I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

4. It is said here [from Aquinas] that the bad angel could not have desired that equality.

5. For this there seem to be four reasons:

First, because the bad angel did not sin from passion (as is plain), nor from ignorance (because punishment does not precede guilt) - therefore from choice; but “choice is not of things impossible” Ethics 3.4.1111b20-23; now for an angel to be equal to God is impossible - therefore he did not sin about this.

6. Second, because ‘for an angel to be equal with God’ involves a contradiction; therefore it does not involve any idea of being; therefore in no way is it included under the first object of the will - therefore it is not in any way willable.

7. Third. The will cannot will anything that is not understood first; therefore the angel’s being equal to God is understood first and shown first by the intellect; either then by an erring intellect, and then it is punishment and not guilt; or by a non-erring intellect - and this is impossible because a ‘non-erring’ intellect cannot show what involves a contradiction.

8. Fourth,abecause an angel’s being equal to God involves the non-being of the angel, for an angel cannot be an angel unless he is inferior to God; but no one can desire ‘that he not be’, from Augustine On Free Choice 6-8 nn.63-84; therefore no one inferior to God can desire equality with God.

a. a[Interpolation] and it seems to be Anselm’s reason, Fall of the Devil [however, no such reference can be found in Anselm, or Aquinas]

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

9. Because, however, these reasons are not cogent, one can respond differently to the question [n.1], because the angel could have desired equality with God.

10. For this there is persuasive proof:

First as follows, that the will has a double act, an act of loving with love of friendship and an act of coveting something for what is loved - and according to each act the will has the whole of being for object, such that, just as someone can love any being whatever with love of friendship, so he can covet any being whatever for himself as loved; therefore an angel could have loved himself with love of friendship, and could also have coveted for himself any covetable good whatever - and so, since equality with God is a good covetable in itself, the angel could have coveted this good for himself.

11. Further, if equality with God were possible for an angel, the angel could covet it for himself (as is plain); but an impossibility of this sort does not prevent an angel from being able to will it, because “the will can be of things impossible” according to the Philosopher Ethics 3.4.1111b22-23 and Damascene Orthodox Faith 36.

12. There is also this proof, that the damned hate God (from Psalm 73.23, “the pride of those who hate you rises up always”); but he who hates wants the thing hated not to be, according to the Philosopher Rhetoric 2.4.1382a15; therefore they want God not to be. But this is in itself altogether impossible and incompossible; therefore this sort of impossibility does not prevent its being able to be desired by a sinning will.

13. There is also this confirmation, that a sinning will could have wanted God not to be and could also - along with this - have wanted the grade and eminence of God to be in another; therefore it could have wanted it to be in itself just as in another, and so it could have willed the eminence of God for itself.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

14. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.5-8].

To the first [n.5] one can say that ‘choice’ is taken equivocally: in one way for an act of will following full apprehension of the intellect, and in this way one is said to sin from choice when there is no passion disturbing the intellect and no ignorance; in another way choice is taken for an act of will following the conclusion of a practical syllogism, which choice is nothing but efficacious volition of the object and for investigating the means by which the object can be attained. In the first way choice is of things impossible, as the Philosopher says Ethics 3 [n.11] that ‘will is of things impossible’ - not only an erring will but a will ‘presupposing full apprehension of the intellect’. In the second way choice is not of things impossible, because no one engages in practical syllogisms about things impossible; for a practical syllogism concludes from the end to what is for the end, so that ‘through this thing, which is for the end’ the end may be reached - and such discursive reasoning is never done for the sake of something ‘impossible’.

15. Or it could more plainly be said that choice is ‘what states full acceptation precisely’ or is ‘efficacious willing consequent to a practical syllogism’. In the first way it can be of anything for which perfect knowledge of the object is presupposed. In the second way it cannot be of anything unless for the ‘being’ of it the will operates as much as it can, because the will wills nothing efficaciously save what it disposes means for through what can be deduced; and such ‘efficacious volition’ is never of anything impossible; for no one deliberates about things impossible, nor does he prescribe to the practical intellect the investigating of means to them - and in this way has to be understood the Philosopher’s remark “choice is not of things impossible” [n.5]. The angels did not in this way sin from choice, that is, from an efficacious volition through which they might want to strive to attain their purpose, by launching an attack and surreptitiously taking God’s eminence for themselves; however they could sin from choice, that is, from something non-surreptitious but from perfect volition of that equality.

16. It is by means of this distinction that one should reply to the question [n.1], because an angel could not with efficacious volition have desired equality with God, since the object is not shown as possible; however the angel can do so with simple volition (which does regard things impossible), wherein there can be merit and demerit -and it is through this that the second arguments [sc. those for Scotus’ opinion, nn.9-13] draw their conclusion.

