Question Two. Whether it was possible for the Intellect of Christ’s Soul to See in the Word Everything that the Word Sees

9. Second I ask whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ’s soul to see everything in the Word that the Word sees.

10. That it was not:

Because then it would be able to see infinites; the consequent is false, for ‘it is not possible to traverse infinites’ (Metaphysics 2.2.994b29-31).

11. Further, the illumining of the good angels happens in ordered fashion, as is plain from Dionysius (Celestial Hierarchy ch.7); therefore, just as a higher angel is illumined before a lower one, so a higher angel is illumined before the soul of Christ is, which is lowest [sc. with respect to the angels], and a higher angel can illumine this soul as someone blessed who is higher illumines someone blessed who is lower; therefore the soul of Christ can see something new in the Word just as the angel illumining it can, because the one illumined does not see things in the Word before the one illumining does.

12. A confirmation of the argument is that the soul of Christ possesses, as to its being illumined, a certain order among illumined spirits; but it does not illumine the angels, for it does not have an active power with respect to them, since it is of a lower nature; therefore, it is illumined by them - which is the conclusion intended.

13. Again, where there are two dimensions, what is adequate to one dimension can be said to be equal to it even though it is not adequate to the other, otherwise a thing could not be at the same time both double and sub-double; therefore, if the soul of Christ knows all the knowable things that God does, it can be said to be simply equal to God; again, if it knows everything that God does, then it can do everything that God does!

14. To the contrary:

The Master in the text ch.2 says that the intellect of Christ’s soul sees everything that the Word sees.

I. To the First Question

15. There are two articles in the first question: first whether the intellect of Christ’s soul can be perfected with the most perfect vision of the Word; second whether it can be thus perfected first and immediately, without any form perfecting it beforehand.

A. It is Possible that Christ’s Soul is able to be Perfected with the Most Perfect Vision of the Word

16. To the first article of the first question one can answer yes for the same reason that, in d.13 n.47, I gave for Christ’s will being able to have the highest charity; and its having it in fact is just as likely.

17. There is a confirmation from Isidore On the Highest Good or Opinions 1, that “The Trinity is known to itself and to the man who was assumed,” and this cannot be understood save of knowledge in the ultimate state, whether simply so or the ultimate possible for a creature.

B. The Intellect of Christ’s Soul can be Perfected First and Immediately with the Most Perfect Vision of the Word

18. As to the second article, it can be said that insofar as the intellect has the idea of receptivity with respect to vision, no other form needs to be received beforehand in order for vision to be received in the intellect

19. Proof of the first proposition [n.18]:

If another form is posited, the object is not present unless, in absolute freedom, it represents itself, for the form cannot be a necessary reason for the object to be present as something seen, because “if he wishes he is seen; if he does not wish he is not seen” [Ambrose, on Luke 1 n.24]; also, when the form is not posited, the object can voluntarily impress itself on the intellect, and do so by actually causing vision in the intellect;     therefore etc     .

20. Further, if some form were necessarily in the intellect prior to vision, let it be called a: then a is related to vision either under the idea of efficient cause, or under the idea of material cause as that which properly receives vision (the way that the surface of a body is related to color, because surface is what properly receives color):

21. But if a is related in the first way [as efficient cause; Aquinas], then vision could be present in the intellect without a, for whatever God can do by an intermediate efficient cause he can do immediately as well, and do so as to anything that is receptive of vision.

22. If a is related in the second way [as material cause; Bonaventure], then it cannot be posited as something necessary for what is being proposed:

First because then the intellect, as it is some part of the soul, would receive blessedness in a, for matter that is receptive of many forms is immediately brought to rest when it has the most perfect form of which it is capable; the case here is of this sort, for the intellect cannot of itself receive other forms save through this form (just as a substance would receive blessedness in its surface if it could not of itself receive per se another form); and so the intellect, as it is some part of the soul, would be naturally at rest before the vision of the Word was present in it - which is impossible.

23. Second because if something absolute, which is the idea of receiving some form, exists per se, it can receive per se (as a surface, if it per se exists, can per se receive color); therefore if a is a something absolute other than vision and is the reason for receiving vision, and if it existed per se, it could per se receive vision, and thus, as existing per se, it could be beatified by vision - and consequently even now it would be immediately beatified; the consequence would also follow that the intellect would not be beatified now save per accidens (just as substance, as regards its passive potency, would be at rest per accidens in a color able to exist in its surface).

