II. Scotus’ own Response

27. For the solution of this question [n.1] two things need to be seen; namely first the degrees of goodness and malice - second what goodness there could be in the volition of a damned angel, or whether any malice is necessarily present in it.

A. On the Degrees of Goodness and Malice

28. About the first I say that over and above the natural goodness of volition that belongs to it insofar as it is a positive being and that also belongs to any positive being according to the degree of its entity (the more the more, the less the less) - besides this goodness there is a triple moral goodness, disposed according to degree: the first of which is called goodness in genus, the second can be called virtuous goodness or goodness from circumstance, and third is meritorious goodness or gratuitous goodness or goodness from divine acceptation in its order to reward.

29. Now the first belongs to volition from its being about an object befitting such an act according to the dictate of right reason, and not merely because it befits the act naturally (as the sun befits vision). And this is the first moral goodness, which is therefore called ‘in genus’ because it is as it were material with respect to any further goodness in the genus of morals; for the act about an object is able as it were to be formed through any other moral circumstance, and so it is as it were potential; but it is not altogether outside the genus of morals (as the act itself in its genus of nature was), but is in the genus of morals, because it already has something from that genus, namely an object befitting the act.

30. The second goodness belongs to volition from the fact that it is elicited by the will along with all circumstances that have been dictated by right reason as having to belong to the will in eliciting the volition; for the good is from ‘an integral cause’ (according to Dionysius Divine Names 4) - and this is as it were the good in the species of morals, because it now has all the moral differences that contract the good in genus.

31. The third goodness belongs to the act from the fact that, on the presupposition of double goodness already stated, the act is elicited in conformity with the principle of merit (which is charity or grace) or according to the inclination of charity.

32. An example of the first goodness: to give alms. An example of the second: to give alms from one’s own property to a pauper who needs it, and in the place in which it can better befit the pauper and for the love of God. An example of the third: to do this work not only from natural inclination, such as could have happened in the state of innocence (or perhaps it could still now be done by a sinner if, while still being a sinner and not penitent, he were moved by natural piety for his neighbor), but also from charity, which he who acts from is a friend of God, insofar as God has regard to his work.

33. Now this triple goodness is so ordered that the first is presupposed by the second and not conversely, and the second by the third and not conversely.

34. To this triple goodness is opposed a triple malice; the first indeed is malice in genus, namely when an act that has only natural goodness (from which it should be constituted in the genus of morals) has malice because it is about an unfitting object (for example if ‘to hate’ is about God); the second is malice from some circumstance that makes the act disordered, even though the act is about an object fitting the act -according to right reason; the third is malice in demerit.

35. Now any of these malices can be taken as contrary to, or privative of, its goodness; and as taken privatively it only removes the goodness - but as taken contrarily it posits something beyond that lack which is repugnant to such goodness. And this distinction is plain in Boethius On Aristotle’s Categories 3 ch. on quality.

36. But malice in genus, taken contrarily and privatively, is convertible - and so, just as between immediate privation and immediate habit there is no middle, so good in genus and bad in genus are immediate contraries; the reason is that an act cannot not be about an object, and the object is fitting or not fitting to the act; and so necessarily an act is good in genus from a fitting object, and an act is bad in genus from an unfitting object.

37. Malice taken privatively and contrarily in the second way is not convertible. For an act can lack a circumstance required for the perfection of a virtuous act and yet not be elicited with a repugnant circumstance that would render the act vicious; for example, if one gives alms to a pauper not from the circumstance of the end (because one does not consider it), nor according to other circumstances required for a virtuous act, then this act is not morally good or vicious - nor however is it bad contrarily, because it is not ordered to an undue end, as one would do if one gave alms to a pauper for vainglory or some other undue end.

38. Malice in the third way taken contrarily and privatively is not convertible -because an act can be bad privatively (such that it is not elicited from grace), and yet it would not be de-meritorious; the thing is plain from the second way [n.37], because an act which is good simply in the genus of morals is not meritorious and yet not every such act is de-meritorious; and thus both in the second way and here there seems to exist an ‘indifferent act’ - an act that, although it is bad privatively, is yet not so contrarily (because it is indifferent), and this indifference will be spoken of elsewhere [d.41 nn.6-14 below]. Likewise, an act can be neutral in the third way (that is, neither good nor bad, taking these contrarily), not only because of the neutrality of the act in the second way, but because of the disposition of the operator; for example, if in a state of innocence -without grace - someone had rightly acted, that act would have been perfectly good in the second way and not good in the third way, because it did not have the principle for meriting nor was it bad contrarily.

