B. On the Identity with its Foundation of the Special Relation of ‘Creature to God’

1. First Opinion

241. [Exposition of the opinion] - The point about relations in general then has been seen. About the special relation of ‘creature to God’ there is one opinion [from William of Ware] that says this relation is the same as its foundation, and this in such a way that the foundation is nothing other than a certain relation to God; for just as a creature, although in itself it is a being, yet in respect of God is called a non-being, according to Anselm [Monologion ch.31],a - so too, although in itself it is an absolute being, yet in respect of God it is nothing other than a certain respect.

a.a [Interpolation] which statement must be understood insofar as the comparison falls under negation (in this way: ‘a creature, not in comparison to God, is something’), because according to no comparison is a creature’s entity proportional to God. But the statement is false if the comparison is affirmed (in this way: ‘in comparison to God a creature is nothing’); for such speech is metaphorical, according to Anselm.

242. With this claim seems to agree the statement that relation is the ratifying of the foundation, which was rejected in 1 d.3 nn.302-329, about the vestige.

243. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion there is Augustine On the Trinity 7.1 n.2, “Everything said relatively is, after removal of the relative, still something;” and again, “What is not anything in respect to itself is not anything that is said in respect of another.”

244. The foundation of a relation, therefore, is some entity formally that does not include the relation itself formally - because if it included it formally, the relation would not formally be a relation to another but to itself, for its foundation is formally to itself and the relation is being posited as formally the same as the foundation. Nor could relation be the first foundation of relation, for there would still remain the question what that first relation would be located in. It is not the case, therefore, that a relation is precisely the foundation of a relation.a

a.a [Interpolation] A reason as follows is formed: if relation is not founded in another it is not relation; so either there will be an infinite regress [sc. if relation is founded in relation] or relation will eventually be founded in the absolute. But the idea of the absolute is that it is to itself, while the formal idea of relation is disposition to another; but formal entity to itself is not the same as formal entity to another;     therefore etc     . - Again, that in whose quidditative idea there is a disposition to another is not to itself, nor is it absolute; therefore nothing created is an absolute entity.

245. This fact [sc. the foundation does not formally include the relation] is also plain in divine relations, where there is the greatest identity with the foundation; and yet the foundation is not formally the relation, because then the foundation would not be formally infinite perfection [1 d.5 nn.114, 117].

246. Secondly there is argument against the aforesaid opinion [n.241] as follows: a definition indicates the total quiddity of a thing, provided it is perfect; but the definition of stone does not include, essentially or formally, respect to another, because then it would not be the definition of stone as stone is in an absolute genus, and so it would not be of a stone as stone is in the genus of substance or as it is a species of substance; therefore in the essence of stone, formally, no respect is included.

247. Third thus: according to this opinion [n.241] creatures are not more distinguished from God than the relations in divine reality are distinguished from each other, because all opposite relations are equally distinct and especially when they pertain to the same mode of relatives; but divine relations, which are relations of origin, pertain to the second mode of relatives, to which also seem to pertain the relations that are in God by reason of efficient causality to creatures [1 d.3 n.287]; therefore if the creature is only a relation, and if opposite relation in God - as filiation - is subsistent relation, opposed to relation of Father, there will be an equal distinction on this side as on that.

248. And there is confirmation, because then a created supposit would only be a subsistent relation, and thus it would be more difficult to conceive the mode of existing of a created person than of an uncreated person.

249. And if you say that creatures differ in absolute nature among themselves but [divine] persons not so - this seems to destroy the position [n.241], because then the creature will have an absolute essence that will not be merely a relation.

250. The further consequence also seems to follow [sc. from the view that a creature is only a relation] that a creature differs less from God than one divine person differs from another, because in divine persons the relation is real and mutual, but between creature and God there is no real mutual relation [1 d.30 nn.30-31, 40, 43];     therefore etc     .

251. Fourth, to the opinion itself [n.241], as follows: things that are formally distinct are not formally and precisely the same (because then they would be formally distinct and not formally distinct, because they would be nothing but the same, formally indistinct); but the relation of creature to God is not formally or specifically distinct in diverse creatures; therefore either creatures do not differ in species or they will be precisely that relation. Proof of the minor: to all those relations - in creatures - there corresponds the same extreme on the part of God, but to relations of different idea there does not correspond a term of the same idea.

252. Fifth thus: in creatures there is a triple relation to God [1 d.3 n.287]; so a reason that the creature will be nothing but one relation is equally a reason that it will be nothing but another relation;     therefore it cannot be precisely any one of the relations. Nor can it be all of them, because they are formally different among themselves - and then any one created essence would have a formal distinction from itself. Therefore etc     .a

a.a [Interpolation] Or thus: a nature one formally and specifically is not many specifically; but any nature has three relations specifically different with respect to God, as is plain - conversely in God to creatures there are three relations of reason;     therefore etc     .

