1. To the Argument on the Part of the Nature that is United

67. To the special argument on the part of the nature assumed [n.6] I say that human nature per se existing is not made complete by the same thing as is person by created personhood, because in the third article [nn.36-39] it was said that person does not ultimately exist by anything positive; but the nature per se exists, speaking of the proper existence of nature, by created positive existence.

68. To the first proof of the assumption [n.7], when the assertion is made that ‘its existence is per se existence’, I concede it in the sense that ‘to exist per se’ is distinguished from ‘to exist in’ (which is proper to accidents). But when the assumption is made that ‘per se existence in intellectual nature is personhood’, I deny it when universally taking ‘per se’ in the above sense, namely as it is distinguished from to exist per se in another, because there is required for personality the ultimate in absence or negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence on a person of another nature; but not everything that per se exists in the prior way (as it is distinguished from accident) need per se exist in this second way.

69. As to the second proof [n.8], it is plain that created nature is a ‘this’ by something positive, but not by something the same formally as the entity of nature, because repugnance to being divided does not belong to created nature save through some positive entity; but there is no need thus to posit, over and above that entity of singularity, some other positive entity of personhood.