39. Perhaps however in this present state of life there is no act neutral between good and bad taken in the third way, save in one case, namely when the act is good from its circumstance and yet to it charity does not incline. And the reason is that anyone now is either in grace or in sin. If in grace and he has an act good in the second way, then grace inclines to it and thus it is meritorious; if he has an act bad in the second way, it is plain that he is de-meritorious (for always the first malice brings in the second, not conversely; and the second the third, not conversely). But if he is bad [sc. in sin] and he has an act good in the second way, then he is not good in the third way and not bad in the third way; therefore he is neutral as to good and bad as these are contraries in the third way, but he is not neutral speaking of the second way.

B. On Goodness and Malice in the Bad Angel

40. About the second point [n.27] I say that a bad angel’s having a good volition can be understood of this triple goodness.

1. On Goodness in Genus

41. And as to the first goodness, which is in genus, there is no doubt but that he could and does have many volitions about an object befitting such act (as in loving himself, hating punishment, and thus in many others).

2. On Meritorious Goodness

42. But as to the other two modes of goodness, namely virtuous and meritorious, there is difficulty.

And first one must see about meritorious goodness.

Here I say that a bad angel cannot have a volition good in this way, understanding this in the composite sense, because that he is bad and that he has a volition good in this way do not stand together, just as neither can a white thing be black in the composite sense, because then the same thing would at the same time be white and black. But in the divided sense it can be denied of a bad angel either by logical potency or by real potency; if real, either the one which states the idea of principle or the one which is a difference of being and which states order to act [cf. Ord. 1 d.20 nn.11-12].

a) On Real Potency which is a Principle

43. About real potency then, one must see how a bad angel does not have ‘the potency which is a principle’ for willing thus.

This principle, first, is understood to be a passive one - and the bad angel has this, because his will is a thing receptive of some right volition; for what is of itself receptive of some right volition is, as long as it remains in itself, not non-receptive; but his will was at some time receptive of a good volition (because before damnation he was able to have merited and been blessed), and he has not lost his natural powers now; therefore now his will is a thing thus receptive.

As to, second, the active principle of right volition, we can speak either about the total principle of volition or about a partial principle. The will indeed is a partial active principle, as has been touched on [I d.17 nn.32, 151-153; Lectura 2 d.25 n.69]; and the bad angel has it complete (according to Dionysius, [n.4]) and the same as he had it in the state of innocence; and consequently it is not true to deny the potency of him, that is, the partial active principle of meritorious volition. But this is not the total principle, because the will alone does not suffice for meritorious willing, but grace is required as a cooperating principle; nor is his will a ‘partial principle’ that is principal or sufficient for putting another partial principle in being; for although a will using the grace already possessed is principal agent as regard the act, however, when grace is not possessed, the will is not sufficient for putting grace into existence, because grace cannot be put into existence save by God alone creating it.

45. And thus a bad angel does not have the total active principle for acting, nor is he a partial active principle in whose power it is to produce in being the remaining partial active principle and to remove the impediments to the use of himself and of his principle for eliciting the act and effect that is common to them. An example of this would be if someone possessed of sight were in darkness; although he would then have a partial principle for an act of seeing (and a principal principle for seeing when light and the visual power come together), yet he does not then have the total principle nor the principal principle sufficient for putting into existence what is required for the effect of these two partial principles, nor even would he be able to remove impediments; and therefore although he has the visual power (inasmuch as he has a principle diminished with respect to vision), yet it would not be in his power to see. Thus I say that it would not be in the power of a bad angel to will meritoriously, because it is not in his power to have grace nor - by consequence - to use grace, nor even to use his will along with the grace for eliciting his act; but all these negative statements are true because it is not in his power to have the form which he is to use, or to remove impediments.

46. But there is here a doubt, because although what has been said about the active principle is true in comparison with the principal effect (which is to act meritoriously from the grace by which one meritoriously wills), yet it remains doubtful about the dispositive principle - or the principle active for disposition - with respect to the principal agent; namely whether he who has the will as principal active principle can dispose himself for grace.

And if so, then it is in a bad angel’s power to will well, just as this is in the power of a wayfaring sinner; for the bad wayfaring sinner cannot do more than dispose himself, and then grace is given him by God whereby he afterwards acts well.