2. Second Opinion

253. [Exposition of the opinion] - Another position [of Peter of Tarantsia and Romanus of Rome, based on sayings of Thomas Aquinas] is that this relation of an angel [and of any creature] to God differs really from the essence of the angel [and any creature].

254. There is confirmation of this from blessed Augustine On the Trinity 5.5 n.6, where he says that in the case of creatures “what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;” and he argues that in this case of creatures relation is an accident.

255. He also expressly maintains this in the same place 5.16 n.17, “Those things are relative accidents that occur with some change in the things of which they are said,” and he means from this that the relation of creature to God is an accident, but that the relation said relatively of God to creature is not an accident in God.

256. And from this he says more expressly toward the end, “That God begins to be called in time what he was not called before is manifestly said relatively; however it is not said as an accident of God (because something happens to him), but plainly as an accident of that in reference to which God begins to be relatively called something.”

257. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this:

Substance is said to be prior to accident in three ways (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-33), namely in knowledge, in definition, and in time; and what it is to be prior in time is so understood that there is no contradiction on the part of substance to prevent it being able to exist prior in duration to any accident; so there would be no contradiction in a stone’s being prior in duration to all dependence on

God, and as a result there would be no contradiction in a stone’s not depending on God, which seems absurd.a

a.a [Interpolation] Or thus: if the relation of creature to God is other than the creature, it is naturally posterior to the creature; but what is prior in nature can exist without what is naturally posterior -as far as it itself is concerned - without contradiction; therefore a stone can exist without a respect to God - therefore it can exist without a term for the respect, which includes a contradiction. The first proposition, the major, is plain, because a relation cannot be prior; for a relation, being founded on the absolute, cannot exist prior to it - nor can it exist simultaneously in nature with it, for the same reason; therefore it is posterior, because it is an accident of it. The second proposition, the minor, is plain, because the idea of ‘naturally prior’ is that - as far as concerns itself - it can be without the other, and in this way, according to the Philosopher, substance precedes accident.

258. Further, Augustine is either taking ‘accident’ generally there [nn.254-56] for anything changeable - and then any created substance is an accident, because it is changeable; or he is taking it there for what is changeable, that is, able to be lost (namely because it can be lost when something remains, and because it is posterior in nature or in duration to the something that remains); if in this second way, then the relation of creature to God is not an accident, because a creature cannot remain either in duration or in nature without that relation.

259. And it seems that Augustine is speaking in this way in 5.4 n.5, in the way some accidents are inseparable: “Just as the color of a raven’s feather is black - but it loses the color, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. Wherefore the material itself of the feather is changeable, and because it ceases to be a feather, so it loses the color also.”a The loss of color however is not a change, because thus indeed the loss of the feather would be a change; but the loss of color is a loss, because just as the feather is prior in nature to the blackness, so too it could be posterior in nature to the blackness, that is, not be at once corrupted together with the corruption of the blackness.

a.a [Interpolation] because while the raven remains it cannot lose the blackness, but it can lose feathers and certain other things.

3. Scotus’ own Solution

260. As to this question then [question five, nn.188, 241], I say that the relation to God common to all creatures is the same really as the foundation; it is not however the same formally, nor is it the same precisely (or not the same with adequate identity), such that the foundation is only relation formally [cf. on real identity and formal non-identity, 1 dd.33-34, nn.1-3].

a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as its Foundation

261. The first point is proved by two reasons:

Because what is said properly to be present in something, and in the absence of which the something cannot be without contradiction, is the same as the something really; but relation to God is properly present in a stone, and in the absence of this relation a stone cannot be without contradiction; therefore the relation is the same really as the stone.

262. Proof of the major: because just as a contradiction stated of certain things is a way of proving distinction, so an impossibility of receiving the predication of contradictories pertaining to being is a way of proving identity in being - and this when there is no essential dependence that requires a manifest distinction (which I make clear thus: because the impossibility that a [e.g. a creature] is without b [e.g. relation to the Creator] is either because of the identity of a with b or because of its priority or simultaneity in nature with b; therefore if b is not naturally prior to a nor necessarily simultaneous in nature with it, and if a cannot be without b, the result is that a is the same as b; for if b is other than a or posterior to it, it is not likely that a could not naturally be in the absence of b without contradiction); but what is present in something properly, as relation is present in the foundation (that is, what is so present in what it is present in that if it were other than what it is present in then it would be posterior to what it is present in), is not prior in nature nor simultaneous in nature with what it is present in; therefore if what is present in something is necessarily required for the being of what it is in, such that what it is in cannot be without it, necessarily it is the same really as what it is in. So it is as to the issue at hand.

