B. Rejection of the Opinion

33. Against these views, and first against the first article [nn.19-25].

If ‘as each thing is disposed to being, so it is to knowledge’ (n.20, Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31), and the singular adds some entity over and above the entity of the universal (from 2 d.3 nn.147, 168-70, 187-88, 192, 197), then the universal when known is not the total perfect reason for knowing the singular according to the total knowability of the singular - which is against him who holds this opinion [nn.24-25].

34. Further, where a plurality entails a greater perfection, a numerical infinity entails an infinite perfection. But so it is in the reasons about representation, because ‘to be apple to represent several things’ entails a greater perfection (for it entails that this single idea includes the perfection of two proper ideas, representative ideas, as I say); therefore being able to represent infinite things distinctly entails that the representing reason is infinitely perfect [2 d.3 nn.367-68, 1 d.2 n.127, d.3 n.352].

35. Further, the representing reason, uniform in itself and in the intellect, does not represent anything in a non-uniform way; nay, neither can the divine ideas - because they are reasons that naturally represent - represent to the divine intellect any diversity in the objects unless they necessarily naturally represent this, as was touched on in 1 d.39 on future contingents [not extant in the Ordinatio but in the Lectura]. Therefore this single idea (which is posited by Henry [nn.19, 24]) will either represent opposites at the same time, opposites pertaining to the existence of things, and this naturally (and then it will always represent opposites, and thus the angel will understand opposites and so nothing) - or it will represent one opposite determinately, and so never the other one. So if an angel at some time has a certain and determinate knowledge of one opposite - as to its existence - through this single idea, he will never through the same idea have a determinate and certain knowledge of the other opposite.

36. Further, fourth, there is particular argument:

An angel cannot, by this habit, know a revealed singular. - For it is posited [by Henry] that the singular is not known through the universal that shines in the habit save because the universal is participated in by the singular itself [n.24]. On this supposition I argue as follows: the singular is naturally known in revelation before the habit is the reason for knowing it; therefore the singular is naturally known distinctly before the habit is the reason for knowing it; therefore the habit is not the reason for the first distinct knowing of the singular - and thus we have the proposed conclusion [sc. set down at the beginning of this paragraph].

37. The proof of the antecedent is from their own statements, because the universal that shines in the habit is not the reason for knowing the singular save because the universal is in the singular, whether it exists in itself or in revelation [n.24]; so the singular naturally has such and such existence - and so naturally has the universal within it (the universal abstracted from it) - before the habit is the reason for knowing the singular.

Proof of the first consequence [n.36]: existence in revelation is nothing but the existence in actuality known by him to whom the revelation is made. For it is not existence in the intellect of the revealer, because this existence is eternal and perpetual; nor is it existence in any existence other than the knowledge of him to whom the revelation is made, because then - by the fact it would exist in such existence - it would be naturally known to anyone else, in the way this opinion posits that anyone can, by his habit, have distinct knowledge of anything existent [nn.27-28].

38. Further, from this position it follows that any existent singular will be naturally known to any other angel [nn.27-28], and so local distance will not impede the intellection of the angel, which is denied by many [including by Scotus himself, 2 d.2 n.205] and seems to be contrary to Augustine in his book On Care for the Dead ch.14 n.17.Here Augustine says, about Luke 16.19-31, that Abraham, because of distance in place, did not know that the rich man had five brothers but had to learn it from Lazarus. ¹⁴

39. Further, the reasons by which he proves that the singular cannot be understood by an angel [nn.20-23] seem to proceed from the view that knowing a singular is a mark of imperfection in the intellect; but this is false, because then the divine intellect would not know the singular. The reasons are also not conclusive, nor should the conclusion be conceded unless necessary reasons lead to it; for it is probable that just as some common sense can sense every sensible, so some created intellect can understand everything per se intelligible - of which sort the singular is.

40. Against the second article [nn.26-28] the argument is as follows:

Henry himself rejects species in blessedness, because one of the blessed would naturally see it in the intellect of a second blessed, and consequently he would naturally see what the species represents. So it is argued in the issue at hand: if the habit is the reason for naturally knowing the singular, then, since a first angel would see the habit naturally in another angel, the object that this other angel would see through this habit could not escape the first angel.