24. If, however, it be said that the whole, namely the intellect informed by a, would be per se beatified by vision [Bonaventure] - on the contrary: of one per se act there is one per se power (Metaphysics 8.6.1045b17-19), so of this one act, namely per se vision, the potency is not a per accidens whole; therefore the second [sc. the a by itself] will precisely be the proper and immediate reason for receiving vision; and so, as proved by the first two reasons [nn.19, 20-23], the intended conclusion follows.

25. Therefore it can be said that the intellect of Christ’s soul can passively receive the vision of the Word first and immediately [sc. without any preceding light or habit, nn.26-27]:

26. And such that it is not perfected first by some light as by an absolute form other than vision:

First because vision is perfect light; for, in the case of natural understanding, a light preceding vision is required due to the imperfection of the object, either because the intelligible thing is not actual of itself but through the agent intellect (which is the light whereby what is potentially intelligible becomes actually intelligible), or because, if it is actually intelligible, it is not sufficient of itself to move the intellect to second act. Neither of these is found in the present case because the divine essence is of itself supreme light and is intelligible in itself and is of itself most perfectly a mover of the intellect; therefore, no light to cooperate with it is required; for the more an object possesses the idea and perfection of a light able to cooperate with it, the less it needs it; therefore an object possessing altogether perfectly in itself a light of a nature to cooperate with it does not at all require light.

27. Similarly, no habit prior to vision itself is required for receiving vision, for a habit does not dispose a power to receive act but rather act is of a nature to be received first before the habit is. However, because an acquired habit in us has this perfection (because it is immanent in the soul as such when there is second transient act), the intellect, which cannot have the most perfection knowledge of several objects at once (for it is not in act), has a permanent knowledge of them at least in the way it is able to, and so it has this knowledge in habit; but if some act were of its nature as permanent in act as the habit with respect to it is, there would be no need to posit a habit, for such an act would have the perfection of both first and second act. But the beatific vision is of its nature a form as permanent in the intellect as is the habit that is posited as prior to it; for both always persist through the perpetual presence of the beatific object, and neither could persist otherwise.

28. And if an objection be raised against this, that then the intellect could see the Word by its purely natural powers, for it could do so without the light of glory and without a habit preceding vision - I respond according to your own statement, and say that this conclusion seems in some way to follow if one posits a light or habit preceding vision such that it is a necessary or sufficient reason for vision; for although a blind man may be given light miraculously, nevertheless he is, having been given light, seeing naturally, because he has a created form [sc. eyes] for the natural use of that operation. Thus, if some habit is supernaturally given to the intellect through which, when given, the intellect can, as through a sufficient form, see God, then, since this habit is something created and perfects the intellect naturally, the result would be that one could see God naturally through some created form. But this result would not follow if one denied such a disposition or preceding light (whether it is called a light or habit I care not), because in each instant naturally prior to the vision there is no cause naturally prior to it; for up to the instant of nature when the intellect sees, a created intellect does not have in itself power for that vision, but all that precedes is the intellect itself in itself, and the object - which object has the power to elicit the vision, and is not a moving power naturally proportioned to the created intellect, and is not of a nature to move it naturally.

29. Next to the form of the argument [n.28]: the conclusion does not follow save as to the fact that the intellect of Christ’s soul could naturally see the Word; but it does not follow that the vision could be in that intellect by its natural powers or by some natural cause; for it can only be made present by the Word immediately causing it, and when the Word causes he causes supernaturally. And to say this is the same as to say that the intellect of Christ’s soul could formally or receptively see the Word by its natural powers, but not that it could effect or elicit seeing the Word by its natural powers.

30. But if it be asked whether a created intellect without such a habit or light (let it be called a) could be disposed for such vision not only passively but also actively so as to elicit it, and to elicit it as perfectly as when it has a, I reply: Take the supposition that the intellect could be disposed actively with respect to the vision of the Word (which supposition was made above, n.21). Then, just as the intellect is actively disposed with respect to natural vision (namely insofar as the intellect is beatified in the same power, nn.26-27, and insofar as it is the principle of natural intellection, and thus insofar as its way of operating with respect to both objects is the same), one can, on the basis of the above supposition, say what was said to the fourth question of the preceding question, namely that if there is a necessary connection of second causes [d.13 n.84] one must say about the intellect what was said there about the will [d.13 n.85]. But as to the receiving of the vision, which the question here is about, there seems to be no simple necessity to concede that a must perfect the intellect first before vision; but if the intellect can receive two perfections in order, namely a as first act and vision as second act, then it is fitting that intellect and vision should be perfected in the same order, even though either perfection could, absolutely, be present without the other.

