B. In Christ there was True Sorrow

61. As to the second article [n.26], I say that in Christ there was true sorrow in his sensitive part because the object approximate to touch and sense appetite was disagreeable to that sense - and the sense had perfect perception, because a disposition of good excellence in touch follows the proportion of good disposition of the body (from On the Soul 2.9.421a19-23), and Christ’s body had the finest complexion, just as his body’s soul was most perfect.

62. Next, an exceeding sorrow in the sense part is of a nature to impede the use of reason. The proof is that a strong pain impedes the use of reason more than does a strong pleasure, for according to Augustine 83 Questions q.36 n.1, “there is no one who would not flee pain more than he would seek pleasure, since we see the most savage beasts terrified with pain and fear in desperate situations.” But there is a certain strong pleasure of sense that totally impedes the use of reason, as is proved by Augustine City of God 14.16, “there is no pleasure in the body greater than it; in the very moment when the extreme point of it is reached, almost the whole sharpness and, as it were, wakefulness of thought is overturned.” And the Philosopher in Ethics 7.8.1149b15-18 says “the delight of the Cyprus born [Aphrodite] steals the mind of the firmest of wise men.” Therefore, much more does a strong pain of sense have a nature, by common law, to impede the use of reason. From this it follows that if, in the case of martyrs when exposed to the greatest torments, their intellect had its use of reason, this was because of a special grace from the Creator.

63. And if it be objected that a firm upstanding politician does not use his virtue to expose himself to such exceeding passions, because he will not be able to use his virtue in them (due to their vehemence) and so is deprived of his use of virtue - I reply that ‘to suffer such pains’ is a good object worth choosing for a good end, and so a choice that has this suffering for object is good because of the due circumstances that surround it, even though the formally good act - which is the choice of the will - does not abide along with the torments and conjoined passions to which the good man chooses to expose himself. So too, someone who exposes himself to fornication, though he does not have the use of reason nor consequently of will in the moment of supreme pleasure, yet he sins mortally in exposing himself willingly to the sort of passion in which he will not be able to use reason; for the object of fornication cannot be a good that by its circumstances (such as the end and other factors) is worth choosing. Likewise, someone can also meritoriously, or un-meritoriously, expose himself to sleep because of a good end, though he will not be able to use reason while asleep.

64. I say third [n.62 was second] to this article [n.26] that if the intellect can exercise its act when the senses are having a vehement experience of something pleasant or sad, it seems natural that the intellect would vehemently cooperate with the lower powers and that the will would suffer delight or sadness along with the sense appetite, according to the third mode touched on in the third way (in the first article, on the sadness of the will, n.55).

65. So, therefore, it can be said to the matter in hand that since Christ’s reason remained wholly in use through the dispensation and special grace of the Creator, his will was not absorbed in the pain of sense appetite and his intellect did as a result intuitively apprehend the pain. The intellect showed the pain to the will, the will grieved along with it, because (in a first way, [n.67]) the will was naturally inclined to the opposite, and this inclination was sufficient for sadness (according to the second way stated in the first article [nn.52-57]).

66. The fact is clear because the affection for the advantageous (which is concupiscence) presupposes the affection for friendship and justice, because everyone who desires some good for someone wants well-being in itself first for that someone before he desires something else for him. Therefore, if in any inclination to a desired advantage there can be a necessary reason for being saddened by the opposite, much more can the inclination to love that for which the desired good is desired be a cause of sadness about the opposite of the good of the thing loved. But since the will is a person’s principal appetite, it is supremely inclined naturally to an advantageous good and desires it. For when there are many parts to the same thing, the higher one is said to be principal among those that belong to the supposit in question (just as, since there are several cognitive powers in man, the supreme one is most of all said to be the cognitive power of man qua man, so too the supreme appetite in man will be said to be the appetite of man qua man). Therefore, the will supremely desires naturally the good of the person it belongs to as being what it loves with love of friendship, and on love of friendship is founded all love of concupiscence. And so the love of friendship is necessarily followed by sadness about the opposite, and thus the destruction of the person will necessarily be sad to his will.

67. In a second way [the will is grieved along with the sensible pain, n.65], because the will is necessarily tied to sense appetite (according to the opinion that was the third way in the first article [nn.58-59]); and this tie was most perfect in Christ, and the intellect apprehended the sad-making object (for it was not impeded), and thus does it follow that there was the suffering of sadness and pain in his will.

68. So there appear to be two ways in which Christ can be posited to have grieved in his will or in his rational appetite: first because of the will’s natural inclination to the good of the person, second because of its tie to sense appetite.

69. If it be objected against the first way [n.68] that then Christ’s soul was supremely saddened in death (for there was then supreme sadness in the sensitive part), one can say that, if his soul was impassible at that moment, it was not saddened at that moment but was sad beforehand, when it was still capable of sadness, because of foreseeing the sad event.

70. On the contrary: Christ’s soul did not know this future contingent save by vision in the Word (from d.14 nn.145-152), so it was only saddened in will to the extent that the thing was shown to it in the Word; but the will taken in this way belongs to the higher part of the intellect.

71. I reply that the lower part of the intellect did indeed display the future suffering, and likewise (which is less apparent) the imagination could have imagined it as frightening and saddening, and so the appetite of the imaginative apprehensive power could have feared - and this appetite is called sense appetite when virtues and vices are discussed [Ord. 3 d.22].