III. To the Arguments for the Opposite

79. To the first argument for the opposite [n.29] I say that the first sin was not the greatest; for just as in the case of goods there is a process from the more good to the less good (as from love of the end to love of what is for the end), so - conversely - in the case of bads there is a process from the less bad to the greater bad, according to Augustine City of God 14.28 [n.46], “love of self to contempt of God.”

80. The other two arguments, namely about the passion of the irascible power in respect of the concupiscible, and about the appetite for one’s own excellence (speaking of excellence as it states a comparison to others of the one excelling [nn.30-31]), can be conceded, because - as concerns the act of concupiscence - the angel did not first covet excellence, which is a passion of the irascible or the concupiscible, but most perfect blessedness; however if we speak of the first inordinate willing of friendship, one can say that it was not an act or a passion of the irascible, but of the concupiscible; for if it is the mark of the concupiscible to covet the good for the one loved, it is its mark to love also the loved good for whom it covets that good.

81. To the verse from 1 Timothy 6.10, “the root of all evils is greed”...Scotus here responds to an argument not given above but contained in the Lectura 11 d.6 n.21. It has no particular reply there but only the general one that the answer to objections is plain from what has been said. The fourth argument given above in the Ord. here is not responded to by Scotus. ⁸