C. To the Principal Arguments

31. To the first argument [n.2] I say that the statement of Augustine can be explained through the remark at Physics 2.2.193b35 that “there is no falsehood when people abstract,” for someone who abstracts does not understand the thing to be other than it is but understands the thing in a way other than the way it is; so that the otherness in abstraction determines his understanding or states the way he understands, but it does not determine the object or state the manner of the object. Thus, in the matter at hand Augustine’s first proposition, ‘anyone who understands a thing other than the thing is errs’, is not true unless the ‘other than’ determines the object, namely the implicit being of it, and the sense is ‘anyone who understands a thing other than the thing is errs’. Then Augustine’s conclusion follows, for the same object, taken according to altogether the same idea of it as object, is not understood more by one person than another, because the ‘more’ here determines the object; and this is enough for Augustine’s conclusion. For therefrom follows that understandings do not proceed to infinity but that there is some supreme understanding; because if the object, on its part, is infinite it cannot be understood in different ways, and some understanding can exist that is adequate to an intelligible according to its intelligibility; and so, by parity of reasoning, another understanding, under the first intelligible, can be adequate to it; therefore too there will be some supreme understanding.

32. To the second [n.3]: although some deny that an object under the idea of the infinite is seen by any created intellect, that is, seen absolutely, and although they also concede that the infinite is concomitantly seen non-formally, yet I concede (as was touched on in Ord. I d.2 nn.130, 136, 138) that only something taken under the idea of the infinite can formally give rest to the intellect. I mean that if it is not formally but concomitantly apprehended under the idea of the infinite, it would not give rest to the apprehending power more than some other finite concomitant intelligible would (for infinity, as concomitantly compared to the apprehending power, is accidental to that power). It is like a triangle which, if it is compared to the intellect only as triangle and the concomitant color is not apprehended per se, does not give rest to the intellect more when white than when black. So too the divine essence only gives rest to the intellect as it is seen, and as it is existent in three supposits; and this fact, namely that the same numerical essence exists in three supposits, only belongs to the divine essence by reason of its infinity;     therefore etc     .

33. And then next to the two proofs to the contrary [n.3]:

To the first I say that although an object distinct in species proves a distinction in species of the act, it does not do so formally (for the object is not the form of any act) but causally, for a preceding cause that is an essentially necessary requisite establishes, insofar as it is distinct, a distinction in the thing caused. However, the specific unity of an object does not establish a unity in species of act, for the same object is the object of every blest intellect and also of every blest will, but volition is not of the same species as intellection. These acts then can be formally distinguished although they do not have objects that are formally distinct; and they can be distinguished formally otherwise than by their objects, because they can be distinguished by their power as well as by their essential causes; and so, given that they would not get distinction from an object that is not distinct in species, yet they are specifically distinguished by some other partial cause.

34. Nor does the Philosopher in On the Soul 2.4.415a18-21 say that acts get unity from the unity of the object but rather they get distinction unless some object is so adequated to the act that it would neither exceed nor could exceed it (as perhaps is the case in respect of its own act); it is not so in the issue at hand. There is an example in the case of motion and its term, for a distinction in the term of motion proves a distinction in the motion, insofar as motion is a flowing form, provided that the flowing form is of the same idea as the form that terminates the motion; but it is not necessary that the unity of the term of the motion prove a unity of the motion, because the same ‘where’ can altogether be reached by motions diverse in species, as by circular and by straight motion, and these motions are not comparable according to the Philosopher Physics 7.4.248a10-15.

