Single Question. Whether the higher Part of the Intellect is a Power distinct from the inferior Power

Scotus, Sent.2 d.24 q.1
Aquinas, ST Ia q.79 a.9
Richard of St. Victor, Sent.2 d.24 q.4
Durandus, Sent.2 d.24 q.4

1. About the twenty fourth distinction the question asked is whether the higher and lower parts [of the intellect] are two distinct powers.

2. That they are: Powers are distinguished by their objects, On the Soul 2; but the objects of these powers are most distinct, namely the temporal and the eternal;     therefore etc     .

3. On the contrary is Augustine On the Trinity 12.4, that we divide the soul into these two, namely the higher and lower part, only by their offices.

To the Question

4. I reply: one understanding can be and is that the higher part is a single power and the lower part is a single power, and that these are distinct; and this understanding is impossible, because, according to Augustine above, the whole image of the Trinity is in the higher part alone, and the nature of the image according to him consists in intellective memory and will, which are two powers, as is plain.

5. There is a confirmation, because the higher part, according to Augustine, has respect to higher things. And it is plain that the intellective memory and the will have respect to eternal things. Therefore likewise the lower power embraces two powers, namely the same powers, and it has respect to temporal things in their order to eternal ones.

6. There is another understanding, which says that it can be and is the case that the memory that is in the lower part is different from the one in the higher part, and the intellective power and the will are likewise different. This understanding too is false, because it belongs to the same power to regard the end and what is for the end. But, as was said, the lower part has respect to temporal things in their order to eternal ones.     Therefore etc     .

To the Argument

7. To the main argument [n.2], therefore, I say that a formal distinction of objects proves a distinction of powers whereas a material distinction does not. But the latter is how things are, because temporal and eternal are material contradictions with respect to the formal object of the intellective and voluntative powers, since such powers abstract from these contradictions, as is plain; for there is a common power for both of them, and therefore such contradictions only materially vary the object. An example: color is the adequate object of sight and is the formal object of sight; but whiteness, since it is not the adequate object of sight, is the material object; and so, whatever does not perceive color is not sight, but not whatever does not perceive whiteness, for sight also perceives blackness.

8. On the contrary: this solution begs the question, as is plain if one considers it, and it also assumes something false. For I say that whiteness and this whiteness are the formal object of sight; for if sight were an intellect abstracting color from this whiteness and from this blackness and the like, the eye of an ox would still see this whiteness as its formal object, but the eye never sees this or that color. There is a fallacy then over adequacy and formality, for these ideas are not equivalent save only in the object of the divine intellect and will; for in their case the formal idea of [the divine] essence is the formal and the adequate object, and the reason is that this formal idea contains all intelligible and willable things. But there is nothing that contains all colors, and so on in other cases; therefore contraction and particularization do not take away the formal idea of the object, but they do take away the idea of adequation.

9. To the argument [n.2], then, it is sufficient to say that, although the temporal and eternal are distinct formal ideas, yet it does not follow that they distinguish the powers, as is plain of whiteness and blackness with respect to the same power of sight. However, to find a precise reason for distinction in powers is very difficult; but more was said on this topic in book one.