Single Question. Whether a Created will can Sin from Malice

1. Concerning the forty third distinction the question is raised whethera a created will can sin from malice, by wanting something not shown to it under the idea of true good, that is, of good simply, or of apparent good or good in a certain respect.

a. a[Interpolation] Concerning this forty third distinction, where the Master deals with the sin against the Holy Spirit, two questions are raised: first whether a will can sin against the Holy Spirit; second whether a created will can sin from malice, by wanting something not shown to it under the idea of true good, that is of good simply, or of apparent good or good in a certain respect. Argument about the first [here the text from William of Alnwick follows, Additiones Magnae d.43 q.un]. About the second, namely whether...

I. Opinion of Others

A. Statement of the Opinion

2. Here the statement is made [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton]Bonaventure, Sentences 2 d.34 a.1 q.3, “One must say that it is possible to speak about evil in two ways, either about that which is bad or about bad under the idea of bad... If intention is compared to bad under the idea of bad, it can be so in two ways: either such that it intends to do this as bad simply or as bad for itself, and no one intends in this way, because nothing is desired by the will save under the idea of good simply or good for itself; or such that it intends this as bad simply but as good for itself, and in this way bad can be done by intention and is sometimes so done, though not by all but by the malicious, who, because of the corruption of their inner palate, taste bad things as good.” ⁵⁶ that it cannot, following the authority of Dionysius Divine Names ch.4, “No one acts looking to what is bad.”

B. Rejection of the Opinion

3. But against this it seems that then a created will could not tend toward an object under the idea [sc. of badness] under which the divine will cannot tend to it; for the divine will can tend toward any good subtracted from the above deformity, though not toward the accompanying idea of badness [dd.34-37 n.168]. And even if it be conceded that anything willable by one will is willable by another (because every will has an object equally common), nevertheless what is willed in ordered fashion by one will is not willed in ordered fashion by another will, because ordered willing does not come from the object alone but from the agreement of act and object about the power; for some act about some object can agree with one will and not agree with another.

4. There is another argument against this opinion, because let hatred of God be apprehended by some created intellective power that is not erring and that consequently is not showing it under the idea of good but only of evil - if a will can will this hatred the proposed conclusion is evident, because there is no goodness in this act prior to the act of willing itself; for if some goodness is assigned because of the act of willing, this is not in the object as it precedes the act but in it as it follows the act of willing. If a will cannot tend toward this shown evil save under some idea of good and not of evil, then either it simply cannot tend toward it, or reason must first have been naturally blinded - and this seems unacceptable and against the argument of Ethics 7.5.1147a24-33.In the passage referred to Aristotle is explaining how the incontinent can know and yet act against their knowledge, and he gives the case where someone has two universal propositions, ‘such things should not be tasted’ and ‘everything sweet is delightful to taste’, and one particular proposition, ‘this thing is sweet’. The incontinent man acts on the particular proposition and the second universal, not the first. But he still knows the first universal. The view Scotus is criticizing seems to require that, in the case of a will where reason is not in error but knows hatred of God is evil, either the will simply cannot hate God or, if it does hate God, reason must first have been so blinded that it no longer naturally knows that hatred of God is evil, which is absurd and contrary to Aristotle. ⁵⁷

II. Scotus’ own Opinion

5. If the affirmative answer is held on this question [n.1], it is easy to distinguish the sin against the Holy Spirit from other sins. For because the will is conjoined to the sensitive appetite, it is of a nature to delight along with it, and so, by sinning under the effect of the sensitive appetite’s inclination toward what pleases it, it sins from passion, and this is called sinning from infirmity or impotence and is appropriately against the Father, to whom power is appropriated. The will also acts through intellectual knowledge and so, when reason is erring, it does not will rightly and its sin from an error of reason is called sinning from ignorance, and is against the Son, to whom wisdom is appropriated. The third sin would belong to the will according to itself, being from its own freedom and not from taking delight along with the sensitive appetite or from an error of reason; and this would be sinning from malice and is appropriately against the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated.Master Lombard, Sentences 2 d.43 ch.1 n.11, “This distinction of wording [Matthew 12.31-32, about the sin against the Holy Spirit] is not so to be taken as if there are different offenses according to the three persons, but a distinction is being drawn there between kinds of sins. For the sin against the Father is understood to be what is done through infirmity, because Scripture frequently attributes power to the Father; the sin against the Son is understood to be what is done through ignorance, because wisdom is attributed to the Son; the third sin (against the Holy Spirit) is expounded here -n.2: Those are rightly said to sin against the Holy Spirit who think their malice overcomes the goodness of God, and who cling to their iniquity with such stubborn mind that they propose never to abandon it and never to return to the goodness of the Holy Spirit...who delight in malice for its own sake. - He then who sins through infirmity or through ignorance easily obtains pardon, but not he who sins against the Holy Spirit.” ⁵⁸

6. Nevertheless, even if a created will is not posited as being able to will evil under the idea of evil, a sin from fixed malice can still be assigned, namely when the will sins from its own liberty, without passion in the sensitive appetite or error in reason; for the most complete idea of sin exists there, because nothing other than the will is enticing the will to evil; and this sin will so far be from malice that the will, without any extrinsic occasion, is choosing from its full liberty to will evil for itself (but not so from malice that the sinning will is tending toward evil insofar as it is evil).