35. To the second proof [n.3] I say that Augustine in City of God 12.18/19 says that “whatever is comprehended by science reaches its end in the knowledge of the knower” - which remark is not to be understood as that it absolutely reaches its end (for then God would not comprehend himself endlessly), but that it reaches its end in the knower, because it is disposed in respect of the knower as if it reached its end. Briefly, however, the only intellect that comprehends an intelligible is one whose perfection in intellectuality and in understanding is as great as is the intelligible’s perfection or intelligibility in being able to be understood; which is why there is a commensuration and adequation between them. For this reason, indeed, neither of them exceeds the other, so each, as it were, reaches its end in the other; for they are simply adequate to each other. It is like the way that, because of the equality of the divine persons, each person could be said to reach his end in another person because not exceeding the other person, though each person is simply infinite. Therefore, because no created intellect is able to have as much intellectuality, whether in first act or in second act, as is the intelligibility of God (on the contrary, the created intellectuality that was supposed to be commensurate with this intelligible in its intelligibility would have to go on being more perfect infinitely), so no created intellect can comprehend God, even though it see whatever, on the part of God, can be seen.

36. To the third argument [n.4] I say that light is required, but not a light different from the object when the object sufficiently supplies the place of light. For the fact that, in the case of natural understanding, the light is different from the object is because of the imperfection of the object; and so, in suchlike cases, no likeness can be drawn from plurality in things imperfect to a plurality in things perfect, for things dispersed in inferiors are sometimes united in superiors, and especially in a supreme that contains all things in one.

37. To the fourth argument [n.5] response can be made in the same way [n.36], because the likeness does not obtain between a natural and a supernatural act.

38. However one can reply in another way that the most perfect act of cognition can be elicited from a power without a preceding habit; for the intellect can most perfectly know the quiddities of the terms before any act of combining them and putting them together in a proposition, and of proving, from the ideas of these quiddities, the truth of the principle proposed in the proposition. For, as the Philosopher says in Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b24-25, “we know the principles insofar as we know the terms.” So assent is given to the principle and its terms before any generation of a habit. Although the habit follows such assent, the habit is also in some way necessary for the perfection of our nature, for knowledge of a principle could not in any way remain in us after the act ceased unless the habit of the principle remained - and thus would someone, after understanding the principle, be as much in essential potency to understanding as he was before.

39. The like can be said of the science of conclusions. For when the principles have been understood and from them has been inferred, by a perfect syllogism, a conclusion that is evident from the principles (according to the definition of perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24, that “nothing is needed for the necessity of it to be apparent,” that is, for it to be evidently necessary through knowledge of the principles and through the evidence of the inference), then the conclusion is necessarily assented to. Thus there is first an act of knowing about the conclusion and therefrom science about it follows, which is the habit of the conclusion - and so a habit is not presupposed to perfect act, but follows it and presupposes it [cf. Ord. Prol. n.9].

II. To the Second Question

A. First Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

40. To the second question the response is made [Aquinas] that the intellect of Christ’s soul cannot see everything that the Word sees. The reason is that the more perfectly a cause is seen the greater is the number of effects seen in it and conversely, as is plain about principle and conclusion; for the more perfectly a principle is seen the greater is the number of conclusions seen in it; so he who can see all the effects in a cause can comprehend the cause. No created intellect can do the latter; therefore not the former either.

41. A distinction is therefore drawn in God’s knowledge, one sort being that of simple apprehension, which concerns possibles, whether these are going to exist in some part of time or not thus going to exist, and another sort being that of vision, which is only of things having existence in some part of time. Everything that is known by the knowledge of vision is posited as known by the soul of Christ in the Word, but not everything that is known by the knowledge of simple apprehension.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

42. Against the reasoning of this position I argue as follows:

If b, c, d belong to a in a certain order such that b is the whole reason for c, then if he who understands b does not comprehend a, much less would he who does not understand c comprehend a. An example about subject, definition, and property: if he who understands the definition does not comprehend the subject, then he who does not understand the property would not understand the subject; or let a prior property be taken for the middle term, and let a more remote property be taken for the third term (which more remote property is present in the subject by reason of the prior property) - in this case the intended proposition is plain. But the properties of ‘being intensively infinite’ and of ‘being that to which infinite possibles are somehow reduced’ are related to God in an ordered way, such that it is because God is intensively infinite that infinite possibles are reflected in him and that he has power for infinite possibles, and not conversely. But someone who knows God under the idea of the intensively infinite does not for this reason comprehend God (from what was said in the preceding question, n.35); therefore, much less does someone who knows the infinites that are reflected in God, or who knows God’s infinite effects, comprehend God.

