The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3. ::

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Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3.

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translator's preface

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book two. distinctions 1 - 3

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first distinction

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question one. whether primary causality with respect to all causables is of necessity in the three persons

I. opinion of henry of ghent

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II. scotus’ own solution

a. the first and perfect causality is necessarily in the three persons

b. on causality in regard to all causables as to their being in a certain respect

C. whether in an absolute person, if posited, there could be perfect causality with respect to all causables

III. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether god could create something

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I. to the question

a. about creation from nothing as ‘from’ denotes order of nature

b. about creation from nothing as ‘from’ denotes order of duration

II. to the principal arguments

III. to the other arguments

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question three. whether it is possible for god to produce something without a beginning other than himself

I. first opinion

II. second opinion

III. to the reasons for the first opinion when holding the second opinion

IV. to the reasons for the second opinion when holding the first opinion

IV. to the principal arguments of each part

question four. whether the creation of an angel is the same as the angel

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question five. whether the relation of the creature to god is the same as its foundation

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I. to the fifth question

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a. on the identity of relation in general to its foundation

1. the opinion of henry of ghent

3. scotus’ own conclusion

4. to the arguments for henry’s opinion

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b. on the identity with its foundation of the special relation of ‘creature to god’

1. first opinion

2. second opinion

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3. scotus’ own solution

a. the relation of creature to god is the same really as its foundation

b. the relation of creature to god is not the same formally as the foundation nor is it precisely the same

C. to the principal arguments

D. to the authority for the second opinion

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II. to the fourth question

b. to the principal arguments

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question six. whether angel and soul differ in species

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I. to the question

a. about the conclusion in itself

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b. on the first reason for this distinction

1. first opinion

2. second opinion

3. scotus’ own solution

II. to the principal arguments

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second distinction. first part. on the measure of the duration of the existence of angels

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question one. whether in the actual existence of an angel there is any succession formally

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I. first opinion as reported and held by bonaventure

a. arguments for the opinion

b. arguments against the opinion

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II. second opinion

a. thomas aquinas’ way of positing it

b. henry of ghent’s way of positing it

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III. in what ways the first opinion can be sustained

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a. the first way, which is according to the intention of bonaventure

1. as to the opinion itself

2. to the arguments brought against the first opinion

b. second way, which is tangential to the intention of bonaventure

IV. against the conclusion of the first opinion in itself

V. scotus’ own response to the question

VI. to the arguments for the first opinion

VII. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether in an angel actually existing there is need to posit something measuring its existence that is other than that very existence

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I. to the affirmative side of the question

a. the opinion of others

b. rejection of the opinion

C. instance against the rejection of the opinion

D. response to the instance

II. to the negative side of the question

III. to the principal arguments

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question three. whether there is one aeviternity for all aeviternals

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I. to the question

a. opinion of henry of ghent

b. rejection of the opinion

D. response to the instance

II. to the principal arguments

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question four. whether the operation of an angel is measured by aeviternity

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I. to the question

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a. the opinion of henry of ghent

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

b. scotus’ own solution

C. instances against scotus’ own solution

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D. response to the instances

1. to the first instance

2. to the second instance

II. to the principal arguments

III. to the authority of augustine adduced for the opinion of henry

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second distinction. second part. on the place of angels

question one. whether an angel is in place

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question two. whether an angel requires a determinate place

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I. to the first question

a. the opinion of others

b. against the conclusion of the opinion

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C. scotus’ own solution

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1. how body is in a place

a. on the first article

b. on the other articles

2. how an angel is in place

D. to the principal arguments

II. to the second question

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question three. whether an angel can be in two places at once

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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question four. whether two angels can be in the same place at once

II. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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question five. whether an angel can be moved from place to place by continuous motion

I. to the question

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II. to the principal arguments

a. to the first argument

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b. to the second argument

1. rejection of the first antecedent

2. rejection of the second antecedent

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3. to the proofs of the first antecedent

a. to the first proof

b. to the second proof

4. to the proofs of the second antecedent

C. to the third argument

D. to the fourth argument

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question six. whether an angel can move himself

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I. to the question

a. scotus’ own response

C. rejection of the instance

II. to the principal arguments

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question seven. whether an angel can move in an instant

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I. to the question

a. the opinions of thomas aquinas and henry of ghent

b. rejection of the opinions

C. scotus’ own response

II. to the principal arguments

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question eight. whether an angel could move from extreme to extreme without passing through the middle

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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third distinction. first part. on the principle of individuation

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question one. whether material substance is individual or singular of itself or from its nature

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal argument

III. to the confirmation of the opinion

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question two. whether material substance is of itself individual through some positive intrinsic thing

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of henry of ghent

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal argument

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question three. whether material substance is individual, or the reason for individuating another, through actual existence

I. the opinion of others

II. rejection of the opinion

III. to the argument for the opinion

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question four. whether material substance is individual or singular through quantity

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I. to the question

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a. the opinion of others

exposition of the opinion

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2. rejection of the opinion

a. the first way: from the identity of individuation or singularity

b. the second way: from the order of substance to accidents

c. the third way: from the idea of ordering within a category

e. against the reasons for the opinion

b. scotus’ own conclusion

II. to the arguments for the opinion of others

III. to the principal arguments

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question five. whether material substance is a this and individual through matter

I. the opinion of others

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question six. whether material substance is individual through some entity per se determining nature to singularity

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a. to the question

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1. the opinion of others

a. exposition of the opinion

b. rejection of the opinion

2. scotus’ own opinion

b. to the principal arguments

C. to the arguments for the opinion of others

II. scotus’ own solution to the fifth question

III. to the authorities from the philosopher for the opposite

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question seven. whether it is possible for several angels to exist in the same species

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

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third distinction. second part. on the knowledge of angels

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question one. whether an angle can know himself through his own essence

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own opinion

C. instances against scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether an angel has a distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence

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I. the response of others to the question

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

C. rejection of the opinions

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II. scotus’ own response to the question

a. on distinction of intellections

III. to the arguments for the first opinion

IV. to the argument for the second opinion

V. to the principal arguments

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question three. whether an angel is required to have distinct reasons for knowing created quiddities in order to know them distinctly

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I. the opinion of others

a. first opinion, which is that of henry of ghent

b. second opinion, which is that of thomas aquinas

C. rejection of both opinions in general

D. rejection of the first opinion in particular

II. scotus’ own opinion

III. to the principal arguments

IV. to the arguments for the first opinion

V. to the arguments for the second opinion

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Annotation Guide:

All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3. > book two. distinctions 1 - 3 > third distinction. first part. on the principle of individuation > question four. whether material substance is individual or singular through quantity > i. to the question > b. scotus’ own conclusion

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio. Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3.

Book Two. Distinctions 1 - 3

Third Distinction. First Part. On the Principle of Individuation

Question Four. Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular through Quantity

I. To the Question

B. Scotus’ own Conclusion

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B. Scotus’ own Conclusion

111. Therefore, I concede the conclusions of all these arguments [nn.76-110], namely that it is impossible for substance to be individual through any accident, that is, impossible for substance to be divided into subjective parts [sc. into individuals] through something accidental to it and thereby have being ‘non-this’ repugnant to it.

B. Scotus’ own Conclusion