3. On Goodness of Virtue or of Circumstances

62. . It remains now to see about moral goodness and the malice opposed to it [nn.30, 34, 37, 40].

63. Here it is said that the bad angels cannot have a morally good volition, because they deform every volition by some disordered circumstance, referring it inordinately to love of self.

64. Likewise habit in them is perfectly bad, being in the term, and so most perfectly inclines them.

65. Therefore they never will well, because of the first point [n.63] - but they always will badly because of the second point [n.64], namely because of the vehemence of their inclination to evil.

66. For the first of these Augustine is adduced On the Psalms 118.11 n.5, “Lead me, Lord, in the way of your commandments.”“But because one is little able to keep the precepts of love by one’s own strength unless one is helped by him who commands that one do what he commands, ‘lead me,’ the psalmist says, ‘in the way of your commandments, because I have wanted it;’ my will is too little for me, Lord, save in that I have willed that you yourself lead me.” ¹⁰

67. Against the first point [n.63].

They have their natural powers complete (according to Damascene [n.4]), therefore there is in them a natural inclination to good; therefore they can, in accord with that inclination, will something in conformity to it, because their power - considered merely as to its nature - can elicit some act consonant to the natural inclination; therefore they can have an act that is not bad, because not contrary to their nature.

68. Further, they have ‘their worm’ [n.54], which is remorse for their sins; but that remorse is a certain displeasure, which displeasure is not a morally bad act because, although it can be deformed by a disordered circumstance, yet - focusing on the fact it is ‘a willing not to have sinned’ - it does not seem to be formally moral malice.

69. Further, if they do not will punishment to the extent it is an injury to nature, focusing on this alone (without any circumstance), it does not seem to be a morally bad act - because just as it is possible to love one’s own nature in a way that is not morally bad, so is it possible to hate what is contrary to it [n.41].

70. Against the second [n.64] I argue in three ways [nn.70-72].

First because it seems that the will could, of its own liberty, not will or not have any act. The proof is that according to Augustine Retractions 1.22 n.4, “nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself” - and this is not understood of the will as to its first being (because, as to its first being, non-will is more in its power than will), but it is understood as to operation. Therefore the will is more in a bad angel’s power as to operation than any inferior power; but the will can suspend any inferior power from every act - therefore it can also suspend itself; therefore a bad angel does not necessarily will bad.

71. Further, second: what is adduced about habit [n.64] is disproved in two ways.

First, because every habit inclines to some act in the same species; therefore this habit, which is posited as the cause of sinning, inclines either to an act of pride only or to an act of hate only. But to whichever act it is posited as inclining, it seems probable that he [a bad angel] could at some time not have that act, because he can have another act distinctly and with his whole effort, and he cannot have two perfect acts at the same time; therefore there is no single act that is necessarily perpetual from the vehemence of the inclination to it, and consequently there is not in general a bad act present necessarily from the habit.

72. Further, second: a habit is not in the power an idea of acting in a way opposite to the proper way of the power itself - which is proved as was proved before against the two opinions, in the reasoning about the priority of the cause as it is a cause, when the second cause does not determine the mode of acting for the first cause but conversely [n.17]. Therefore if a non-habituated will could non-necessarily will this thing (which belongs to the liberty in it), an habituated will may non-necessarily will it. - And then what the Philosopher says Ethics 7.8.1150a21-22, that ‘the bad man does not repent’, has to be expounded, that it is about ‘repents with difficulty’, because no act can be so intensely in the will that it altogether takes away power for the opposite.

73. As to this article [n.62], then, it seems one can say that the bad angels do not necessarily have some bad act, whether speaking of some determinate act or of some vague or indeterminate one.

74. And as to determinate act the point seems sufficiently plain, because if a bad angel has only a determinate habit, that habit inclines to a definite act, one in species -and it is plain [sc. from n.71] that he can have some act other in species than that one and, for that time, not have another act, and by parity of reasoning not have any other act at all to which such habit does not incline. He may also have several habits inclining to acts diverse in species, but some habit does not incline very strongly; and he is able not to have an act of that ‘non-maximally inclining’ habit; therefore he is able not to have an act of any other habit.

75. As to vague and indeterminate act the same thing is proved; either if he can suspend himself from every volition, as one of the reasons [n.70] proceeded (which, however, assumes a doubt, because it does not seem a bad angel could suspend himself from every act or volition). Or because sometimes he can have a volition that is not bad with the malice contrary to moral goodness, though he not have an act good with complete moral goodness [nn.68, 37] (which good act is based on all the circumstances [n.30]). Although there does not appear in this any impossibility to prevent him having an act completely good morally [n.67]; at any rate this seems probable, that he can have his act to be ‘good in genus’, that is, by focusing on this and not deforming it with circumstances contrary to the circumstances of good volition [n.169]. Or if he has the act circumstanced with certain good circumstances and disordered with certain bad ones, but it is not necessary that he be always bad; for it seems strange to deny natural power in that excellent nature where no reason appears that it should be denied. Yet it is probable that the bad angels do not proceed to act in accord with this power, because of the vehemence of their malice, and it is more probable that they act by this malice than that they act by the natural power by which they have ability for acts that are in some way opposite.