43. Besides, he who knows one effect in the Word does not comprehend the Word, nor does he comprehend the Word as cause of it; therefore, no matter how many effects he knows, he does not comprehend any of them, nor the Word as cause of any of them - and so, much less does he simply comprehend the Word even if he knows all the effects.

44. Further, the example about principle and conclusion [n.40] takes up something false: for a cause, qua cause, receives no perfection from the caused, for it is naturally prior to it; therefore knowledge of the principle, as it is cause of knowledge of the conclusion, is in no way perfected by knowledge of the conclusion.

45. Confirmation of the argument [n.44]: let some principle be taken as it is in some degree known; I ask whether some conclusion can be known through it such that precisely this knowledge [of the principle] stays in the intellect without increase or not without increase. If the first, then the proposition intended here is gained, that he who knows the conclusion does not know the principle more perfectly - and as this holds of one conclusion so it holds of any conclusion at all that is included in the principle. If the second, then this principle, as known in this degree, is not the principle, because it is [as thus known] not the principle of any conclusion - which is false; again, there would be a circle of causality [in knowing] between principle and conclusion.

46. There is also confirmation from the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 1.1.71a11-16, where he holds that one must know not only the ‘what it is’ of the subject but also the ‘why’ of the property and predicate. And his reason is that the whole idea of science is contained virtually in the whatness of the subject, and that in no way is knowledge of the ‘what it is’ of the subject acquired by the demonstration but is totally presupposed to it, and that what is acquired by the demonstration is only knowledge of the inherence of the properties in the subject; and so the upshot is that, as regard knowledge of the conclusion with respect to the principle, knowledge of the principle, the ‘what it is’, is altogether presupposed to the demonstration, and that it in no way becomes more perfect through the demonstration.

47. To the argument then [n.40] one can say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the arguing; for although he who more perfectly knows the cause more perfectly knows the effect, and so can know more things when the cause more perfectly represents the things caused, yet it is not, conversely, the case that when he knows more effects he then more perfectly knows the cause; for knowledge of the principle can stand in itself without being increased by the greater number of conclusions elicited from it. And can one also say the same about a cause and the several effects known from it.

48. As to the distinction which is used to solve the question about the two kinds of knowledge, namely knowledge of vision and of simple apprehension [n.41], I argue against it because the soul of Christ can apprehend in the Word any never-to-be future possible; therefore his soul has precisely no term set down for its knowledge of what God knows by the knowledge of vision. The proof of the assumption is that it is also likely that other souls will see in the Word, and see distinctly, that he can create things he does not create; so much more will Christ’s soul be able to see in the Word any of the possibles.

49. Further, it can be that his soul sees in the Word some possible in a relation of one thing to another; so, in order to avoid infinity, it is necessary to fix a term other than by inclusion of actuals and exclusion of possibles.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

50. Another response [Bonaventure] to the question is the distinction that the intellect of Christ’s soul is able to see everything in the Word habitually but not actually (and so about all souls).

51. Proof of the second part [the ‘not actually’]:

Infinite virtue does not have power for more than infinite objects; so if a finite virtue has power for infinite objects then a finite virtue would be equal with an infinite one, which is unacceptable;     therefore etc     .

52. Further, a finite virtue sees two things more distinctly than three things, and three things more distinctly than four and, thus continuing upwards, it sees a thousand things less distinctly than it sees a hundred;     therefore , thus continuing infinitely, it sees more things less distinctly than it sees fewer things; but to see finite things ad infinitum more distinctly than some infinite limit is not to see; therefore etc     .

53. Further, third, an extensive infinity presupposes an intensive infinity, according to Averroes On the Substance of the Globe ch.3; Christ’s soul cannot have an intensive infinity, since it is a creature and something finite; therefore it cannot have an extensive infinity for infinite objects.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

54. Against this opinion.

And first against the first part of the position, about habit [n.50]; if the sense is that a single habit is the reason for understanding infinite objects, this seems impossible (and this for the opinion’s own reasons); for then it would follow that such a habit is intensively infinite, as was proved in 2 d.3 nn.367-377 about the habit that some posit in angels which, as to itself, is representative of infinite objects.