41. Further, when two intelligibles are compared to a same intellect which is not bound to the power of imagination, the more actual and more perfect intelligible - not exceeding the natural faculty of the intellect’s nature - is more intelligible to that intellect; but for Henry, a vague concept, formed in the intellect of the angel who does the speaking, is intelligible to the other angel by its natural power [n.29];     therefore much more intelligible to this other angel is the determinate concept which this vague concept expresses (because a determinate concept is more perfect and more intelligible; and the intellect of any angel whatever has any caused concept whatever for any intelligible not exceeding it, and this intellect is not bound to a phantasm, as is plain; therefore etc     .).

42. Further, third: either there is one act of understanding all singulars or there are different ones. If there is a single same one - and it is naturally of all singulars (for it is of them as it precedes the act of will of the one understanding, because it is through an action of understanding which precedes every commanded intellection and every volition) - then that act cannot be of one singular without being of another singular; just as neither can a natural cause, as far as concerns itself, be cause of one effect (to which it is naturally ordered) and not of another [sc. to which it is also naturally ordered] - and if by one action it is of all effects in general, then it is necessarily of all of them together. So if this act cannot be of all of them together, it cannot - as far as it is natural - be one and the same for all of them, because then it could (as such) be of all of them together. - If there are several acts, then one angel, seeing this and that act to be different in the intellect of the angel speaking to him, can distinctly see which object this act is of and which object that act is of; and thus it will not escape him what singular the speaking angel is considering, because of the identity of the non-varied act in that angel (for that angel will have different acts for considering different singulars).

43. Against the third article [n.29]:

First: it follows that in the intellect of the angel who is speaking there are two concepts about the same thing, one vague that designates and the other determinate that is designated [sc. which is unacceptable]; for it is then determinate when it is the reason for generating the vague designating one.a

a. a[Interpolation] Hence if the determinate conditions of the singular were in the hearer as they are in the speaker, the hearer would express that singular determinately to himself; but so it is in the case of an angel, because the habit he [Henry] posits is in the one angel just as in the other.

44. Further, it seems superfluous to posit this vague concept. For we express a determinate singular, known to us, through a vague singular, because we know we cannot cause a concept in the intellect of him to whom we speak and we know that the universal conditions of a vague particular are known to him; if we could make a distinct concept about what we were speaking about, a determinate singular known to us would not be expressed by a vague particular; therefore since an angel can make a distinct concept of a distinct singular known to him in the intellect of another angel (as will be plain in our solution [nn.49-52, 65]), in vain does Henry posit a vague indeterminate concept.

45. Against the fourth article [nn.30-32]:

First: it does not seem that the disposition for a purely supernatural form could be caused by an angel, because although for a form immediately producible by God (but as cooperating with the common course of nature) some natural cause could make disposition (as with the organic body in respect of the intellective soul) - yet for a form altogether supernatural (that is, without the common course of nature cooperating), that ‘a natural agent produce an immediate disposition’ seems unacceptable.

46. Further, the reason adduced for this article [n.32] would prove that the superior angel made the inferior angel see something revealed in the Word [nn.86-87]; for this is the ultimate perfection of the intellect, to see the Word, much more than to understand some revealed truth beyond the common course of natural intellection.

47. Further, against this whole opinion there are two difficulties:

First, how the speaking angel does not speak to just anyone. For if ‘to speak’ means precisely ‘to express a concept’ (which is seen in him as in a book [n.29]), and if this expressed concept can be seen by anyone equally - then he who expresses it speaks equally to anyone.

48. The other difficulty is how a first angel speaks to a second when he causes nothing in the second but only in himself [n.29]; for there seems no reason for the second to understand more now than before if nothing else comes to be in him. And this seems especially absurd in illumination [n.31], for it is clear that the first angel is illumined immediately by God and when God illumines he makes nothing in himself but the first thing he makes is in the intellect or angel illumined; therefore it is likely thus in the case of other inferiors who illumine, that the one who illumines does not cause anything in himself by the fact he illumines, but that the first thing caused is in the one illumined.