17. To the second argument [sc. for the first opinion, n.6] I say that, just as there is a double intellection, absolute and comparative (the absolute indeed is only of some simple object, contained under the intellect’s object - the comparative or collative intellection can be for anything at all, and this whether the comparison is ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’; for the intellect composes not only possible propositions but also impossible ones) - thus there is one volition that is absolute, and it is only of some simple object contained under the first willable thing; and another volition that is comparative, and it can compare any simple willable to any other, even if in that comparison there is included a contradiction. But speaking of the first volition, the propositional complex here [sc. ‘an angel being equal to God’] is not willable, because it is not something ‘simple’ including in itself the idea of the first object, but is only a certain relation of a simple object to an object - each of which ‘simple objects’ is per se willable, for both what the angel wills and for whom he wills is per se willable. When, therefore, one says that ‘this whole does not include the idea of the first object’ [n.6], the thing is false when speaking of the parts of the whole; for both parts - namely the ‘what’ and the ‘for whom’ in themselves - include the per se object of the will, and this is enough for the will to will one part in its order to the other.a

a. a[Interpolation] just as, for the intellect to combine any simple with any simple, it is enough for each simple to be able per se to be apprehended by the intellect.

18. To the third argument [n.7] I say that the simple intellect can apprehend equality with God without error; and such simple apprehension suffices for the appetite to desire for another ‘the apprehended thing’ - just as, with the intellect apprehending white and apprehending a raven, it can will whiteness to be in the raven. Now equality with God can be apprehended without error because it exists in someone without error; for the Son of God is equal to the Father and he can be apprehended. Even if nothing were equal, still equality could be apprehended absolutely; nor is there error or falsity in that simple apprehension, and yet the simple apprehension suffices for willing this simple for anything understood or loved.

19. But if you argue ‘by what intellect is this shown, by an erring intellect or a non-erring one?’ [n.7] - I say that it is shown by a ‘non-erring’ but simple one, to which it does not belong to err or to say truth (for these are conditions of the intellect when combining and dividing); and there is no need for the intellect to apprehend beforehand [n.7] (to combine this with that or to divide this from that), but it is enough that the will compares this to that, because the will is a collative power just as the intellect is - and consequently it is able in some way to bring together the simples shown to it, just as the intellect can.

20. To the fourth argument [n.8] it could be said that the will could will ‘itself not to be’ by way of consequence, because anyone who is ‘sinning mortally’ wills something wherein he does not will to be subject to God; and in this - as a consequence - he wills ‘himself not to be’, because he cannot be unless he is subject to God.

21. To the form of the argument, however, it can be said that, if he wills the antecedent, he need not will the consequent when the consequent does not belong to the per se understanding of the antecedent - as in the example posited about someone being able to desire being bishop without desiring to be priest [Ord. 1 d.1 n.47]. And the reason is this, that just as knowing the consequent does not follow on ‘knowing the antecedent’ unless the consequence of the first from the second is knownAn example from Rep. II A d.6 q.1: “The intellect can know the antecedent and not know the consequent - as that every mule is sterile and yet not that this mule is, because it does not know the consequence.” ⁴ - so, the willing of the consequent does not follow on the ‘willing of the antecedent’ unless there is ‘a willing of this consequence’; for if the consequent is not known (or there is no ‘willing of the consequence’) there is no need - because of willing the antecedent - to will the consequent. Now, however, in the proposed case, the consequent does not belong to the per se understanding of the antecedent [sc. ‘the angel wills himself to be equal to God, therefore he wills himself not to be’]; nor, if it was, would the per se relation [sc. of the consequent to the antecedent] be known or willed - and therefore there is no need to will the consequent.

22. To the remark of Anselm On Likenesses,Alexander of Canterbury On St. Anselm’s Likenesses ch.64: “If you want to be equal to Peter in glory, you will be; ‘in glory’ I say, because you cannot will to be Peter in person; for if you will this, you would will yourself to be nothing - which you will not be able to will.” Scotus here responds to an authority he did not cite above earlier; it is found, however, in Rep II B d.6 q.1. ⁵ the response is that one cannot in ordered way will to be Peter, because the will is not ordered when it wills something and refuses what necessarily follows on it (whether as something intrinsic or not), but about a ‘non-ordered’ will this need not be true.a

a. a[Interpolated note]: Note, according to Anselm Fall of the Devil 6, that the angel desired something that he was going to have had he stood, and thus not equality first of all, although - as a consequence - after other sins he would have desired it directly or indirectly.