C. Scotus’ own Opinion

1. The Soul of Christ sees Everything in the Word Actually

58. In a third way one can say that Christ’s soul does see actually in the Word everything that the Word sees.

59. The explanation is that any intellect is receptive of knowledge of any object, because it is receptive of the whole of being, and consequently it has a natural desire for any intelligible whatever; and if it knows anything whatever, if is therein naturally perfected. And what I say of knowledge I say also of seeing things in the Word, because that vision is the most perfect knowledge of an object that can be had. Therefore any intellect is receptive of the vision of anything whatever in the Word, and I mean this divisively, or one by one. Therefore any intellect is also receptive conjunctively of many visions at once in the Word as to all objects.

60. Proof of the consequence [n.59]: anything can be in anything; for if two things, since they are not opposed, can be present together in something, then infinite such things can be together in the same thing, because the reason for the impossibility or incompossiblity of infinite things is no different from the reason for that of two things; for any of them can be per se present and any of them can be present together in something, because they are not opposed; and as many as you like can be present together, because no new impossibility follows from the fact that the number of things that inhere is larger; and thus the conclusion follows. Such is how it is in the case of the proposed conclusion here, for just as the seeing of an object in the Word can exist in Christ’s soul, so can the seeing of two objects at once, for these objects are not repugnant; otherwise Christ’s soul could not see in the Word both its own blessedness and some other thing. And so, since his soul always sees its own blessedness in the Word, it could never see anything else. Therefore no number of objects posits either a new impossibility (as is plain) or a new opposition, because if there were an opposition it would be of one thing to another in respect of any intellect.

61. Nor is the infinity in question here incompossible with a created intellect. The proof is that something receptive, according to the strict idea of the receptive, is not more perfect in itself if it is in act with respect to its powers than if it is in potency with respect to its acts. The thing is clear because acts are outside the idea of the receptive (as is plain in the case of matter and form); therefore the intellect is not proved to be more perfect if it is in act according to all its passive powers than when it is in potency to the acts. But, as it is, the intellect is in potency to an infinite number of visions, for it is plain that it is, of its nature, in potency to any act and at the same time in potency to all of them; therefore if it were in act according to all those acts, a greater infinity would not follow then than now.

62. But if you say that it is not capable of all of them at once, then this is false, because it is in potency to all of them at once; therefore it can have all of them at once in act, for there is no opposition between the acts, and they do not require in the receptive thing anything repugnant to them.

63. Further, as will be said in the next question [nn.107-108], if Christ’s soul knows all singulars in their proper genus, that is, through their proper species, then also through infinite species, for the singulars can be infinite. But an infinity of visions is not more repugnant to the intellect than an infinity of intelligible species, because although the visions are in some way more perfect than the species they yet do not require a different idea in what is receptive of them.

64. A confirmation of this opinion [n.58], that it is in fact so, comes from Augustine On the Trinity 15.16 n.26, that “perhaps there will be no thoughts still wanted there.” For although this be doubtful about the blessed generally, yet about Christ’s soul, as being the most blessed, it seems probable that it will not have such thoughts; therefore whatever it knows habitually it can know actually.

65. There is a confirmation from Damascene ch.67/65, who says that Christ’s soul had foreknowledge of future contingents; this knowledge does not seem to be merely habitual, because future contingents, as it seems, are not of a nature to be known save intuitively, whether in themselves or in the Word.

66. Likewise, second act is more perfect than first act [sc. than habit], and so the first act would be more perfect if Christ’s soul knew that it was seeing everything actually than if it knew habitually; therefore one must show the impossibility of Christ’s soul seeing everything actually in order for this perfection to be lacking to it. So if the reasons adduced to prove this impossibility [nn.40-41, 51-53] can be solved, then it seems that the opposite of them should be held to be more probable.

67. Again, the act of glory does not seem to suffer interruption, and so it is not sometimes about one thing and sometimes about another; therefore it is about all them at once, and is so actually.

68. This opinion [nn.58, 67] could be stated in two ways:

In one way that Christ’s soul would have a single vision of the Word as primary object and of all that shines out in the Word as second objects, to which second objects it would not have distinct relations; nor for this reason would there follow an infinity in the act founding those relations, because they would only exist in potency. And in this way no infinity is posited in the act, because the object does not have actual existence.

69. In another way that there would be a vision proper to any object, such that infinite visions would be received in the intellect at once from the Word as cause. And according to this second way one would have to posit that some infinites exist - which seems to contradict many authorities of Aristotle and the saints.

70. If the first way is taken [n.68], it would not follow for this reason that the vision is formally infinite (the way the divine vision is), for it would not comprehend the first object or the secondary objects, nor would there follow from its perfection that it was of the secondary objects, but, given that it was only of the first object, it could be the same act (it is otherwise in the case of the divine vision with respect to itself and other things, for the divine vision is by its perfection necessarily of those other things).

2. A Doubt about Scotus’ Opinion

71. But given that Christ’s soul could receive a single vision with respect to infinites, or could receive infinite visions, there is a doubt whether as regards those infinite visions, if they exist, or as regards the single one, if it is in respect to infinites, a created intellect could have the idea of elicitive principle.

72. And it seems that it could, because the intellect elicits understanding as it is naturally prior to understanding; but by the fact that some understanding is elicited nothing is lost to the intellect of the perfection that belongs to it as it is naturally prior to understanding; therefore by the eliciting of one understanding its power of eliciting another is not taken away.

73. This reasoning [n.72] is confirmed, because it could elicit any of the infinite visions or understandings just as it could elicit some single one, even though it did not then elicit it; but even if it did elicit one, it remains in itself just as perfect insofar as it can elicit another; therefore it can elicit some single one.

74. But the contrary also appears to be the case, because any finite active virtue can have some effect intensively adequate to it, or several effects extensively adequate to it, and be unable to cause many at the same time; therefore no created intellect can elicit an infinite number of visions at the same time.

75. And then, in response to the first argument, about the priority of the elicitive principle to the effect [n.72], one should say that something prior can have several additional things posterior to it which it cannot elicit at the same time; and so, although nothing from it insofar as it is prior is taken from it by the fact that it causes one of the posteriors, yet it cannot at the same time cause any number at all of the posteriors.