II. To the Principal Arguments

17. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that good and bad in acts are not opposed by way of privation, either when speaking of moral goodness and badness or when speaking of meritorious or demeritorious goodness and badness; for an act is not bad merely from the fact it lacks this or that sort of goodness, but because it lacks the goodness it ought to have; but not every act ought to have such goodness.

18. To the other argument [n.3] I concede that like habits are generated from like acts, and thus that from many indifferent acts a like habit can be generated that stably inclines to acts similar in kind; yet it does not incline to them as good or as bad acts, just as the habit too is in itself neither good nor bad - as it is also not generated from acts good or bad; and so the unacceptable result that the reason adduces is not unacceptable but should be conceded as true.