55. But if you say that there are founded on this habit infinite respects to infinite objects, and that this could be without infinity in the foundation - against this the argument is that then, accordingly, the second member contradicts the first [n.50]; for the habit is hereby posited as founding infinite respects without an infinity in the foundation itself following on; therefore, by similarity, there is nothing unacceptable in some act being actually of infinite things through infinite respects to infinite things, and yet the act not being in itself infinite.

56. The point about respects [n.55] also does not hold, because some respects can be founded on a same thing and others not; for if there were an infinite number of whitenesses, an infinite number of likenesses would be founded on the nature of whiteness, because the very unity of the nature of whiteness (which is the proximate idea for the foundation of the likeness) would be, as concerns itself, in infinite things; but relations to what is essentially posterior [sc. the habit] cannot be infinite in relation to what is essentially prior [sc. the objects], especially when the priority is one of perfection (namely the perfection of efficient or final causality), because the more that something can be such a cause of many things at the same time, the more perfect it is; and so, if it can be of infinites at the same time, it can at the same time be in infinites [sc. if the habit can be of infinite objects, the habit must be infinite]. Such is the relation of a habit to an object known in first act, for the object is the idea in which the habit first has being.

57. Further, I prove that the second member contradicts the first [n.50] because every single habit in a single intellect can have an act or acts adequate to the habit or to the intellect where the habit is, for every finite total cause can be understood to have an adequate effect or effects. This single adequate effect, if posited, will be single for all objects (or several effects will be if several are posited), for the habit is posited to be for all the effects in first act, and so the second act will also be for all effects. Thus, either the habit is infinite, which is what is proposed on one side, and then an actual infinity follows just as does an habitual infinity. Or the single act, or several acts, which would be of infinite objects, would not be infinite, which is what is proposed on the other side, and then the finite habit would not be an infinity, for from a finite total cause an adequate infinite effect or effects cannot follow.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

1. The Soul of Christ sees Everything in the Word Actually

58. In a third way one can say that Christ’s soul does see actually in the Word everything that the Word sees.

59. The explanation is that any intellect is receptive of knowledge of any object, because it is receptive of the whole of being, and consequently it has a natural desire for any intelligible whatever; and if it knows anything whatever, if is therein naturally perfected. And what I say of knowledge I say also of seeing things in the Word, because that vision is the most perfect knowledge of an object that can be had. Therefore any intellect is receptive of the vision of anything whatever in the Word, and I mean this divisively, or one by one. Therefore any intellect is also receptive conjunctively of many visions at once in the Word as to all objects.

60. Proof of the consequence [n.59]: anything can be in anything; for if two things, since they are not opposed, can be present together in something, then infinite such things can be together in the same thing, because the reason for the impossibility or incompossiblity of infinite things is no different from the reason for that of two things; for any of them can be per se present and any of them can be present together in something, because they are not opposed; and as many as you like can be present together, because no new impossibility follows from the fact that the number of things that inhere is larger; and thus the conclusion follows. Such is how it is in the case of the proposed conclusion here, for just as the seeing of an object in the Word can exist in Christ’s soul, so can the seeing of two objects at once, for these objects are not repugnant; otherwise Christ’s soul could not see in the Word both its own blessedness and some other thing. And so, since his soul always sees its own blessedness in the Word, it could never see anything else. Therefore no number of objects posits either a new impossibility (as is plain) or a new opposition, because if there were an opposition it would be of one thing to another in respect of any intellect.

61. Nor is the infinity in question here incompossible with a created intellect. The proof is that something receptive, according to the strict idea of the receptive, is not more perfect in itself if it is in act with respect to its powers than if it is in potency with respect to its acts. The thing is clear because acts are outside the idea of the receptive (as is plain in the case of matter and form); therefore the intellect is not proved to be more perfect if it is in act according to all its passive powers than when it is in potency to the acts. But, as it is, the intellect is in potency to an infinite number of visions, for it is plain that it is, of its nature, in potency to any act and at the same time in potency to all of them; therefore if it were in act according to all those acts, a greater infinity would not follow then than now.

62. But if you say that it is not capable of all of them at once, then this is false, because it is in potency to all of them at once; therefore it can have all of them at once in act, for there is no opposition between the acts, and they do not require in the receptive thing anything repugnant to them.

