I. To the First Question

A. Solution

12. The answer to the first question is plain from the first and last question of the first distinction. For in the last question [d.1 nn.211-220] it is said that the essence is not the formal idea of terminating the union, although it is the idea of effecting it; it was however able to be the formal idea of terminating, as was said in question two of the first distinction [d.1 nn.108-109].

13. So therefore, if the discussion is about the idea of causing the assumption, it is plain that the divine nature is the idea of causing it; but it is not in fact the idea of terminating it, though it could be that idea.

14. But if the question is asked about the assumer as term, one can say that if it is of the idea of the assumer that it have incommunicable subsistence and the essence by itself does not have incommunicability, then the essence cannot be the assumer as term. But if in the assumer, that is, in what terminates the union, a singular per se existence without incommunicability is sufficient, then, since ‘being per se and a this’ belongs to the divine nature, the divine nature would be able to do the assuming.

B. To the Principal Arguments

15. To the Arguments.

To the first [n.2]: a reply seems difficult for those who say that the property or the person differ only by reason from the nature [see Lectura 3 d.5 n.25 for how they should make reply].

16. It was said differently in 1 d.2 nn.388-390, that an entity incommunicable from the nature of the thing is not formally communicable; and so the Father communicates to the Son an entity that from the nature of the thing, before all operation of the intellect, is communicable and not incommunicable. And accordingly, whatever third thing they are compared to that belongs to one of them according to its formal idea, it should not belong to the other if it is not formally the same as the other; of this sort is the act of assuming according to one of the ways [supra d.1 nn.93-94, 108], because assuming belongs incommunicably to what is subsistent insofar as it is subsistent as to the term.

17. To the next [n.3] I say that infinity is not the idea of terminating this union but independent personhood is, from d.1 n.44 supra. But if you say that infinity can for something be the idea of terminating, because it supplies the place of any created supposit [cf. William of Ware, d.1 n.18 supra] - this can be denied if incommunicability is required in the term; for ‘infinite’ and ‘incommunicable’ are not formally the same, because everything infinite is formally communicable [sc. in God].