A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

93. Here the assertion is made [William of Ware] that the three persons can assume the same nature.

Because what is prior can exist without contradiction in the absence of the posterior, and consequently the prior can remain indistinct when a distinction is made in the posterior; but the idea of singularity or individuation in created nature is prior to the idea of person, as is plain, because the Word assumed an individual nature not yet existing in a person [n.32]; therefore it can remain the same individual nature although there are several personhoods extrinsic in respect of the nature.

94. Further, the distinction of relation is not a sufficient reason for distinguishing absolutes, as is plain from induction; therefore, since the distinction of divine persons is relational, there is, for this reason, no need for the absolute nature to be distinguished; but the [created] nature can be assumed by the three persons (as is plain); therefore it is possible for them to assume the nature without distinction in the nature.

95. Therefore is the assertion made that, just as the same soul can be in diverse parts of the body, and the same body can be miraculously in diverse places, so one nature can exist at the same time in two supposits (when those supposits are extrinsic and not the same as the nature).

2. Weighing of the Opinion

96. Against this there is the following objection, that the divine essence is infinite from the fact it can be the same in three persons [1 d.2 nn.385-387], therefore this human nature would be infinite if it could be in several persons.

97. Proof of the consequence:

Because the reason it could be in two persons is an equal reason for it being also in infinite persons.

Also, if it could have at the same time several perfect uncreated personhoods, then it could have at the same time a created and an uncreated personhood, or several created personhoods, because there is no greater repugnance in a created and uncreated personhood existing together in one nature than in two uncreated personhoods existing together in it, each of which perfectly supplies the place of created personhood.

98. To the first of these reasons [n.97] the response is made that the divine essence is the same for the three persons, and its being infinite follows from this identity and not from the fact merely that it is at the same time in three persons; but the assumed human nature would not be the same for the three persons but extrinsic to them, although it would be in them at the same time.

A like response is made to the second reason [n.97]: the divine nature founds the three uncreated relations and personhoods, and from this follows its infinity; but the human nature extrinsic to them would not found them.

99. Against the first response the objection is that, just as a substantial form, which gives perfection of substance to several supposits, would be a substance actually unlimited, so an ensuing accident, which actually perfected the same supposits, would be an unlimited accident (an example: just as the soul is unlimited as to perfecting several substantial parts of the body, so its knowledge is an unlimited accident with respect to the parts of the body); therefore, just as the divine essence, because it is essentially the nature of three supposits, is the infinite quasi essential nature of them, so the human nature would be infinite, although it is a quasi extrinsic nature of several supposits.

100. There is a confirmation, that it seems as impossible for one accident to exist in two first subjectsScotus Metaphysics 1 q.1 n.72, “That seems to be the first and proper subject to which the properties first belong that are per se considered in the science.” ³ as it is for one substantial form to be in two matters; therefore, if infinity follow necessarily from the fact that one substantial form is in diverse matters, then infinity would follow necessarily from the fact that one accident is in many subjects. The antecedent is plain, because an accident is adequate to the first subject just as form is to matter - and more so, because the accident converts with the subject.

101. The second reason [n.98] is flawed: the point is clear about the will, which can found diverse relations, even relations of a different idea, and yet is finite; likewise, the same white thing can found many likenesses, and the same father many paternities, without infinity; the same nature too can found many created personhoods, even an infinity of them, because an infinity of them is no more repugnant to it than two are; and thus infinity follows.