63. Further, as will be said in the next question [nn.107-108], if Christ’s soul knows all singulars in their proper genus, that is, through their proper species, then also through infinite species, for the singulars can be infinite. But an infinity of visions is not more repugnant to the intellect than an infinity of intelligible species, because although the visions are in some way more perfect than the species they yet do not require a different idea in what is receptive of them.

64. A confirmation of this opinion [n.58], that it is in fact so, comes from Augustine On the Trinity 15.16 n.26, that “perhaps there will be no thoughts still wanted there.” For although this be doubtful about the blessed generally, yet about Christ’s soul, as being the most blessed, it seems probable that it will not have such thoughts; therefore whatever it knows habitually it can know actually.

65. There is a confirmation from Damascene ch.67/65, who says that Christ’s soul had foreknowledge of future contingents; this knowledge does not seem to be merely habitual, because future contingents, as it seems, are not of a nature to be known save intuitively, whether in themselves or in the Word.

66. Likewise, second act is more perfect than first act [sc. than habit], and so the first act would be more perfect if Christ’s soul knew that it was seeing everything actually than if it knew habitually; therefore one must show the impossibility of Christ’s soul seeing everything actually in order for this perfection to be lacking to it. So if the reasons adduced to prove this impossibility [nn.40-41, 51-53] can be solved, then it seems that the opposite of them should be held to be more probable.

67. Again, the act of glory does not seem to suffer interruption, and so it is not sometimes about one thing and sometimes about another; therefore it is about all them at once, and is so actually.

68. This opinion [nn.58, 67] could be stated in two ways:

In one way that Christ’s soul would have a single vision of the Word as primary object and of all that shines out in the Word as second objects, to which second objects it would not have distinct relations; nor for this reason would there follow an infinity in the act founding those relations, because they would only exist in potency. And in this way no infinity is posited in the act, because the object does not have actual existence.

69. In another way that there would be a vision proper to any object, such that infinite visions would be received in the intellect at once from the Word as cause. And according to this second way one would have to posit that some infinites exist - which seems to contradict many authorities of Aristotle and the saints.

70. If the first way is taken [n.68], it would not follow for this reason that the vision is formally infinite (the way the divine vision is), for it would not comprehend the first object or the secondary objects, nor would there follow from its perfection that it was of the secondary objects, but, given that it was only of the first object, it could be the same act (it is otherwise in the case of the divine vision with respect to itself and other things, for the divine vision is by its perfection necessarily of those other things).

2. A Doubt about Scotus’ Opinion

71. But given that Christ’s soul could receive a single vision with respect to infinites, or could receive infinite visions, there is a doubt whether as regards those infinite visions, if they exist, or as regards the single one, if it is in respect to infinites, a created intellect could have the idea of elicitive principle.

72. And it seems that it could, because the intellect elicits understanding as it is naturally prior to understanding; but by the fact that some understanding is elicited nothing is lost to the intellect of the perfection that belongs to it as it is naturally prior to understanding; therefore by the eliciting of one understanding its power of eliciting another is not taken away.

73. This reasoning [n.72] is confirmed, because it could elicit any of the infinite visions or understandings just as it could elicit some single one, even though it did not then elicit it; but even if it did elicit one, it remains in itself just as perfect insofar as it can elicit another; therefore it can elicit some single one.

74. But the contrary also appears to be the case, because any finite active virtue can have some effect intensively adequate to it, or several effects extensively adequate to it, and be unable to cause many at the same time; therefore no created intellect can elicit an infinite number of visions at the same time.

75. And then, in response to the first argument, about the priority of the elicitive principle to the effect [n.72], one should say that something prior can have several additional things posterior to it which it cannot elicit at the same time; and so, although nothing from it insofar as it is prior is taken from it by the fact that it causes one of the posteriors, yet it cannot at the same time cause any number at all of the posteriors.

D. How the Second Opinion could be Sustained

76. If this third way is not found pleasing, nor that Christ’s soul sees infinites elicitively (whether by receiving infinite visions of infinites or by receiving one vision of infinites [n.71-75]), one can say that it sees everything habitually in the Word but not actually [n.50] by explaining the distinction in this way: It sees the Word by some act or habit, and through the act all things shine forth in the Word as present in first act, and so are known to it habitually; for, speaking generally, that is said to be known habitually for which the habit is a sufficiently ostensive first act. There is not therefore any single habit in Christ’s soul which, by its single idea, displays infinite objects; rather that by which the soul sees the Word first is a first act by which shine forth for it all that shines in the Word - and this because the Word is an object manifest to it, and a willing mirror representing all things.

