2. Rejection of the Opinion

13. Argument against this view:

First about synderesis, that if it has an elicited act necessarily tending toward good and resisting evil, and there is no such thing in the will, then synderesis is not in the will.

- The proof of the assumption is that in 1 d.1 n.80 it was shown that the will does not necessarily enjoy the end shown to it, and that no power or force or habit in the will can be a principle of necessarily enjoying; so neither can it be a necessary principle for willing in conformity with practical principles, which are taken from the end.

14. Further, if there were some such power or force or part in the will that would necessarily tend by an elicited act toward good and resist evil, then it would be supreme in the whole will, because it would have regard to the ultimate end that the first practical principles are taken from; therefore the will, according to any force or inferior part of it whatever, would be in its power so that, when it moved, the lower part or force would obey it and be moved in conformity with it. So it would prevent all sins in the will, because, as it would be moved necessarily, so it would necessarily move the whole will; for the whole will would be moved as it moves, and if the whole will were right, there would be no sin.

15. Argument against the other part, about conscience:

First because an appetitive habit is not generated from one act [Ethics 1.6.1098a18-19, 2.1.1103b21-22]; but conscience comes from one practical syllogism, by evident deduction of some conclusion from the first practical principles; so conscience is not an acquired appetitive habit. Plain too is that it is not innate, nor a part, nor a force.

16. Further, what is of a nature to be caused by some cause cannot be caused by another cause unless this other cause virtually contains the perfection of the first cause; a habit of the will is of a nature to be caused by an act of will as by its proper cause; therefore it cannot be caused by another act unless this other act contains an act of will virtually in itself. But an act of intellect does not contain an act of will virtually in itself according to Henry, because ‘the act of will is more perfect’;Quodlibet 1 q.14, “One must simply say that that power is preeminent over another whose habit, act, and object are preeminent over the habit, act, and object of that other. Now so it is in the present case, that the habit, act, and object of the will are altogether preeminent over the act, habit, and object of the intellect. Therefore one must absolutely say that the will is preeminent over the intellect and is a higher power than it is.” ⁵⁰ therefore the intellect cannot by its own act cause in the will the sort of weight that would be a quasi habit of the will.Quodlibet 9 q.5, “I say that although the will is in no way moved by the practical intellect as to its act of willing...yet it is moved by it as to some passion, which passion is as it were a weight in the will as the will is free, inclining it into a mode of habit so as to will [accordingly].” ⁵¹

17. Further, either the will is able not to accept the weight, and then the intellect will not be a sufficient cause of it - for when a sufficient cause acts the effect exists once the passive recipient is in due proximity to the cause. But if the will is not able not to accept it, then - when the consideration in question is actually present in reason - the will is not able to put the weight aside, because reason does not have a lesser necessity in causing the caused weight than in preserving it.

18. Further, the will must act either according to the given weight or not. If it must, then it is not free, because the agent of this weight is a natural cause so its effect too will be a natural form;     therefore an agent necessarily acting according to this weight does not act freely, because acting thus or otherwise is not in its power. If the will does not need to act according to this weight (which even the Apostle manifestly seems to mean, from the gloss on Romans, ‘Whatever is against conscience etc     .’,Henry, Quodlibet 1 q.18, “The objection about the gloss on Romans, that ‘everything which is not of faith (that is, of conscience) is sin’, proceeds correctly save that ‘conscience’ is not there taken properly but in extended sense for a thinking of reason.” Romans 14.23, “Everything that is not of faith is sin.;” gloss, “What is done against faith (that is, so as to be believed against conscience) is evil.” ⁵² which makes it plain that some sin can be committed against conscience), then the result is that, when a perfect conscience is present, the will is able to will the opposite of what conscience dictates, and so this habit is never corrupted by an act of will, which seems absurd when positing that it is a habit of will.