III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

332. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.308-311], which reject this species. To the first [n.308] I say that, when speaking of God, the word ‘effigy’ does not seem to be a proper one; for perhaps nothing is properly said to be ‘effig-ied’ save what is figured.

333. But if, using proper words, the proposition ‘every reason proper for understanding any object represents that object adequately’ is taken, I say that here ‘adequately’ can be understood simply of entity to entity, or it can be understood according to the proportion of thing representing to thing represented (as matter is said to be adequate to form according to proportion, although not according to entity because the entities of them are unequal; yet matter is as perfectible as form is perfective, which is that the matter represents the form as much as the form is representable), or, in a third way, ‘adequately’ can be understood according to a proportion, not absolutely, but by comparison to such act (to wit, that it represents an object as perfect and as perfectly as the power, through the sort of act it represents, apprehends the object).

334. Universally in the first way, no per se representing thing (because it is the reason for representing and is not a something known) is adequate to what it represents but falls short, as is plain of whiteness and the species of a white thing. In the second way some reason does represent adequately, as the most perfect species of white represents the white thing, and it is a reason for quasi comprehensively seeing the white thing. In the third way any species of white (even in an eye going blind), even if does not represent the white thing as perfectly as the white thing was representable, yet does perfectly represent it by comparison to the ensuing act [sc. of sight], because it represents it as perfectly as is required for having such a species about the object.

335. As to the issue in hand, then, I say that no species can adequately represent the divine essence in the second way (nor even in the first way), because that essence -which is comprehensible to its own intellect - cannot be comprehended save through the essence as through the reason for comprehending; but in the third way, by comparison with a created intellect, a species can in some way adequately represent the divine essence, that is, as perfectly as such an act attains it.

336. When the minor proposition is proved through the term ‘infinity’ [sc. ‘no created essence or species can represent adequately the divine or uncreated effigy, because anything of the former sort is finite but the object is infinite’, n.308], I say that, just as a finite act can have an infinite object under the idea of infinite and yet the act more immediately attains the object than the species does, so a finite species can represent an infinite object under the idea of infinite; the species is not however adequate in being, nor even in knowing simply, because it is not a principle for comprehending [1 d.3 n.65].

337. To the next proof [n.309], when argument is made about the species of one creature in respect of another, I say that a natural likeness in being is not a per se reason for representing one thing in respect of another thing, because this white thing, however much it is more like another white thing than the species is, is not the reason for representing it; but the species of this white thing, which is much less in natural entity, is more like the white thing in the agreement and likeness of the proportion that is of representing thing to represented thing [n.333].

338. To the third [n.310] I say that ‘determination in an object’ can be understood in two ways: in one way as determination to singularity, in opposition to the indetermination of a universal; in another way as determination to a definite participated degree, in opposition to the unlimitedness of what is participated. In the first way ‘determination in an object’ does not impede intellection of the supreme good, which is God; rather that is the supreme good which is of itself a certain singularity; in the second way ‘determination in an object’ does impede this intellection, because the supreme good is good not in some determinate degree but good absolutely, able to be participated in by all degrees.

339. And although Augustine says about this good and that good (perhaps about singular goods that occur to the soul) ‘Take this good away and that good away, and look at the good itself, if you can etc.’, yet he has this understanding only because particular goods include limitation; but, when limitation is taken away, there is a stand at the unlimitedness of the good in general, and in this good is God understood in general, as was said in 1 d.3 n.192; or, further, there is a stand at the good most universal in perfection, and then, by taking away the limited degree of good, God is understood more in particular (and such good is neither this good nor that).

340. To the fourth [n.311] I say that ‘image’ is in one way taken for a likeness that depicts or represents precisely, which represents, not because it is known, but precisely because it is the reason for knowing; in another way ‘image’ is taken for a likeness that depicts what is something other than itself, and it represents because it is known; in the first way the species of white in the eye is an image; in the second way a statue of Hercules is an image of him.

341. In the first way the species of God in an angel is more an image than the angel is. In the second way is the angel an image, and to this image belongs a likeness in some way natural in existence, and it consists somehow in what Augustine proposed (in the fact that the soul in a way possesses a unity and trinity, just as the divine essence does), and this likeness is a concurring part in the idea of what is capable of blessedness. Although, therefore, the divine species represents the divine essence more distinctly than an angel does, yet an angel is more of an image to the extent an image is said to be something more alike in nature, possessing acts similar to the acts that are posited in the Trinity - and to this image, from the fact it has such acts, there belongs a capacity for that of which it is the image; and, through these means (namely natural likeness in acts) this capacity belongs to the image of God as Augustine is speaking of it, that ‘it is able to have a capacity for him and to participate in him’.

342. To the next argument [sc. the fifth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a]This fifth argument reads as follows in Lectura 2 d.3 n.275: “Further, the species that would represent the divine essence can also represent the Trinity, because the Trinity exists in the divine essence; therefore if an angel could naturally know the divine essence distinctly through a species, he will be able naturally to know the Trinity distinctly, which is false.” Such an argument is also found in Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 4 q.7. ⁷² one could say that, although the species in the intellect of an angel is the reason for distinctly knowing the divine essence, yet it is not a reason for distinctly knowing the mode of that essence in the supposits [persons], just as also some created quiddity in us can be distinctly known although what supposits it is in and how it is in them is not known.

343. And if it be objected against this that when the supposits are, from natural necessity, intrinsic to the nature, then that which is the reason for distinctly knowing the nature will be a reason for distinctly knowing the supposits in the nature, and in that case it seems that an angel could naturally know the divine essence in the three supposits (because he could naturally know that in the first supposit there is an infinite memory productive of a supposit, and that in two there is an infinite will productive of another supposit) - one could say that the knowledge would not be purely natural, because an angel could not naturally reach it on the basis of his natural powers, nor on the basis of the necessary causes of something acting naturally; so that, although an angel possessing a species of the divine essence could naturally use the species, yet the species itself is from a cause that is supernatural and acting supernaturally.

344. But against this is objected that an angel naturally knows all things other than God, although he receives the other species from God imprinting them supernaturally. One could say that the angel could have the other species from the objects in themselves, with no agents being required other than those objects; but in no way could an angel have the distinct species with respect to the divine essence save from God imprinting it, and imprinting not naturally but supernaturally.

345. To the last argument [sc. the sixth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a]This sixth argument reads as follows in Lectura 2 d.3 n.276: “Again, if some species distinctly represented the divine essence and the Trinity of persons in the essence, then since one angel could see that species naturally in the intellect of another angel, he can naturally know what it represents; and thus an angel can by natural knowledge know more about matters of belief than the faithful know by faith, which is false.” Such an argument is also found in Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 4 q.7. ⁷³ I say that if one holds that a blessed angel does not see supernatural things through that species, then neither will another angel, seeing the species in the first angel’s intellect, see supernatural things through it. But if it is posited that the species is, for the intellect, the reason ‘as that in which’ for seeing the Trinity, one can concede that it is the reason also for another intellect that sees, because the other intellect too has in it a like species of seeing; but then one has to say that the seeing is natural in one way and not in another way, as was expounded in the preceding response [nn.343-344].