47. Now whether the wayfarer can have some motion of attrition from his pure natural powers, under the existence of general influence, or whether some special operation is required will be discussed later [Ord. 4 d.14 q.2 n.4]; but on the supposition that he can, someone might deny this dispositive power of a damned angel and assert that it can belong to a wayfaring sinner.

But there is an obstacle to this from the authority of Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.12], which more concedes to a fallen angel the power for returning to good from his pure natural powers than to a fallen man; therefore if a man wayfarer can from his pure natural powers have this dispositive power, much more so can an angel.

48. According to this, then, as to all the members about potency as it is a principle [nn.43-45], it does not seem one should deny of the bad angels that they can will meritoriously, save that they do not have the total principle of meriting, nor the principal partial principle, either with respect to good volition or with respect to the special grace which is required for good volition; and yet neither can a bad angel will well in the same way that a wayfaring sinner can, as will be said later [nn.54-56].

b) On Real Potency which is a Difference of Being

49. If the understanding is about the potency that is a difference of being, namely what is ordered to act - then it can be conceded [sc. that a bad angel can have a meritoriously good will] as to remote potency, namely the potency that follows the idea of passive and active potency (although secondarily and in diminished fashion); but it cannot be conceded as to proximate potency, because it only issues in act when all impediments are removed, such that what has it can at once issue in act; and this sort of potency does not come from the passive potency that a [bad] angel has, nor from the partial cause that the will is; for one of the partial causes needed for acting [sc. grace] is lacking

c) On Logical Potency

50. But if it is understood of logical potency, which states the manner of composition formed by the intellect, then in this way the impossibility can be in the composition either because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms to each other or because of an extrinsic repugnance to what is required for the extremes to be united. An example of the first is ‘man is irrational’. An example of the second is if the eye were in darkness and it were impossible for the opaque obstacle causing the darkness to be removed, then it would be impossible to see; not to be sure because of the intrinsic repugnance of the terms (which terms are ‘eye’ and ‘to see’) but from the repugnance to one or other term of something extrinsic, namely the repugnance of the opaque obstacle to the term ‘to see’.

51. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that there is not here [sc. in a bad angel] an impossibility from an intrinsic repugnance of the terms or extremes; on the contrary there is no repugnance to the predicate in the subject. If there is any impossibility, then, it will be from the repugnance of something extrinsic to the union of the extremes; but this extrinsic thing can only be the active cause that is required for the extremes to be united; such a cause, with respect to the union of grace with some subject, is not of a nature to be any other cause than God; therefore, it will only be impossible for the bad angels to will well or to have grace because it is impossible for God to give them grace.

52. Now the impossibility on the part of God is assigned in two ways: on the part of absolute power and on the part of ordained power [Ord. 1 d.44 nn.3-11].

Absolute power is in respect of anything that does not include a contradiction. And it is plain that it is not impossible in this way for God to give grace to that nature; for since that nature is capable of grace (as touched on when discussing passive potency [n.43]), the consequence is that there is no contradiction in the proposition ‘grace actually informs that nature’.

53. The ordained power of God, as was touched on earlier, is that which is conform in its acting to the rules predetermined by divine wisdom (or rather, by divine will [1 d.44 nn.3, 6-7, 1 d.3 n.187]) - and, as to beatifying or punishing the rational creature, the rules are those of ordained justice. These rules are collected from the Scriptures, among which is the authority of Ecclesiastes 11.13, “Wherever the wood falls, there will it be” (that is, in the love of whatever thing the rational creature will have remained, in that it will continue to remain).

54. And Augustine concludes, City of God 21.23, from such rules of Scripture (for example Isaiah 66.24, “their fire will not be extinguished, and their worm will not die,” and Matthew 25.46, “these will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life”), that it is certain God will never give them grace. According to this then it would be impossible for the bad angels to will well, because it is impossible by God’s ordained power to give them grace.

55. But against this it is argued that then there seems to be an impossibility in the same way about the wayfaring sinner who, however, will not in the end repent - for God has pre-ordained not to give him grace; and if the impossibility is only on this side, because of this sort of order, then it does not seem more impossible for a demon to repent than for such a sinner to repent.

I reply that the ordained power of God does not regard particular divine acts (about which there are not universal laws), but regards the universal laws or rules of doable things; of such sort is the law about the damned - and there is no such law about the bad while they are on the way, even if they remain finally bad. An example of this: if someone had laid down that every murderer should be killed, it would not be possible by ordained power - according to the order already in place - to save this particular murderer; if however he could kill a murderer but not because of some such universal law, he could also save him (or not kill him) even by ordained power. Thus a wayfarer who will not be saved can be saved, because there is no universal law laid down already against this as there is against the salvation of the damned.

