.21, “Is the soldier who is to be crowned not afraid, namely Paul, and the Lord who is going to be crowned is afraid...?” meaning to say ‘not so’; fear is about something not wanted which is known or believed to be in future;     therefore etc     .

116. Again, the Master in the text (and he is quoting Jerome) maintains there is not passion in Christ but pro-passion; but if Christ did absolutely not want it then, since such not wanting follows the full apprehension of reason, the sadness following such not wanting would seem to possess the full idea of passion.

117. Anyone who would be pleased with the conclusion of these arguments and authorities could say that Christ’s lower will, as it is free, did not absolutely not want death but was nevertheless saddened because he conditionally did not want it, namely as far as was in himself, provided God’s good pleasure could be fulfilled in some other way.

118. Now some people say, that in this sort of case there is a combination of the voluntary and involuntary, and that what is willed simply is what someone wills as far as is in himself, and that what is not willed in a certain respect is what someone wills because of a present necessity (for example: what is voluntary simply for someone in danger at sea is not to cast his merchandise overboard; or alternatively, what is involuntary simply for someone in such danger is to cast his merchandise overboard, so his casting overboard causes him sadness, and is voluntary in a certain respect); and so these people would say that in the matter at hand Christ did absolutely not want death but that insofar as it concerned him and in a certain respect he did will it. As to this view I say it is false both generally and in the matter at hand.

119. First, generally, the point is shown by the case of the man in danger at sea; for since he is lord of his acts by his will, in whose power it is to use his motive force or to not use it to throw his goods overboard, and that this is as much in his power in danger as otherwise, therefore he then casts his goods overboard simply voluntarily, because he is not then coerced by anyone to use his motive force for the purpose. For it is plain that his will could love the merchandise so inordinately that it would not want to throw them overboard even to avoid danger.

120. Next, as to the matter in hand, Christ does not seem not to want death, save with a diminishing determination, namely ‘if something else could be well done instead’; and this determination is a diminishing one because the condition in question does not exist.

121. Now, according to this way, a ‘willing to die’ without any diminishing condition is conceded; for if the addition is made that he willed to die ‘for the honor of God’ or ‘for the sake of justice’ or ‘for the salvation of men’, then the end of the action does not, in these cases, diminish the act; therefore what someone does or suffers in this way does not make the act to be simply unwilled but to be so in a certain respect, namely insofar as it is up to him.

122. But a motive perhaps for taking the opposite side is that such a determination is sad simply — just as ‘throwing overboard’ is sad for a man in danger on the sea and ‘dying’ sad for a brave man.

123. But this is not compelling (for the opposite side), because a conditioned not-wanting, when the condition is not wanted, is sufficient for being sad simply, and so the wanting consequent to some unwanted condition is not sufficient for being glad, as in the case of the merchant where a ‘willing to throw overboard’ follows on ‘there will be a storm’, which is something he does not want.

124. But then Christ’s death does not seem sad, for it is not the case that it was unwanted because of some pre-supposed unwanted thing.

125. I reply: just as a brave citizen would not want his city to undergo a necessity of such sort that the city’s being freed from it would require his own death (and so the necessity is here pre-supposed as something he does not want), so Christ did not want his hearers to be such that they could not have the truth preached to them without being scandalized into mortal hatred. Therefore, if he wanted to die for the truth of his teaching, something he did not want is presupposed on the part of his hearers. And if he wanted to die for the salvation of the human race, something else he did not want is pre-supposed, namely that men are in the sort of state that his death was needed to snatch them from it. And if he wanted to die because of the divine good pleasure, there too something Christ did not want seems to be pre-supposed, for the divine good pleasure had his death for object and for the sake, as it seems, of some end to which this object was ordained, and this end is either the preaching of the truth or the procuring of men’s salvation.

126. So then, if these last arguments be sound [nn.119-125], one would have to say, in brief, that Christ did not, in his lower part, want death or the passion — and did not want it both by his will as it is a nature (that is, as it is conjoined with the suffering sense appetite [n.106]) and by his will as it is free, insofar as it thus only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [n.117] — the way said before about the higher part, that this part as it is a nature did not want it [n.95-97], and that as free it only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [nn.101, 98]. And so he was saddened in both parts in the same ways. Nor is it valid to say, ‘he did not want it absolutely,     therefore he was not saddened’, since a conditional not-wanting suffices for being saddened simply; hence, one can only argue, ‘he did not want it absolutely, therefore he was not saddened for this reason’ — but compatible with this is that he was saddened simply for some other reason (a single reason or a double one).

127. Thus is the gloss fulfilled [Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, psalm 87.4] “‘My soul is filled with evils etc     .,’ that is with sadnesses and pains,” because his whole soul was saddened in will as to both respects, both as will is nature and as it is free (with a conditional not-wanting, namely as far as it was up to him), and his whole soul as to its intellect in both its parts apprehended something naturally and conditionally disagreeable to will.

b. Second Possible Solution and the Weighing of it

128. However, if anyone wants to assign in the lower will a cause of sadness that was not in the higher will (by saying that the lower will did absolutely not want the pain, which was not the case for the higher will), he can posit that the lower part considers the Passion in abstraction from its order to the ultimate end, because to consider the Passion under the circumstance of the ultimate end belongs to the higher reason; but when that circumstance is removed, the Passion is not something wanted, for it was only to be wanted because of the ultimate end; therefore the lower reason does not say the Passion is to be willed, and so neither does the lower will want it.