263. The minor [n.261] is manifest, because just as it is impossible for a stone to be without God, so it is impossible for it to be without its dependence on God - for it could be without the term of the dependence in just the same way as it could be without the dependence; for being without the term is not incompossible save because of the dependence itself - but something ‘not necessary simply’ is not the idea of what is simply necessary;     therefore etc     .

264. Against this reason [n.261] I raise the objection that then [sc. if relation to God were the same really as the creature] any relation that is present in the divine essence through act of the divine intellect would be the same as the essence (proof: it is incompossible for the essence to be without it - for if such a relation could be new then the divine intellect could change, which is impossible); but to posit that such a relation is the same as the essence is unacceptable, because then it would be real (for whatever is the same as a thing is real); but the relation is not real (from 1 d.31 nn.6, 8-9, 16, 18); wherefore     etc .a

a.a [Interpolated note] Again, the relation of likeness is not the same as whiteness, and yet it is necessarily present when the term is in place; therefore      if the term were necessary, the relation would simply necessarily be present - and yet it is not then more the same, because it is not more intrinsic to the term just because the term is incorruptible. Likewise there is this argument: if the term were corruptible the relation would not be the same as the foundation, therefore neither is it the same when the foundation is incorruptible. - This reason well shows that incorruptibility of the term does not make per se for this identity; but incorruptibility of the term in comparison with the foundation does well make for it, that is, if it is simply impossible for the term not to be unless the foundation is not - and further, if this is the first relation of dependence of the foundation on a term, because then by reason of the foundation there is simply this necessity of coexistence; because of the first of these points [‘if it is simply impossible for the term not to be     etc .’] the relation, according to one opinion, of vision to the object would be that of identity - because of the second of them [‘and further, if this is the first etc .’] the dependence of our nature on the person of the Word in Christ would not be identical with our nature.

    Again, a relation to something simultaneous in nature as to a term is posterior to the foundation (as likeness is posterior to whiteness); therefore      also a relation to something prior in nature to the term can likewise be posterior. Nor does it therefore follow, from the fact that the foundation’s being without the term is a contradiction, that the foundation’s being without the relation is a contradiction [nn.262-263].

    These two reasons [sc. in the preceding two paragraphs] are probable reasons against the first reason about the contradiction of ‘being without each other’ [n.261]. Likewise, the foundation cannot generally be without a respect that is other than it (as body and figure); therefore the inference ‘not without this, therefore the same as this’, when the thing in question is a respect, does not follow.

    Against the other reason, namely that a respect common to everything other than the term is not the accident of anything [n.266], has a logical instance against it, that creation is not created (a concrete is not asserted of an abstract). Again, more really: ‘inherence accidentally’ is itself present in a thing but whiteness is not; therefore a relation is itself related but the foundation is not. There is therefore not the same reason of standing in the first case and the second. [Vatican editors: these interpolated objections are left without answer.]

    Note, in the year 1304 (almost at the end): ‘the two extremes are the one total cause of relation’; later differently: ‘because the foundation is the total cause of relation but the term is a sine qua non’ (just as fire is the total active cause of heat but wood is a sine qua non), such that the foundation is prevented from causing as long as it does not have the term. [Vatican editors remark that the first note in this paragraph is the regular teaching of Scotus; the second or later note is nowhere found in him.]

265. I reply. The incompossibility of a separation can be by reason of that from which something is inseparable, and it can be by something extrinsic. An example of the second: because, according to the Philosopher, for the heaven to be without motion would be a contradiction, not indeed from a cause intrinsic to the heaven (because the heaven is receptive of motion, indifferent to rest and to motion), but from an extrinsic moving cause; yet it does not follow that the heaven is [the same as] its own motion, although it cannot be without motion. Now I say that the incompossibility of being a stone without dependence of it on God is by reason of the stone precisely; and by this reason is also the reason for the incompossibility of being a stone without a term for the dependence of it - and whatever is the reason for requiring a term of dependence is the reason for having the dependence. But in the objection adduced [n.264], there is no necessity for the inherence simply of such relation, nor any incompossibility of the nonbeing of the object on the part of the divine essence itself (as if it were impossible for the essence to be unless it required a term ‘to which’ and this term was unable not to be), but there is only incompossibility from an extrinsic cause, namely the divine intellect (a cause, I say, simply necessarily acting), and the incompossibility is on the part of the intellect’s doing something new.

