b. On the Second Mode or Way of being Said, that is, on Sadness as it Arises from an Object naturally Disagreeable or from an Object Disagreeable to Sense Appetite

51. Apart from the first mode of being sad, namely when the object is disagreeable through the will’s not wanting it [nn.47-50], there seems to be a doubt whether any other disagreeableness of an object is sufficient to cause sadness, namely when the object is disagreeable naturally (and is not something freely willed) - or alternatively whether, when the object is disagreeable to and saddens sense appetite, it is sufficiently disagreeable to the will (provided however it is shown to the will by the intellect) because of the connection of the will with the sensitive appetite.

52. As to the first alternative [n.50], one could say that a natural object’s disagreeableness to the will (as the will is a natural power) suffices for causing sadness in the will, quite apart from the object’s being not wanted because of an elicited act of will against it.

53. The point can be made clear from Augustine in his Enchiridion [ch.28 n.105, or ch.105 n.28] that “the will so wills happiness that it cannot will misery.” Now this willing of happiness is natural, as was said in Ord.1 d.1 n.152; therefore the natural willing of something suffices for not being able naturally to will the opposite of it, and consequently for not being able naturally to enjoy the opposite and to being necessarily saddened by it, just as the willing of natural happiness suffices for being saddened by natural misery.

54. And if it be objected against this that virtue and nature are distinguished against each other and nevertheless acting virtuously is without sadness, therefore, notwithstanding the natural disagreement of the object to the power, there can be an agreement more truly through the virtue and so the disagreement alone does not suffice [sc. for sadness] - I reply: natural inclination is double, and one is toward the advantageous and the other toward the just, each of which is a perfection of the free will; however the former inclination is said to be natural more than the latter, because the advantageous more immediately follows nature (as nature is distinguished from freedom) than the just does; and so there cannot be a natural inclination to the advantageous without this inclination being sufficient for not wanting the opposite and being saddened because of it, but there can be a natural inclination to the just that is not sufficient for a free not willing of the opposite and for accordingly being saddened because of it.

55. As to the second alternative [n.51], one can say that the connection of the will with sense appetite (provided however that a thing desirable to appetite be understood and be able to be presented by the intellect to the will) also suffices for the agreeable to sense appetite to be agreeable to the will and for the disagreeable to sense to be disagreeable and sad to the will; for it is in this way that a surrepticious pleasure is supposed to be in the will before any free act of the will.

56. And what happens in the case of surrepticious pleasures can also happen in the case of sadnesses or pains as regard sad things. Just as the intellect (when it is not distracted by something) is necessarily affected by the senses when these are strongly moved, so one could suppose that the will does not cooperate necessarily but rather is affected along with the affected sense appetite, and is so about the same object, provided the will is not impeded by the intellect’s nonconsideration of the affection or by some other impediment that overcomes it.

57. In this way is it said that a virgin who is forcefully violated does not sin, even if in her will she feels delight along with the delight of her sense appetite, because delight and the delightful can be against one’s will as far as every elicited act of will is concerned. According to the other way [the first alternative, nn.52-53], one should say that although she delights as to her sense of touch yet she does not do so as to her will - unless, that is, she freely wills the delightful object.