2. A Doubt about Scotus’ Opinion

71. But given that Christ’s soul could receive a single vision with respect to infinites, or could receive infinite visions, there is a doubt whether as regards those infinite visions, if they exist, or as regards the single one, if it is in respect to infinites, a created intellect could have the idea of elicitive principle.

72. And it seems that it could, because the intellect elicits understanding as it is naturally prior to understanding; but by the fact that some understanding is elicited nothing is lost to the intellect of the perfection that belongs to it as it is naturally prior to understanding; therefore by the eliciting of one understanding its power of eliciting another is not taken away.

73. This reasoning [n.72] is confirmed, because it could elicit any of the infinite visions or understandings just as it could elicit some single one, even though it did not then elicit it; but even if it did elicit one, it remains in itself just as perfect insofar as it can elicit another; therefore it can elicit some single one.

74. But the contrary also appears to be the case, because any finite active virtue can have some effect intensively adequate to it, or several effects extensively adequate to it, and be unable to cause many at the same time; therefore no created intellect can elicit an infinite number of visions at the same time.

75. And then, in response to the first argument, about the priority of the elicitive principle to the effect [n.72], one should say that something prior can have several additional things posterior to it which it cannot elicit at the same time; and so, although nothing from it insofar as it is prior is taken from it by the fact that it causes one of the posteriors, yet it cannot at the same time cause any number at all of the posteriors.