266. The second principal reason for the first member of the solution [nn.260-61] is as follows: what is uniformly said of everything other than the term [of a relation] is not accidental to anything that is said relative to that term; the relation of creature to God is of this sort [sc. said uniformly of everything other than the term];     therefore etc     .a - and so it is the same as the foundation.

a.a [Interpolation] but such a relation, common to every creature, is uniformly said ‘of everything other than God’ in relation to God himself; therefore it is not accidental to any creature.

267. Proof of the major: because if it were accidental to one it would, by parity of reason, be accidental to another; as, for example, if the relation of effect to cause were accidental to the stone (and would consequently be a thing other than the stone), then by parity of reason this relation would have the relation of effect to God - and then another relation of effect would be accidental to the first relation, and so on ad infinitum.

268. Against this reason [n.267] I raise the objection that there appears nothing unacceptable in relations proceeding to infinity; for it was said in 1 d.19 n.6 that relation is founded on relation, as proportionality on proportion. From this the argument goes as follows: if Socrates is the same as Plato then the sameness of Socrates is the same as the sameness of Plato, and by parity of reason the sameness is the same as sameness; and the first sameness [sc. of Socrates with Plato] is a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation could be without it; therefore by parity of reason any sameness will be a thing other than that which it belongs to, and so there will be infinite real relations. And so can it be argued about proportions and likenesses.

269. To this I reply that there is a stand in the second stage [of the infinite process]. To understand this, let the first foundations be taken, namely Socrates and Plato, between which there is mutual sameness, and let this sameness in Socrates be called a and that in Plato b; let the sameness of a with b be called c, and let the reverse sameness, of b with a, be called d. I say that a differs from Socrates because Socrates can be without a (because he can be without the term of a), and a cannot be without the term; however a does not differ from c but c is the same as it, because a cannot be without b (since they are by nature together); and consequently it is a contradiction for a to be unless both the foundation of that which is c and also the term of it are. But when the foundation and the term of c exist, c will necessarily exist - so it is a contradiction for a to be without c; and c is formally present in a, because a is said to be the same with the very sameness that is c; therefore c is the same as a, and consequently a stand will be made there.

270. And if you ask by what sameness c is the same as a, I say that it is so by a itself, because the sameness is only one of reason, for it is simply of what is the same as itself.

271. In the same way there is a stand in likenesses of proportionalities, because one proportionality is like another with essential likeness (but two individuals of the same species are said to be alike in specific form), and so just as there is a stand in specific sameness in the second stage [of the process to infinity] (and not in the first stage), so too in the case of likeness of proportionalities.

b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the same formally as the Foundation nor is it precisely the same

272. As to the second article, namely that a relation is not formally the same as its foundation [n.260], I suppose this to be manifest from the understanding of what it is to be ‘formally the same’, because the per se idea of a respect does not formally include the idea of an absolute, nor conversely does the idea of an absolute per se include the formal idea of a respect; likewise, as to what is there added [n.260], that the foundation is not precisely the relation itself, this was proved against the first opinion [nn.243-52].

273. And then I understand how there can be a true and non-precise identity in the following way:

When, in the case of creatures, something contains another thing by identity, or is unitively many things, this is not because of the perfection of what is contained but of the perfection of what contains - just as, if the intellective soul (according to some) contains the vegetative soul and the form of substance, this is not because of the perfection of the form of substance (because it does not contain all the others), but because of the perfection of the intellective soul. Likewise, let it be that being contains any property at all of being (as truth, goodness, and unity), yet this containing is not from the perfection of what is contained but from the perfection of what contains - just as also in divine reality, the fact that relation is the same as the foundation is not from the perfection of the relation (as if it contains the essence by identity), but from the formal infinity of the essence, because of which the essence has in itself relation by identity.

274. In all these cases (and especially in the case of creatures) the container is not precisely the contained, but is an entity as perfect in itself as it would be if the contained were outside the container and added to it - nay, a more perfect entity, because by its perfection it contains every other entity; hence the intellective soul is not merely substantial form (because then it would not be perfect), but is as perfectly the ultimate entity - which is there - as it would be if it presupposed entity other than itself.

275. So I say in the issue at hand, that the foundation is not only the relation (which it contains by identity), but is as absolute as it would be if the relation were added to it, or if it had altogether no relation; but this is not because of its own perfection [sc. as foundation], but it is because of perfection (either simply or in some way or other), because the foundation contains the relation by identity, so that the containing itself prevents the accidentality of the relation from being able to be an accident, because it is perfectly contained in the substance - which relation, however, if it were not thus contained, would of itself not perhaps have the fact that it is the substance by identity.