129. Against this way of proceeding [n.128] one can argue as follows:

First that the reason on which it rests only shows the possibility of the lower will not wanting what the higher will absolutely wants, which is not the point at issue, for ‘not wanting it absolutely to be’ does not imply ‘absolutely wanting it not to be’, and the latter is what the other way of proceeding denies [n. 117].

130. Again, one can argue that the intended conclusion about ‘wanting it not to be’ cannot be inferred; for if a circumstance that the lower reason considers is enough for concluding that ‘this thing is not to be wanted’, then the circumstance in question is not determinable by the other circumstance [the circumstance of the ultimate end] whereby it is concluded that the Passion is to be willed; for something that is ‘per se not to be willed’ cannot be made ‘to be willed’ by anything else. The point is clear as follows: if the lower reason shows an object a without the circumstance of the ultimate end (because of which circumstance it is something to be willed), then it does not show the object is either to be willed or not to be willed but that it is as it were neutral; for an object that can be made by circumstances into something to be willed is not an object that is determinately not to be willed, for then nothing could make it into something to be willed.

131. Third, it also seems that the lower reason could display the Passion along with the circumstance that makes it to be wanted [the circumstance of the ultimate end]; for otherwise the practical lower reason could not be directed by principles taken from a nobler end (because ‘being directed by those principles’ means to consider the end from which they are taken); and so someone who is morally brave could not, insofar as he is prudent (for prudence belongs to the lower reason), direct himself in acts of courage by considering happiness. But if this result is unacceptable, then the lower reason, when, as far as it can, it shows the object completely and does not show a part of it (with the circumstance of the ultimate end removed), it will show it as something to be willed.

132. There is also a fourth argument — about the morally brave man, that an absolute not-willing seems to be a reason to avoid the thing not willed so as to prevent it happening, and the determination is not ‘so as to prevent it happening through himself’ but ‘so as to prevent it happening to himself’.

c. Scotus’ own Conclusion

133. As to this article and its treatment [nn.106-132], it does not seem one has to keep the idea that the inferior part absolutely did not want the Passion [n. 108], for even without this idea one can keep the fact that the lower part was saddened by the Passion both as this part is a nature and as it is free, for it was saddened because of conditional not-wanting, as was said above [nn.117, 123,126].

d. To the Arguments for the First Solution

134. As a solution to the arguments [nn.110-116], one can say that ‘moral good’ is a per accidens being, containing in itself an act of some sort together with many circumstances additional to the act, so that one can conclude, by reason of one of the circumstances, that the whole is worth choosing, and yet conclude that, with the circumstance removed, the remainder will, because of some other circumstance, not be worth choosing.

135. So by reliance on this point [n.134] for the first argument for the first way [n.110], the major is granted about the same per se object, but here the object is only per accidens the same and not per se.

136. Using the same point [n.134] for the second argument [n.111], I say that the conclusions of the higher reason are principles for drawing further conclusions when taken per se and as inferred from the principles of the higher reason; and in this way opposite minor premises can well be assumed under a principle about a thing that is per accidens the same, one of which minors may be true by virtue of one part of the whole and the other by reason of another part.

137. The reply to the third argument [n.112] is clear again from the same point, that there would be a sophism if opposite conclusions were drawn, but when the whole is ‘per accidens the same’ a predicate is proved of it because of one circumstance that is opposite to a predicate proved of it because of another circumstance.

138. To the argument about a brave man enduring death [n.113], I say that it proceeds of circumstances that belong to the lower reason, and so the reply made above [n.131] can be applied directly to it.

139. To the argument to the contrary [n.114] one can say that ‘absolutely not wanting a’ and ‘absolutely willing to undergo a’ are mutually compatible provided one assumes some unwanted thing, namely the necessity of undergoing a. And when you say [n.114] that ‘an absolute not-wanting is cause of fleeing what is not wanted’, this is true in itself, not as inferred by someone other than the one by whom ‘do not want’ is inferred.

140. As to Augustine [n.115] I say that Christ did not have the same reason for fearing that we have, because he did not have sins to make him fear as ours do us. Thus can the words of Ambrose be understood, “You are grieved, Lord, not over your wounds but mine,” [n.77].

141. To the Master and Jerome [n.116]: if the will suffered not only because of a surreptitious movement preceding consent (and this sort of passion — which can be called ‘pro-passion’ — belongs to the will as it is a nature), but also because of a movement following a freely elicited not-wanting, then the propassion in question must be understood to be distinct from passion that overthrows reason, of which sort there was none in Christ.No reply is given by Scotus to the principal arguments posed at the beginning, nn.2-19, but answers can perhaps be supplied, mutatis mutandis, from the parallel passage in the Lectura 3 d.15 nn.108-121 ⁹⁸