77. Let the second member [sc. ‘not actually’, nn.76, 50] be conceded -and what we find express in us declares in its favor, that attention directed to many objects is less perfect; and so it seems impossible for a finite power to see infinite objects at the same time with perfect attention.

78. Likewise, if Christ’s soul were to see infinites actually, the perfection of his soul would infinitely exceed the perfection of other souls, which seems unacceptable.

79. In favor of this can be adduced Avicenna’s remark (On the Soul part 4 ch.2) that ‘there is in the wisdom of the Creator no hiddenness save according to what can be received’, for although the Word, as willingly showing everything, is willingly present to Christ’s soul, yet that soul cannot receive everything at once but each singular one by one; and so Christ’s soul can see one thing after another as regards any of the numerically infinite things it turns itself toward. The result then is that it does not know everything [sc. actually], because all the things successively received are infinite.

80. And if it is objected that any blessed can in this way see anything in the Word non-simultaneously, I reply that for any other blessed the Word is a mirror representing a determinate number of things beyond which such soul cannot want, in ordered way, to see other things. But for Christ’s soul the Word is a mirror representing everything, and so this soul can want, in ordered way, to see as many of the infinite things as it has immediate power for seeing, just as if they were present to it through its own habit or through some known first act that could be called a habit.

E. To the Principal Arguments

81. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.10], it is plain that Christ’s soul can know infinites.

82. To the second [n.11], I say that although the illuminings happen in ordered fashion, yet not according to the order of natures but according to the order of graces; so the illuminings happen first to Christ’s soul, and by this soul are the angels illumined.

83. And when, in confirmation of this reasoning, the argument is made that the soul does not have an active power etc. [n.12], I say that, as concerns the action whereby a creature is said to illumine a creature, a rational soul is said to illumine an angel and conversely, for in the fatherland the souls of the blessed will have the same way of speaking to others as the angels also have; and so if some truth in the Word is revealed first to some soul before to an angel, that soul will be able to reveal it to an angel, and accordingly can illumine the angel, just as an angel can illumine a soul if another truth were revealed to the angel first.

84. To the argument about the proportion of cause to effect, of principle to conclusions [nn.13, 40], the answer is plain in the disproof of that opinion [nn.43-47].

F. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

85. To the arguments for the second opinion, which prove that Christ’s soul cannot see infinites.

To the first [n.51], when it is said that an infinite virtue does not have more power than for seeing infinites, I say that this is not true; for although it does not have power extensively for more than infinite things, yet it has more power intensively and can see more perfectly than any finite virtue; for its act would be more intense according to the proportion and greater virtue of the power.

86. To the next [n.52], when it is said that what sees things ad infinitum would see finite things more distinctly, it can be said that ‘to see more indistinctly ad infinitum in respect of more things’ is not necessarily the case on the part of the intellect as it is receptive, because it could receive from the object visions as distinct of more things as of fewer things. But the indistinctness [of vision] does hold of the intellect as it is efficient cause, and so, if the argument were valid, it would only prove that the intellect has no elicitive power with respect to infinite visions seen distinctly.

87. But it can be said that the argument does not even prove this, for although in fact the intellect in us understands more things less distinctly than fewer things, yet this does not hold of it as it is prior to the elicited act but it follows from something concomitant, namely from its state [sc. the fallen state of human nature, n.123]; and this state need not be posited of Christ’s intellect.

88. To the third argument [n.53] I say that ‘an extensive infinity that extends to infinite things as to receiving their forms’ does not prove an infinity of entity in the receiver (as is plain of prime matter, if it is receptive of infinite forms); on the contrary it proves rather the lowness of the entity; but ‘an extensive infinity that extends to infinite things as to effects it can cause at once’ does prove an intensive infinity, in that the manyness here does prove a greater perfection in that which extends to more things (but it does not prove it of something that is receptive and not causative).

89. But if one posits that the intellect is elicitive of infinite things [n.72], I still say that this infinity too does not prove intensive infinity of the intellect but rather of the object, for the object is principal in respect of the visions and is the principal active cause, but the intellect is not.