C. Rejection of the Opinions

313. Against the first [Henry], who posits the above reasons for the negative conclusion [nn.307-311], the argument is as follows:

Because it can be proved from the same reasons that an angel does not naturally know the divine essence through any created representation; and, according to Henry, an angel does not know naturally through the divine essence, because no creature can naturally see that essence. And from this it seems to follow that an angel can have no natural knowledge of the divine essence; for nothing about this essence is seen distinctly and in particular, because this seems to be possible only through the essence, or through something distinctly representing it, both of which Henry denies; and it is not seen indistinctly, or in some more common concept (a concept not proper to the divine essence), because Henry denies every concept common and univocal to this essence and to another.

314. Further, the divine essence, according to him, is of a nature only to form a single concept in the divine intellect, so that no other concept is had about it save by an intellect busying itself about it [cf. Scotus 1 d.8 nn.55, 174-175, 188]; therefore the divine essence is of a nature only to make of itself one real concept about any intelligible whatever. Proof of the consequence: every concept that is of a nature to be had and to be caused by virtue of this essence in any intellect is of a nature to be, by virtue of it, had in an intellect comprehending it; such is the divine intellect. And further it follows that no real concept save one can be had about this essence; the proof of this consequence is that every real concept that any intellect can have about this essence can be caused by this essence (otherwise it would not be perfect in idea of object), because that which is most perfect in idea of object can cause every real, causable concept about itself. And the further consequence is that either an angel’s intellect will have that one concept (however it is caused), or it will have altogether no concept; but it cannot have the former (namely ‘to know through the divine essence’ or ‘through a proper representing reason’, nn.306-311); therefore it will have no concept.

315. Against the second [Aquinas], who posits that an angel understands the essence through himself insofar as he is the image of God [n.312], I argue:

Although the image that is only a reason for knowing, and is not as a known species (as is true of the visible species in the eye and the intelligible species in the intellect), represents the object immediately, or non-discursively, yet the image through which the object it is the image of is not known, save as through a known species, is not the reason for knowing the object save only discursively (the way the knower reaches discursively the thing known); but the essence of an angel can only be posited as an image in the second way and not in the first way; the angel then does not know the divine essence through the image save discursively. But this is unacceptable, because according to those who hold this opinion the angelic intellect is not discursive [Aquinas ST Ia 1.58 a.3];     therefore etc     .

316. Further, all discursive thought presupposes simple knowledge of that which it discursively reaches; therefore, if through the known essence [sc. of the angel] discursive knowledge is had of the divine essence, a simple concept of the divine essence must be had first, and then another, prior reason must be sought after for knowing it.

317. There is a confirmation too in that no object causes a distinct knowledge of some other object unless it includes that other object virtually in itself, because ‘each thing is disposed to being known as it is disposed to being’ [cf. Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31]; an object then that does not include something virtually as to entity does not include it as to knowability. But the essence of an angel does not include virtually the divine essence under some distinct idea; therefore neither does the angel thus know the divine essence.