136 occurrences of therefore etc in this volume.
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17.
Book 3. Distinctions 1 - 17
Seventh Distinction
Question Three. Whether Christ was Predestined to be Son of God
I. To the Question

I. To the Question

58. I reply.

Since ‘predestination’ is principally a pre-ordering of someone to glory and to other things in their order to glory, and because glory for this human nature in Christ, and the union of it with the Word in order to glory, were pre-ordered, since a glory as great as has now been conferred on it should not have been conferred on it if it were not united to the Word - therefore, just as the merits, without which someone would not be ordered fittingly to a glory as great as he would be ordered to with them, fall under predestination, so this union, which is ordered fittingly to so great a glory, though not by way of merit, fell under predestination; and thus, just as this nature’s being united to the Word was predestined, so the Word’s being man and this man’s being the Word were predestined. -The inferences are proved by way of likeness, as was said about passive making [nn.44-48].

59. And if you say [Godfrey of Fontaines, Aquinas] that ‘predestination regards first the person, and so it is necessary to find first here some person to whom first God predestined glory and the union in its order to glory; but he did not predestine this union to any divine person (plainly not to the person of the Word as of the Word; and not to that person as human nature, because in this sense the union is included)’ - I reply: the proposition that ‘predestination regards the person alone’ can be denied; for just as God can love any good other than himself (not merely the supposit but the nature), so also can he pre-choose or pre-order for something other than himself a good fitting to that other, and thus he can pre-choose glory and a union in order to glory for the nature and not only for the person. However it is true that, in all other cases besides this one, predestination regards the person, because in no other case has God pre-ordered a good for the nature save by pre-ordering a good for the person, because a nature for which a good can thus be pre-ordered exists only in a created person. It is not so in the issue at hand.