II. To the Principal Argument

8. To Anselm [n.2]a I say that freedom absolutely is a perfection simply; so, according to him, it is posited as existing formally in God. Freedom in us is limited, but it can be considered according to its formal reason without the limitation, and then it is not a limited perfection but a perfection simply (an example: wisdom is a perfection simply and the idea of it is also absolutely in us; and yet not only so, but with a limitation, in the sense that our wisdom includes two things, one of which is a perfection simply and the other not, but includes the limitation). Thus I say that this will of this species, which is in us, includes liberty, which is a perfection simply; but it does not include it alone but with a limitation, and this limitation is not a perfection simply; by reason of the first the ability to sin does not belong to it, nor is it the proximate foundation of the order to being actually deficient, but by reason of the second.

a. a[Interpolation] The answer to the first argument can be clear from what was said. But as to the intention of Anselm:

9. The authority of Anselm must therefore be expounded in this way, that being able to sin is not part of freedom as freedom is a perfection simply, nor is anything else proved by Anselm’s argument about the ability to sin not existing in God. But if this created freedom is taken according to its own order, the ability to sin is not part of it; however, as it states the proximate foundation of this order, then the ability to sin is part of it.a But as this power is some positive being, thusb is it from God, “for from him and in him and through him all things are; to whom be honor and glory for every and ever. Amen” [Romans 11.36].

a. a[Interpolation] To the second [n.2 interpolation b] I say that the power to sin, which is the foundation, is more eminently in God than in the creature. But that this power is thus more eminently in God is not because it is a power for immediately causing that act [sc. sin] in himself, just as the power to run is in God, but not so that he can cause an act of running in himself immediately, but in another in whom running is of a nature to exist.

You will say that by the same reason the act of sinning can exist eminently in God.

One must reply that the act of sinning as concerns what is positive in it (namely the substrate act) is in God.

To the third [n.2 interpolation b] one must say that the power to sin has an order to other powers as it is the foundation of the order to act, and it is a higher power; but if the discussion is about the totality of it, then, by reason of the privation, it would be last in order.

But of what sort is it by reason of the positive element in it?

One can say that order is found in three ways in powers: either by reason of the terms that they are powers for, or from themselves considered in themselves, or from their mode of operating.

By reason of the terms I say that the power is not higher, because there is a power in nature for substantial form, but this power is for an accidental form; but every substantial form is more perfect than an accidental form.

In the other two ways the power can be higher:

In the first way as it is in itself, as to the nature it exists in, because it exists in a nobler nature (namely an intellectual nature), and in a supreme nature (as the angelic nature); and it is the supreme power in that nature.

But as to the mode of operation it can be said to be a more perfect power; for the more something is more absolute in relation to a posterior, the more perfect it is; hence because God is most perfect, there is in him no real respect to a posterior. Also, the more something is more absolute in relation to a posterior, the more the posterior depends on it - as is plain in the case of God, because he has such perfection. Now the will is, among the other powers, more absolute in relation to a posterior; for the other powers depend on it in their acts, but it, in its idea of cause, depends on none.

b. b[Interpolation] Therefore it is plain from what has been said that the power to sin is from God in every way in which it is something positive.