56. If it be objected against this that ‘as law is about the universal so is judgment according to law about the universal, and the judgment follows from the law (    therefore the reason there can be no going against the law is equally a reason there can be no going against judgment following the law); but this wayfarer, if he will be damned, will be so according to a judgment consonant to the law; therefore etc     .’ - I reply that the law is about him who is bad in the term, and therefore when the law is applied to some particular individual (that is, to this or that already judged individual, because he is in the term), the judgment is no more revoked than is the law; but about this bad individual still present on the way there is no judgment by any law, just as the general law itself does not extend itself to the wayfarer.

57. There is another doubt: is this obstinacy of a bad will from God or from the bad will itself? For if it is from the will, it seems that the will could spring back itself from the obstinacy, just as it could of itself have willed the bad; for the power by which it moves itself to something is the same as that by which it rests in it, and it can withdraw itself from it and move to something else that more inclines it, of which sort is the object of it. But if the obstinacy is in place from God, then the malice will be from God, and thus God is cause of sin, which seems unacceptable.

58. On this point.

Although Augustine [Fulgentius] may seem to say, On the Faith to Peter ch.34 that God has ordained the turning away of the will to evil to abide perpetually, and obstinacy is sign of a bad will - yet because the act, while it exists, has as it were a cause continually (because its being is as it were in a state of continually being caused), then just as God cannot be the cause of bad ‘qua bad’ in the first act of eliciting it so neither is he in its continued being, which is its ‘being continually elicited’; therefore the will alone will be the cause, but from God is the punishment of fire, which is what punishes evil. Also, this obstinacy, as it states the malice of sin in the will, can be said to be from God, not indeed as positively willing it, but as abandoning and refusing to give grace; for just as God graces him whom he disposes to give grace to, so he does not grace him whom he forsakes (that is, with respect to the gracing that he has a refusing of).

59. When, therefore, it is argued that if the obstinacy is from the will alone then the will alone can spring back to the opposite (namely back from the object toward which it inordinately inclined itself) - I reply and say that for springing back meritoriously there is required a principle other than the will, namely grace, which a bad angel cannot have of himself - and God, according to his desertion of him, has disposed not to give him grace. But if you argue that a bad angel can at least have a ‘circumstanced willing’ as to what he inordinately willed, although that willing would not be meritorious for him -then this belongs to the following point, namely about moral goodness [nn.75, 28, 30, 39].

60. From what has been said, then, it seems there is no denial of power, that is, of power as active principle, unless ‘active principle’ is taken to be the total or principal principle [n.44]. Nor is there denial of the power which is order to act, save of proximate power [n.49]. Nor denial of logical power save extrinsically [n.51], on which side there is no impossibility of uniting the extreme terms when speaking of God’s absolute power [n.52], but there is when speaking of his ordained power, as collected from Scripture (as was said before from Augustine [n.54]), because God has not disposed to unite those extreme terms, and because there is no other cause of the permanence of the bad in bad than divine abandonment [n.58] - or the fact God has disposed not to give them grace, since they are in the term [n.59], and that he has not made this disposition about bad wayfarers [nn.55-56].

61. It seems too that this is proved by the authorities of the saints - first from Damascene ch.18, “What the fall is for the angels, this death is for men;” second from Augustine City of God 21.11, 23, “There is nothing more certain in Scripture than the judgment [sc. about the saved and the damned] of Scripture.”

3. On Goodness of Virtue or of Circumstances

62. . It remains now to see about moral goodness and the malice opposed to it [nn.30, 34, 37, 40].

63. Here it is said that the bad angels cannot have a morally good volition, because they deform every volition by some disordered circumstance, referring it inordinately to love of self.

64. Likewise habit in them is perfectly bad, being in the term, and so most perfectly inclines them.

65. Therefore they never will well, because of the first point [n.63] - but they always will badly because of the second point [n.64], namely because of the vehemence of their inclination to evil.

