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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 4 to 44.
Book Two. Distinctions 4 - 44
Fourth and Fifth Distinctions
Question Two. Whether the Angel merited Blessedness before receiving it
I. To the Second Question
B. The Common Opinion and Scotus’ Opinion

B. The Common Opinion and Scotus’ Opinion

15. Therefore the opinion is held that the angels merited their blessedness, and that they did so before they received it.

16. Clarification of the first point: because every nature attains its perfection by its proper operation; but the perfection and end of any rational creature is blessedness, which is natural only to God. Now every “such operation, which leads to the end, is either maker of the end, namely when the end does not exceed the virtue of the one operating (as medication in respect of health), or is meritorious of the end, namely when the end exceeds the virtue ‘of what operates for the sake of the end’, and then the end is expected from the gift of another; but ultimate blessedness exceeds both angelic and human nature; therefore both man and angel merit their blessedness,”3 - and so the first point is plain.

17. The second point is made clear thus: the same thing cannot be from perfect and from imperfect grace; but merit is from imperfect grace, reward from perfect grace.

18. But this reason does not seem cogent, because it is possible for some soul to have as much grace on the way as it will have in the fatherland, although now it cannot have as perfect use of it as it will have in the fatherland; hence the same habit will remain, and it could remain equal, but the same act will not.

19. Therefore I make the second point clear differently, because the will does not at the same time will mutably and immutably, or fixedly (such that then it could not will the opposite) and not fixedly (such that at the time when it elicits the act it could will the opposite); but when it is rewarded it wills immutably, that is, insofar as it is considered as eliciting the act (and consequently, as naturally prior to the act itself, it operates for it) -but when it merits, it does not thus immutably will, but it seems as contingently eliciting to elicit it.

20. In favor of this, there are congruences also adduced, that the disposition should precede what it is the disposition for, and the way should precede the term; but merit is the disposition and the way with respect to blessedness; therefore etc.