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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3.
Book Two. Distinctions 1 - 3
Third Distinction. First Part. On the Principle of Individuation
Question Seven. Whether it is Possible for Several Angels to Exist in the Same Species
I. To the Question

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

225. Those who answer to the preceding questions about individuation that the principle of individuation is quantity or matter [nn.71, 132, 148, 153-154] accordingly in consequence give a negative answer to this question [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], namely that there cannot be several angels in the same species, because the principles of such an individual difference for a species cannot be found in angels; and they have to say that this is impossible not only by an intrinsic impossibility [sc. on the part of the angel] but also by an extrinsic one [sc. on the part of divine power], because it is simply incompossible in such a way that an individual distinction cannot belong to angelic nature, because that which precisely can be the principle of such a distinction is repugnant to the nature - just as it would be incompossible for there to be several species under animal if the different actualities by which the species were distinguished were repugnant to animal.

226. However, the foundations for this opinion were rejected before in the preceding questions [nn.75-104, 136-141, 155-167, 200].

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

227. The simply opposite conclusion must therefore be held, namely that it simply is possible for several angels to exist in the same species.

The proof is as follows:

First, because every quiddity - as far as concerns it of itself - is communicable, even the divine quiddity; but no quiddity is communicable in numerical identity unless it is infinite; therefore any other quiddity is communicable, and this with numerical distinctness - and thus the intended conclusion. But that every quiddity is communicable is plain because this is not repugnant to it from perfection, since it belongs to the divine quiddity, nor from imperfection, since it belongs to things generable and corruptible; therefore etc.

228. Further, any quiddity of a creature can be understood, without contradiction, under the idea of a universal; but if it were of itself a ‘this’, it would be a contradiction to understand it under the idea of a universal (just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the idea of universality), because the idea of understanding the object is repugnant to the object understood, which means that the understanding is false; therefore etc.a

a.a [Interpolation] Or as follows: no created quiddity is of itself a ‘this’, but it can be conceived as a universal, because in its idea is not included singularity (and therefore God cannot be a universal, because he is of himself a this, not possessing the genus and difference that belong to created quiddity); therefore, since any quiddity has principles that are not of themselves ‘this’, it can be understood under the idea of a universal. But it is of the idea of a universal that it is multipliable into many, because a universal arises from the fact that it is understood according to an indifference to this thing and to that, as being sayable of many things according to the same idea; and there is a confirmation from the idea of species [sc. because a species is of itself sayable of many].

229. Further, if God can annihilate this angel in this species, then, after the angel has been annihilated, he can produce this species anew in some other individual, because being does not become, by the annihilation of this singular, repugnant to the species; for otherwise it would be only a fictitious being, like a chimaera. God can, then, produce the same species in some individual, otherwise he could not make the same order of universe as he made at the beginning; but not in this angel [sc. the one annihilated], according to those who hold this opinion, ‘because a man could not rise again the same in number unless the intellective soul remained the same in number’.

230. Further, intellective souls are distinguished by number in the same species, and yet they are pure forms, albeit perfective of matter; there is, then, on the part of forms, no impossibility in their being distinguished by number in the same species; for whatever would entail, by reason of form, this impossibility in angels would entail it also in souls.

231. But if you say that souls have an inclination to diverse bodies and thus they have an aptitude for perfecting matter, and so they are distinguished by diverse relations64 - on the contrary:

This inclination is not an absolute entity, because a thing cannot be inclined to itself; therefore it supposes some prior entity absolute and distinct, and so in that prior entity this soul is distinguished from that. Therefore souls are distinct without these sorts of relations (as without a formal reason for distinguishing).

232. There is confirmation, because this aptitude cannot be of the formal idea of the soul, for it is a relation; but a relation is not of the formal idea of anything absolute.

233. Again, it is because a soul is this soul that it therefore has this inclination and not conversely (because form is the end of matter and not conversely); therefore this inclination is not the idea of being this soul, but presupposes this idea.

234. This point [n.230] is also confirmed for some [e.g. Aquinas] who find it unacceptable that any species simply of intellectual nature should be damned in its totality; but, on the positing of this position [sc. that there is one angel per species], there would be many species of angels where none would be saved; therefore the position is not true.

235. And there is proof of the first proposition [n.234] from what Augustine says

Enchiridion ch.29 n.9: “It has pleased the universal Lord that, since not the whole multitude of angels, by deserting God, had perished, the part which had perished should remain in perpetual damnation, but that the part that had stood with God, while the other part was deserting him, should rejoice in their happiness most certainly known to be always going to be; however the rational nature that was in man, since it had all perished in sins and punishments, deserved to be in part repaired, whence it might be joined to the curtailed society of angels that the former ruin had diminished.” This totality and partialness in angels does not seem to be rational unless it be posited that no angelic species had totally perished as to all individuals, and so some from each species fell and some stood; therefore etc.

236. Further, if it be conceded that the quiddity of an angel is of itself communicable to many and so - as far as concerns it of itself - communicable to an infinite number (for there is no idea of impossibility on the part of a numerical multitude), then, if the fact the nature is produced in this individual means that the possibility of its being in more is taken away, the nature exists in this individual according to its whole communicability and so infinitely, because it is infinitely communicable according to its quiddity; therefore that single angel would be formally infinite. The consequent is unacceptable, therefore the antecedent is too.a

a.a [Interpolation] Or the argument goes as follows: if the quiddity of an angel is in itself multipliable into many, then it is multipliable also into infinites; therefore it cannot, by its being received in some one angel, be made incommunicable to another angel unless it is in the former in its whole commonness; now this whole commonness does not belong to the former unless it is in him infinitely, because it is in itself infinitely communicable. But this reasoning of others supposes that the quiddity of an angel is of itself multipliable and that the whole of its commonness is received in this angel; and then the reasoning would proceed, but others would have to deny the antecedent.

237. I say therefore that every nature which is not itself pure act can - according to the reality according to which it is nature - be potential to the reality by which it is this nature, and consequently can be a ‘this’; and just as it does not of itself include any quasi singular entity, so such entities in whatever number are not repugnant to it, and so it can be found in any number of them. But in the case of what is of itself a necessary being, there is a determination in nature to being ‘this’, because whatever can be in the nature is in it - so that the determination cannot be through something extrinsic to singularity if there is in the nature of itself a possibility for infinity; things are otherwise in the case of any possible nature, where there can be multiplication.