66. For the first of these Augustine is adduced On the Psalms 118.11 n.5, “Lead me, Lord, in the way of your commandments.”“But because one is little able to keep the precepts of love by one’s own strength unless one is helped by him who commands that one do what he commands, ‘lead me,’ the psalmist says, ‘in the way of your commandments, because I have wanted it;’ my will is too little for me, Lord, save in that I have willed that you yourself lead me.” ¹⁰

67. Against the first point [n.63].

They have their natural powers complete (according to Damascene [n.4]), therefore there is in them a natural inclination to good; therefore they can, in accord with that inclination, will something in conformity to it, because their power - considered merely as to its nature - can elicit some act consonant to the natural inclination; therefore they can have an act that is not bad, because not contrary to their nature.

68. Further, they have ‘their worm’ [n.54], which is remorse for their sins; but that remorse is a certain displeasure, which displeasure is not a morally bad act because, although it can be deformed by a disordered circumstance, yet - focusing on the fact it is ‘a willing not to have sinned’ - it does not seem to be formally moral malice.

69. Further, if they do not will punishment to the extent it is an injury to nature, focusing on this alone (without any circumstance), it does not seem to be a morally bad act - because just as it is possible to love one’s own nature in a way that is not morally bad, so is it possible to hate what is contrary to it [n.41].

70. Against the second [n.64] I argue in three ways [nn.70-72].

First because it seems that the will could, of its own liberty, not will or not have any act. The proof is that according to Augustine Retractions 1.22 n.4, “nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself” - and this is not understood of the will as to its first being (because, as to its first being, non-will is more in its power than will), but it is understood as to operation. Therefore the will is more in a bad angel’s power as to operation than any inferior power; but the will can suspend any inferior power from every act - therefore it can also suspend itself; therefore a bad angel does not necessarily will bad.

71. Further, second: what is adduced about habit [n.64] is disproved in two ways.

First, because every habit inclines to some act in the same species; therefore this habit, which is posited as the cause of sinning, inclines either to an act of pride only or to an act of hate only. But to whichever act it is posited as inclining, it seems probable that he [a bad angel] could at some time not have that act, because he can have another act distinctly and with his whole effort, and he cannot have two perfect acts at the same time; therefore there is no single act that is necessarily perpetual from the vehemence of the inclination to it, and consequently there is not in general a bad act present necessarily from the habit.

72. Further, second: a habit is not in the power an idea of acting in a way opposite to the proper way of the power itself - which is proved as was proved before against the two opinions, in the reasoning about the priority of the cause as it is a cause, when the second cause does not determine the mode of acting for the first cause but conversely [n.17]. Therefore if a non-habituated will could non-necessarily will this thing (which belongs to the liberty in it), an habituated will may non-necessarily will it. - And then what the Philosopher says Ethics 7.8.1150a21-22, that ‘the bad man does not repent’, has to be expounded, that it is about ‘repents with difficulty’, because no act can be so intensely in the will that it altogether takes away power for the opposite.

73. As to this article [n.62], then, it seems one can say that the bad angels do not necessarily have some bad act, whether speaking of some determinate act or of some vague or indeterminate one.

74. And as to determinate act the point seems sufficiently plain, because if a bad angel has only a determinate habit, that habit inclines to a definite act, one in species -and it is plain [sc. from n.71] that he can have some act other in species than that one and, for that time, not have another act, and by parity of reasoning not have any other act at all to which such habit does not incline. He may also have several habits inclining to acts diverse in species, but some habit does not incline very strongly; and he is able not to have an act of that ‘non-maximally inclining’ habit; therefore he is able not to have an act of any other habit.

75. As to vague and indeterminate act the same thing is proved; either if he can suspend himself from every volition, as one of the reasons [n.70] proceeded (which, however, assumes a doubt, because it does not seem a bad angel could suspend himself from every act or volition). Or because sometimes he can have a volition that is not bad with the malice contrary to moral goodness, though he not have an act good with complete moral goodness [nn.68, 37] (which good act is based on all the circumstances [n.30]). Although there does not appear in this any impossibility to prevent him having an act completely good morally [n.67]; at any rate this seems probable, that he can have his act to be ‘good in genus’, that is, by focusing on this and not deforming it with circumstances contrary to the circumstances of good volition [n.169]. Or if he has the act circumstanced with certain good circumstances and disordered with certain bad ones, but it is not necessary that he be always bad; for it seems strange to deny natural power in that excellent nature where no reason appears that it should be denied. Yet it is probable that the bad angels do not proceed to act in accord with this power, because of the vehemence of their malice, and it is more probable that they act by this malice than that they act by the natural power by which they have ability for acts that are in some way opposite.