II. To the Principal Arguments

13. As to the first argument [n.2], it is plain that it proceeds of intending as intending states the tending of something determined and limited by another.

14. As to the second [n.3] I say that the first vision is not caused by the conjoining intention of the will, but the whole of it [sc. vision and the thing seen] can be, if one concedes that it happens in the same instant of time and thus by confirmation of the vision; but once the first intellection has been posited, the will can turn toward or away from it in respect of other operations and so join them in diverse ways. The major, then, that ‘no distinct vision can be had without conjoining intention’ must be denied, unless the conjoining is understood not to be actually concomitant; and in this way must the proposition be denied that ‘a discrete vision precedes in time every intellection’, though it does precede in nature. Or if the vision - which is without concomitant intellection and intention - can be without the conjoining intention of the will, as that vision can be with which intellection and volition are concomitant, then the proposition must be absolutely deniedh that ‘a discrete vision cannot be without conjoining intention’. Nor is the denial of this proposition contrary to Augustine, for Augustine himself means that the will can turn the pupil to the object and tend toward the object, but he does not mean that no vision could come to be unless an intention tends in this way and turns it.

15. To the last argument [n.5; no response is given to the third argument, n.4] I say that to compare by way of judgment belongs to the intellect alone, just as does also the act of understanding - but to relate things by using or ordering one lovable thing to another belongs to the will; for just as the will is reflexive, because it is immaterial, so it is also collative or capable in its own way of relating things in its own way.