II. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the first argument [n.2] I say that neither of the above [sc. immortality and lack of rebellion] can be preserved on the basis of pure nature.

21. When the proof is given that their opposites are punishments, I say that they are not but rather natural conditions - just as it is not a punishment but natural for a man to die, and not a punishment but natural that his appetite is drawn to its delightful object; for because man is composed of many organic parts and thus there are many appetites in him, it is natural for each of them to be drawn to its delightful object and natural also for the body to be capable of being used up, unless there are remedies that supply it abundantly so that the using up does not prevail.

22. Against this it is said that these features [sc. rebellion and death] would have been involuntary, therefore they would also have been punishments. I reply and say that although involuntary yet they are not punishments; for death is against the natural inclination of an ox, and yet it is not a punishment for the ox, because there is no punishment save in the will (according to Anselm On the Virginal Conception ch.4, “Only the will is punished, for nothing is a punishment for anything save what is against its will”). But if you mean by ‘involuntary’ that it is against an act of the will, I say that it would not have been an involuntary punishment for someone existing in pure nature; for if the will had not wanted its nature to have had the condition that was natural to it, it would have sinned!

23. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘natural rectitude’ is the liberty innate to the will, which it is necessary for the will to have been made in by God; nor is this rectitude corrupted by sin; and thus original justice, if it is set down as the natural rectitude of the will, will be the will’s very liberty. But this liberty does not have the natural effects that are attributed to original justice [n.18]; and if these effects are attributed to a quality intermediate between nature and infused virtue, there is no necessity to posit that intermediate quality, because all the things with respect to the will that appear unacceptable will be saved without it.

24. To the third [n.4] I say that someone existing in pure nature is not equal to someone who has sinned while existing in justice; not because the latter has some crookedness which the former does not have, but because the latter is in debt for the original justice he received, and the former is not; and so the latter is guilty and the former is not. Even if the vision of God is conferred on neither, yet to one the lack of vision is a punishment and to the other not; for the one who is guilty is deprived of it by his guilt, while the other is deprived of it by the condition of nature.

25. To the fourth [not in the Ordinatio, but in the Lectura and Reportatio, where it is argued that, if original justice was a supernatural gift, it would then have been a sufficient principle for earning merit] I say that even if original justice is a supernatural gift, yet there is no need for it to be a principle of merit; for it is related to grace, which is a principle of merit, as exceeding to exceeded - exceeding indeed because it joined the will more firmly to the ultimate end than grace does. For, according to some [Alexander of Hales, Matthew of Aquasparta, Aquinas], it so joined to the ultimate end that it did not allow for any venial sin along with it, but charity does allow for this [cf. Lectura 2 dd.21-22 nn.9-10]; and according to what was said before [nn.14, 17], it at least so joined the will to the ultimate end that the will found it easier and more delightful to suffer some lower sadness than to rest in any lower delight by departing from the delight of the end; grace does not cause this easiness, since along with it there stands proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good. But grace exceeds in this respect, that it joins to the ultimate end as to a supernatural good and as to attaining such a good supernaturally, by merit; the supernatural gift did not so, but joined to that good only as to something agreeable and delightful.