136 occurrences of therefore etc in this volume.
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Seventh Distinction
Question Three. Whether Christ was Predestined to be Son of God
III. To the Principal Argument

III. To the Principal Argument

70. As to the argument [n.56] one can concede that, in respect of his being man, he was predestined to be Son of God to the extent the ‘in respect of’ states the formal idea according to which the extreme term is taken determinately in itself; for the man is formally God, and his predestination to be God preceded the man, that is, the person as existing in human nature; thus is the man made God. But if the ‘in respect of’ be taken properly as a mark of reduplication [cf. d.6 n.61 footnote], namely such that it states the cause of the inherence of the predicate in the subject, then in this way he is not God in respect of his being man, because he is not God by humanity.

71. One can, in another way, distinguish the major [n.56] when it says ‘he was predestined to be God in respect of his being God’, namely that the ‘in respect of’ can determine the act of predestination in the sense of ‘he is God in respect of the fact he was predestined’, or that it can determine the term of predestination thus, ‘he is God in respect of the fact he is God’. In the first way the major is false and the minor true [sc. that predestination precedes what is predestined]; in the second way the major is true and the minor false.

72. One can, in a third way, say, and perhaps more really, that neither in respect of his being man nor in respect of his being God was he predestined to be Son of God, because the phrase ‘to be predestined to be Son of God’ includes two things, one of which requires in the term something temporal (namely the ‘to be predestined’), and the other of which requires the term to be eternal (namely the ‘to be Son of God’). But, as it is, there is no thing the same that is the reason for both of them in the term; for although in the term two things come together, one temporal (which can be the term of the predestination) and the other eternal (because of which ‘to be Son of God’ may belong to the term), yet no one nature is the reason for both of these belonging to the term. But if something else were allowed to be the ‘in respect of’ as to the whole predicate, then a cause in respect of both in the predicate would be being indicated; and therefore properly - logically speaking - neither in respect of his being man nor in respect of his being God or Son of God is he predestined to be God or Son of God.